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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Because CEOs can affect the behaviors and performance of firms (Finkelstein, Hambrick, 
& Cannella, 2009; Hambrick, 2007), a great deal of research in the field of management has 
documented the relationship between CEOs’ psychological status and organizational behavior (e.g., 
Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Ou, Waldman, & Peterson, 2014). 
However, knowledge accumulated in other fields of social science has, by no means, been fully 
utilized in understanding the influence of CEOs on firm behavior. For example, in economics and 
sociology, subjective factors such as individual expectations and values are regarded as important 
factors in explaining individual behaviors. To the extent that firms' strategic decision-making and 
performance can be predicted by the characteristics of their CEOs (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), 
subjective factors of the CEO may have significant effects on firm behavior. However, in 
traditional management literature, these factors are either measured by secondary data that can 
easily be observed or are totally omitted from the analysis. In this dissertation, we directly observed 
subjective CEO expectations or values that had not been observed in previous studies, by using 
approaches to explain individual behaviors that have been used in other fields of social science. 
Utilizing the data on these expectations or values, we attempted to understand more accurately, the 
factors that have been regarded as important in management literature and grasp the influence of 
the factors that have not been accounted for in previous studies.  
Till date, in other fields of social science, research has examined individual expectations 
and values as factors explaining their behavior. For example, in economics, since the 1990's, 
researchers have pointed out the importance of measuring the individual’s probabilistic 
expectations to explain their choice behavior (Manski, 2004). In particular, when individuals make 
decisions under uncertainty, it has been revealed that individuals’ expectations have high 
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explanatory power with regards to their choice behavior (Gan, Gong, Hurd, & McFadden, 2015; 
Hurd, Smith, & Zissimopoulos, 2004; Spaenjer & Spira, 2015). Moreover, when lifespan and 
health conditions matter to the individual’s decision, subjective expectations are regarded as 
having a particularly important influence on individuals’ decision (Dominitz & Manski, 1996; 
Giustinelli & Manski, 2018; Manski, 2004). In sociology, existing research shows that personal 
values, especially religious values, have a considerable influence on individual ethics-related 
behavior such as marriage, divorce, or crime (Bainbridge, 1989; Cochran & Akers, 1989; Evans, 
Cullen, Dunaway, & Burton, 1995; Heaton & Pratt, 1990; Lehrer & Chiswick, 1993). 
In this dissertation, we have three research questions. The first question is "Why and how 
do CEOs’ subjective career horizon affect long-term investment behavior?" CEOs’ career horizons 
can be referred to as their expectations of career security over career termination (i.e., retirement). 
Extant studies reveal that when a CEO's career horizon is short, he/she tends to avoid long-term 
investment that will benefit the firm, and to instead make short-term investments that will benefit 
him- or herself (Conyon & Florou, 2006; Matta & Beamish, 2008). These studies assume that all 
CEOs uniformly retire at a given age and measure the career horizon using the difference between 
the uniform retirement age and the CEO’s age. Therefore, these studies have a limitation, in that 
they do not deal with heterogeneity in career horizons amongst CEOs who are of the same age. 
Furthermore, measuring career horizons in this way causes a more serious challenge, in that it is 
impossible to distinguish between the effects of CEOs’ career horizon, and that of their age. Study 
1 resolves these issues by simultaneously introducing to the model, CEO subjective career horizon, 
and CEO age. 
The second research question is "Why and how do the expectations of managerial 
succession by family-owned firm CEOs influence their investment time horizons?" This research 
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question is of particular importance in the context of family businesses. In family business research, 
the transgenerational succession, especially within the family, is considered to be one of the most 
important issues (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). 
Accordingly, numerous publications on the family businesses concentrate on the characteristics of 
the successor, the succession process, and the influence of the successor's selection on the firm's 
strategic decision-making and performance (Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002). 
However, extant research has not sufficiently taken into consideration the possibility that the 
existence of a successor influences the decision-making of the incumbent CEO. Moreover, even 
when there is no agreed-upon successor, the CEO’s expectation that his/her successors will be 
found, may affect their firm behaviors. Taking this perspective, Study 2 investigates the ways in 
which CEOs’ expectations of managerial succession affect decision-making related to long-term 
investments, by directly measuring the subjective probability that a successor will be found.  
The third research question is "How does a CEO’s religiosity influence his/her firm’s 
environmental proactivity?" Although previous studies find antecedents of corporate 
environmental proactivity from diverse theoretical perspectives, their explanations are restricted 
mainly to firm or institutional characteristics. Little research sheds light on the micro-foundations 
of environmental proactivity (Aguinis & Glavas 2012). Study 3 regards CEOs’ religiosity as a 
possible factor in corporate environmental proactivity, given that individual religiosity evokes 
individual morality. Many previous studies that have dealt with the relationship between religion 
and individual behavior have used religious affiliation as an independent variable. However, there 
may be differences in religious views, even amongst members of the same religion. In the field of 
environmental economics, a recent study indicates that even after controlling for their religious 
affiliations, an individual’s religiosity affects his/her environmental behaviors (Owen & Videras, 
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2007). This study measures CEOs’ religiosity in the same way as Owen and Videras (2007), and 
thereby clarifies the influence of CEOs’ religiosity on environmental proactivity. 
In this dissertation, we analyze small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to answer 
these research questions. Because SMEs face a variety of restrictions such as inadequate resources, 
a limited ability to raise funds, and a shortage of human resources (Welsh & White, 1981), the 
CEO plays a significant role in strategic decision-making (Lubatkin et al., 2006). Therefore, SMEs 
provide a suitable context to examine the influence of CEOs’ subjective factors on firm behavior. 
Furthermore, by targeting SMEs, it is easier to obtain a response to questionnaires directly from 
CEOs. In the case of large companies, even when designating the CEO as a respondent, it is 
difficult to actually obtain a response from the CEO, him- or herself. Hence, with regards to this 
point, targeting SMEs is a clear advantage for this dissertation.  
Each study of this dissertation has theoretical and methodological contributions. Study 1 
addresses the methodological challenge by directly measuring the CEO’s subjective career horizon 
through a survey. Then, it is possible to distinguish the effects of the CEO's age, and that of his/her 
career horizon on long-term investments, suggesting that previous studies have underestimated the 
effects of the career horizon. Put differently, the impact of the opportunistic behavior of CEOs 
approaching retirement, on long-term investment behavior, may be even greater than what is 
indicated in existing studies. Regarding theoretical implications, Study 2 contributes to family firm 
succession literature. Although organizational researchers have indicated that the beliefs of top 
managers are predictors of corporate behavior, few studies have theoretically and empirically 
identified the beliefs that have an impact, and the ways in which they affect corporate behavior. To 
bridge this gap in the literature, Study 2 successfully applies the concept of socioemotional wealth 
to explain the ways in which a family firm’s CEO’s expectations of managerial succession 
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determine the choice of investment time horizons, by varying the periods over which firms 
evaluate investments. Study 3 is the first attempt to verify the relationship between CEOs’ personal 
perspective on religion, and the environmental behavior of the firm. In this regard, this study 
contributes significantly to the development of existing CSR research. Moreover, while CEOs’ 
personal perspective on religion may encourage environmentally conscious behavior, by 
demonstrating that this effect will vary depending on the degree of discretion of the CEO in 
decision-making, we provide a new theoretical perspective. 
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Chapter 2: Succession in Family Businesses: A Review of the Research 
Introduction 
A majority of businesses around the world are family-owned or controlled (Chang & Shim, 
2015; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Waldkirch, Nordqvist, & Melin, 2018). For 
example, according to the Japanese National Tax Agency’s “Outline of Results of Statistical 
Survey for FY2016”, 96.5% of firms in Japan are family-owned, and the smaller a firm’s capital, 
the more it tends to be family-owned. In particular, more than 90% of firms with less than 100 
million yen in capital are family-owned. The same trend is seen in Western countries as well (Amit, 
Krivoy, Mansbach-Kleinfeld, & Zalsman, 2014). Accordingly, research on family firms has 
expanded greatly over the past 30 years. For example, 868 articles on family firms were published 
over the 25-year period between 1971 and 1995 (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1996), but almost 
the same number, 734, were published in 47 journals over the 15-year period from 1996 to 2010 
(De Massis, Frattini, & Lichtenthaler, 2012). 
Studies on family firms have traditionally focused on the differences between the 
performance of family firms and that of non-family firms. In many of these studies, family firms 
were assumed to be homogeneous (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). However, more recent 
studies have focused on the factors that lead to differences among family firms, rather than the 
differences between the two types of firms. Although extant research indicates many factors 
causing heterogeneity among family firms, the issue of succession has attracted significant interest 
from family business researchers. 
Transgenerational value creation through succession within a founder family is a critical 
matter for family firms (Gersick, Gersick, Davis, Hampton, & Lansberg, 1997). Because of the 
limited number of candidates for succession within a family, familial relationships between the 
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incumbent CEO and potential successors, and the emotional factors involved, succession in family 
firms is more complex than CEO succession at non-family firms. This is why some have noted 
that succession and its impact have greater import for family firms (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & 
Steier, 2004). 
This study presents an overview of the research on succession issues in family firms, so 
as to shed light on the research trends in recent years. In the first step, we identified the 
international journals on management and economics. We chose 50 publications with the highest 
impact factor (IF), which is a metric that shows the frequency of citation and a journal’s degree of 
influence. In addition to these, we also included two other journals—Entrepreneurship Theory and 
Practice, and the Journal of Business Venturing—which were included in the Financial Times 50 
list but were not in the IF top 50. Next, from the Web of Science, we extracted articles with “family 
firm” in their title, abstract, or keywords, and from this group, we extracted those articles 
containing the word “succession”. Finally, we also added key articles that were included in the 
reference lists of recent review articles on succession in family firms (Daspit, Holt, Chrisman, & 
Long, 2016; Nelson & Constantinidis, 2017; Nordqvist, Wennberg, & Hellerstedt, 2013), which 
are not published in the above journals. 
Research questions in family business studies dealing with succession issues can be 
classified into three areas: the factors that affect successor selection, the condition of successful 
succession, and the impact of succession on subsequent firm performance. Below, we first review 
the definitions of family firm and the theoretical perspective in family business studies. Then, we 
review extant research on succession in family firms, in line with the three research questions 
stated above. 
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The Definition of Family Firm 
Family business scholars have been engaged in a definitional debate. The definition most 
commonly used in research is a combination of share ownership, and involvement by family 
members. In these studies, family firms are considered to be those in which family members own 
a majority stake, and control management (e.g., Graves & Thomas, 2006; Kontinen & Ojala, 2011). 
At the same time, some research focuses on the involvement of multiple generations of family 
(Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1997; Tan & Fock, 2001), while others focus on the perception of 
the CEO on whether a firm is a family firm (Davis & Harveston, 2000; Gallo & Garcia-Pont, 1996). 
The existence of many definitions of a family firm (Astrachan, Klein, & Smyrnios, 2002; Chua, 
Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Klein, Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005) makes it difficult to compare 
research findings. For example, Villalonga and Amit (2006) compare nine definitions of family 
firms and note that the relationship between family businesses and their performance varies 
depending on the definition. 
Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma (2005) propose two basic elements which comprise the 
definition of a family firm. The first, named “the components of involvement,” is based on the idea 
that family involvement is a sufficient condition to classify a firm as a family business. This 
involvement by family members is often measured by (1) the percentage of stock held by family 
members, (2) the number of family members involved in the management, and (3) the number of 
generations involved in management or ownership (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). 
Moreover, Klein, et al. (2005) present three objective measures of family involvement: (1) the 
percentage of stock held by family members, (2) the percentage of family members on the board 
of directors, and (3) the percentage of family members on the management team. 
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Table 1: F-PEC Scale (Klein et al. 2005) 
 
 
The second, named “essence”, is based on the idea that, while involvement by family 
members is necessary, this alone is not sufficient to classify a firm as a family firm, and whether a 
company can be regarded as a family firm depends on the desire of family members to maintain 
the firm as a distinct entity (Chrisman et al., 2005). Representative of this type of approach is the 
Family Influence on Power, Experience, and Culture (F-PEC) scale proposed by Astrachan et al. 
(2002). On this scale, whether a company is a family firm depends on the extent to which the 
family’s goals and values are consistent with those of the company, and the level of family 
members’ emotional commitment to the company (see Table 1). 
Power
Percentage of family share ownership
Percentage of family on the management team
Percentage of family on the Board
Experience
What generation owns the company?
What generation(s) manages(s) the company?
What generation is active on the governance board?
How many family members participate actively in the business?
How many family members do not participate actively in the business but are interested?
How many family members are not (yet) interested at all?
Culture
Family members agree with the family business goals, plans and policies.
Family members feel loyalty to the family business.
Your family and business share similar values
Family members support the family business in discussions with friends, employees, and other family.
Family members really care about the fate of the family business.
I understand and support my family’s decisions regarding the future of the family business.
Family members are proud to tell others that we are part of the family business.
Family members are willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to .764
help the family business be successful.
Your family has influence on your business.
Deciding to be involved with the family business has a positive influence on my life.
There is so much to be gained by participating with the family business on a long-term basis.
Your family members share similar values.
Note: Adopted from Klein et al. (2005). The cultural subscale uses a 5-point Likert format (5LF), anchored by 5 (strongly agree) and 1 (strongly disagree).
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Theoretical Perspectives in Research on Family Firms 
The theoretical models typically used in research on family firms include agency theory, 
resource-based theory, and institutional theory (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2003; Chrisman et al., 
2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2001; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Furthermore, in recent years, the 
concept of socioemotional wealth has been incorporated into these theories as a way of grasping 
the peculiarities of family firms. In this section, we first introduce the concept of socioemotional 
wealth, and then focus on the ways in which it is used in research on succession in conjunction 
with agency theory, resource-based theory, and institutional theory. 
Socioemotional wealth 
Early studies on family firms often used existing theories from other fields, but these 
theories did not necessarily provide a better understanding of the peculiarities of family firms. In 
recent years, a new theoretical framework, named “socioemotional wealth”, has been proposed by 
a research group led by L. Gómez-Mejía to explain the peculiarities of family firms. 
Socioemotional wealth refers to the non-financial aspects of a firm, that satisfy the family’s 
emotional needs (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007), and 
consist of several dimensions. For example, Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz, and Gómez-Mejía (2012), 
and Berrone, Cruz, and Gómez-Mejía (2012) specified that socioemotional wealth consists of five 
dimensions: (1) desire to maintain control and influence over the family firm; (2) a sense of dynasty, 
that implies a long-term orientation; (3) identification with the firm and a concern for its reputation; 
(4) emotional attachment to the firm; and (5) binding social ties. 
In the socioemotional wealth perspective, the peculiarities of family firms come from the 
fact that socioemotional wealth is an important reference point in decision-making. Because 
members of a family pursue their family’s non-economic goals as well as economic ones, they 
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sometimes make decisions that are not economically rational. For example, using the sample of 
olive farmers in southern Spain, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) conclude that when family firms are 
faced with the decision to join local cooperatives, they are less likely to join than non-family firms, 
even though joining cooperatives would stabilize operations and reduce business risk. They 
suggest that behind this decision, there is an intent to avoid loss of the family’s socioemotional 
wealth through the reduction of management autonomy. Similarly, Berrone et al. (2012) show that 
family-owned firms engage in pollution reduction to build family identity and reputation, 
regardless of the high costs of such actions. Using socioemotional wealth as a reference point for 
strategic decision-making does not necessarily mean that family businesses are not concerned 
about economic performance. Rather, a family’s desire to maintain control within family creates 
tradeoffs between behavior that protects socioemotional wealth at the expense of economic 
performance, and behavior that creates economic gains despite the loss of socioemotional wealth. 
While socioemotional wealth is an overarching framework, it indicates a new direction in 
research on family business and is steadily gaining acceptance as the dominant theoretical model 
in this field of research. In fact, during the ten years since the socioemotional model was first 
proposed, 421 papers published in international peer-reviewed journals have applied this 
framework (Jiang, Kellermanns, Munyon, & Morris, 2018). In addition, corporate reputations 
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), charitable donations (Dou, Zhang, & Su, 2014), patent citations 
(Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz, & Spiegel, 2013), and many other family firm behaviors are now being 
researched using the socioemotional wealth model. Moreover, in recent years, researchers have 
started to focus on boundary conditions and measuring method of socioemotional wealth (Pearson, 
Holt, & Carr, 2014). 
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Agency theory 
Studies on family firms, to date, have used agency theory, focusing on the structure of 
ownership and control of these firms (Chua, Chrisman, & Steier, 2003). However, some family 
firms may be characterized by intra-familial altruism and mutual trust (Chrisman et al., 2003). 
Therefore, some assumptions that underlie agency theory do not hold in the context of family firms. 
In fact, studies on the performance of family firms, which use agency theory, have produced 
conflicting results (Chrisman et al., 2003; Gómez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel, & Gutierrez, 2001; 
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). 
For example, studies that explain the superior performance of family firms using agency 
theory focus on the non-separation between ownership and control. This characteristic of family 
firms enables opportunistic investment based on the CEO’s judgment and intuition (Gedajlovic, 
Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012), and may promote long-term investment, which leads to 
a strategic advantage over other firms (Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003; Habbershon 
& Williams, 1999). Many empirical studies have actually confirmed that stock ownership by 
family members has a positive impact on performance (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
McConaughy, Matthews, & Fialko, 2001; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Schulze et al., 2001). 
However, the presence of family members in family firms may actually increase potential 
agency issues rather than reduce them. For example, although we can expect that family members 
would decide to maximize profit, the unique relationships among family members may create 
incentives for opportunistic behavior, such as free-riding and shirking of responsibility. For 
example, extant research indicates the possibility that family members would seek out additional 
compensation in non-monetary forms, such as special allowances, spinning of information, or 
bribe-taking (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling, & Dino, 2005). Minichilli, Corbetta, and MacMillan (2010) 
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found that the more the percentage of family members in top management teams, the more family 
firms were likely to have irregularities. In addition, agency problems can occur between family 
members and non-members. Information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between these two 
parties (Fama & Jensen, 1983) create tensions between family and business objectives (Bennedsen, 
Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007), and family members will turn their attention 
toward strengthening and protecting their own positions and looking for their family’s power 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). These types of agency problems have also been associated 
with lower performance by family firms (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). 
 Some studies have used another variation of agency theory, named behavioral agency 
model (BAM), which is synthesis of agency and prospect theory. Although traditional agency 
theory assumes a fixed risk preference for agents, Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía (1998) relax this 
assumption by incorporating prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) to explain dynamic 
decision-making in family firms. BAM incorporates the concept of loss aversion, in which self-
interested individuals prefer to minimize their current losses at the expense of maximizing future 
gains. Thus, agents can be loss averse, even if they take greater risks. 
Family business studies using BAM have shown that aversion to the loss of 
socioemotional wealth is a driving force in the strategic behavior of family firms (e.g., Berrone, 
Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Makri, 
& Kintana, 2010). From the standpoint of BAM, when family firms encounter tradeoffs between 
future economic gains and socioemotional wealth preservation, they will become loss averse with 
respect to their socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2010). Because of this, family firms 
will embrace high-risk decisions to preserve their socioemotional wealth, even when doing so 
could be detrimental to their long-term economic wealth. However, they will also avoid high-risk 
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decisions that will harm their socioemotional wealth, even if doing so would increase long-term 
economic wealth (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). For example, despite the long-term economic benefits 
of investment in R&D, studies have shown that family firms tend to invest less in R&D than non-
family firms for reasons of protecting their socioemotional wealth (e.g., Chen & Hsu, 2009; 
Czarnitzki & Kraft, 2009; Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010). 
While BAM provides a more accurate explanation for why family owners and 
managements make certain strategic decisions, it does not explain when or how decisions based 
on socioemotional wealth generate profits for family firms (Shukla, Carney, & Gedajlovic, 2014). 
As is the case with other theories derived from agency theory, BAM should be used in conjunction 
with other theories, such as institutional theory. 
Resource-based view 
Resource-based view is one the most dominant paradigms in strategic management, 
which states that firms can gain a sustained competitive advantage by accumulating resources that 
are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) (Barney, 1991). The resource-based 
view has been used to explain the superior performance of family firms (Chrisman et al., 2005). 
In addition, using this paradigm, many studies have discussed a broad range of topics, including 
entrepreneurship (Aldrich & Cliff, 2003; Alvarez & Barney, 2004), corporate governance (Carney, 
2005), internationalization (Graves & Thomas, 2008; Westhead, Cowling, & Howorth, 2001), and 
organizational culture (Zahra, Hayton, & Salvato, 2004). 
A fundamental question in studies on family firms that employ a resource-based view, is 
whether family involvement makes family firms different from non-family firms. That is to say, 
these studies make the assumption that family members themselves are seen as a resource that are 
VRIN, and the inherent nature of family involvement gives rise to unique resources that lead to 
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competitive advantage. 
Habbershon and Williams (1999), the seminal article on family firms from the resource-
based view of the firm, introduce the concept of “familiness.” This concept refers to the bundle of 
resources obtained as a result of family involvement, that are distinctive to a firm (Habbershon et 
al., 2003). They state that familiness influences capability, which, in turn, becomes a source of 
competitive advantage for family firms. However, familiness itself do not always generate profits. 
Families can benefit by accumulating and using these resources, but these resources can also pose 
problems. For example, family firms blessed with stable and frequent interaction among family 
members can easily develop mutual trust and a shared vision, but at the same time familiness can 
also take the form of nepotism or a lack of professionalism. Empirical studies that deal specifically 
with familiness are scarce, and it is unclear whether the findings of these studies would introduce 
a specific theory regarding family firms. Furthermore, there is still no consensus that this concept 
can explain the superiority of family firms (Rau, 2014). 
Succession in family firms can severely damage the resources built up over time to gain 
a competitive advantage. For example, in order to preserve the tangible and intangible wealth 
accumulated over many years, a family sometimes nurtures a potential successor within the family 
to offer a key management position to this heir, even when that person is not the best one for that 
role (Handler, 1994). However, this kind of nepotism can harm the family’s economic and 
socioemotional wealth. Nepotism that implies a lack of good talent, or self-protection by managers 
within a firm (Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, & Becerra, 2010; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2001), creates internal 
discord within the firm, and is detrimental to its performance. Moreover, nepotism is generally 
considered to be immoral, and if rumors of nepotistic practices spread, the family’s image is 
damaged, which can then damage the family’s socioemotional wealth. In addition, nepotism can 
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sometimes cause conflicts among siblings (Schulze et al., 2001), conflicts of interest within the 
family (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008), or even conflicts of interest between the family and outside 
stakeholders (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2014; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2012). These types of 
antagonistic relationships have a negative impact on a company’s image and reputation, and they 
can harm its socioemotional wealth. 
However, designating a successor within the family fulfills the desire for survival across 
generations, which is one dimension of socioemotional wealth (Morgan & Gomez-Mejia, 2014; 
Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). Nepotism therefore holds importance for 
family firm CEOs who place emphasis on their socioemotional wealth. Accordingly, from the 
standpoint of socioemotional wealth, nepotistic behavior is not irrational for family firm CEOs. 
Nepotism can be seen as a way to contribute to maintaining the family’s control and influence over 
the firm, and the family dynasty. 
Institutional theory 
Agency theory and resource-based theory have traditionally been the dominant paradigms 
employed in research on family firms. Studies using these theories have primarily focused on 
issues within family firms that can impact governance structures and performance and have not 
paid attention to external factors (Jaskiewicz, Heinrichs, Rau, & Reay, 2016). That is why recent 
studies of family firms have increasingly used institutional theory and analyzed the firm’s 
relationships with social institutions. For example, Melin and Nordqvist (2007) and Parada, 
Nordqvist, and Gimeno (2010) use institutional theory as a framework for explaining changes in 
governance structures within family firms. Similarly, Reay (2009) examines how institutional 
pressure affects the identities of family firms. While several studies have thus employed 
institutional theory in their analyses, it is still unclear whether family- and non-family firms differ 
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in their responses to institutional pressure, and if so, the reasons for which these differences exist 
(Berrone et al., 2014). 
In recent years, the concept of institutional logic has been used to characterize the diverse 
organizational fields in institutional theory, and to analyze the competition between the cognitive 
frameworks of the actors involved in those fields (Haveman & Rao, 1997; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, & 
Caronna, 2000; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). Institutional logic means the fundamental logic of the 
institutional order of modern society, such as capitalism, democracy, nation-states, and families. 
Institutional logic regulates proper behavior by providing a means to understand the norms, values, 
and goals that give meaning and legitimacy to individuals and organizations (Thornton, Ocasio, & 
Lounsbury, 2012). According to institutional theory, organizations are constantly exposed to 
multiple institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Competing forms of institutional logic 
provide organizations with choices on how to behave, and organizations will adhere to the logic 
of the institutions to whom they are closest (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Pache & 
Santos, 2010). However, recent studies have noted that organizations become worried, and do not 
know how to proceed when they are confronted with the conflicting logic of multiple institutions 
that they equally rely upon, and this hurts performance, legitimacy, and continuity (Raaijmakers, 
Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 2015; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Research on family firms that employs the concept of institutional logic has demonstrated 
that family logic and commercial logic coexist in decision-making in family firms (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011; Melin & Nordqvist, 2007). These types of logic 
are particularly meaningful when family firms make difficult decisions regarding succession. 
Although extant studies have asserted that family firms operate with two forms of logic- family 
logic and commercial logic (Chrisman & Patel, 2012), there is no consensus as to whether the two 
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are competing or complementary (Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999). 
While not using the term “institutional logic” directly, many studies on family firms 
suggest that the behavioral norms of families are in conflict with that of firms. For example, some 
studies have argued that an institutional overlap between a family and a business causes conflict 
between family and firm (Lansberg, 1983), leading to a decline in profitability. Other studies have 
similarly noted the possibility that attention to family logic may lead to a sacrifice of firm profits. 
These studies suggest the possibility that a firm’s strategic decision-making in favor family profit 
may impair the firm’s ability to achieve its financial goals. In line with these arguments, several 
studies have noted the tendency for family firms to fail or decline, unless the family’s goals, norms, 
and values are discarded (Martinez & Aldrich, 2014). 
 At the same time, the view that family logic and business logic are complementary also 
exists. Extant research explains this complementary relationship using the aforementioned concept 
of familiness. Familiness varies by firm, and has the potential to be a unique and useful resource. 
Familiness that aligns with family logic is useful for creating resources that are VRIN. For example, 
the goal of passing on a family firm to future generations may encourage the accumulation of 
resources that generate profit for a longer time period. Furthermore, family members’ ongoing 
commitment to the firm can create knowledge that is proprietary to the family and increase the 
value of social capital. This results in better usability of resources based on the family, and a 
synergistic relationship between family logic and commercial logic. 
Family business researchers that employ institutional theory have noted the importance 
of family- and business logic as factors that regulate family firm behavior (Leaptrott, 2005; Miller, 
Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2011). However, they have not paid much attention to other types of 
institutional logic. As stated in Besharov and Smith (2014), focusing on more than two types of 
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logic can vastly improve understanding of the behaviors that organizations engage in to gain 
legitimacy. For example, in addition to family and business logic, community logic is another type 
of institutional logic that can impact family firms. Reay, Jaskiewicz, and Hinings (2015) show that 
close relations with stakeholders in a local industrial community can result in profits for family 
firms. However, even though family business research on institutional theory recognizes the 
importance of focusing on community logic, few studies have systematically considered the impact 
of community, family, and business logic on family firms. Filling this gap requires clarification of 
how these various types of logic are interrelated, and how different types of family- and non-family 
firms behave in order to gain legitimacy and achieve sustainability. 
 
Succession in Family Firms  
One of the most important issues in the lifecycle of a family firm is whether the firm will 
be successfully passed on to the next generation. In family firms, the transfer of ownership and 
management from one generation to the next is a period of extreme instability, and many family 
firms face challenging issues as they attempt to survive into the next generation. 
The issue of succession has been an important topic in family business studies. Extant 
research on succession can be classified into three areas. The first is research on the factors 
determining the selection of successors. The second is research on the conditions of successful 
succession, focusing on relationships among family members, or the characteristics of the 
successor or incumbent CEO. The third is research on changes in the firm’s performance, 
attributable to succession. This section reviews the existing literature in these three areas. Table 2 
summarizes the empirical research that employs econometric models in these three areas. 
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Determinants of successor selection 
Much of the research on CEO succession has been in the field of finance. These studies 
have identified factors affecting the choice of successors, such as whether the successor should be 
chosen from within the firm or from outside (Cannella Jr & Lubatkin, 1993; Ferris, Jayaraman, & 
Lim, 2015; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Mobbs & Raheja, 2012). In addition to 
these options, family firms also have the option of choosing a successor from within the family 
(Lin & Hu, 2007; Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014). Deciding whether to choose a 
successor from within the family depends on the structure of the family, and the relationships 
within it. For example, using data on Italian firms, Calabrò, Minichilli, Amore, and Brogi (2018) 
argue that the family’s oldest son is usually appointed as the successor when the family wants to 
preserve socioemotional wealth. In addition, some studies state that the existence of a youthful 
successor within the family provides an incentive for the current CEO to ensure that the successor 
will be a family member (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). These studies note that although it is 
uncertain whether young potential successors in a family will actually take over the business, at 
least until these candidates become adults and can make their own decisions as to what path they 
will take, the incumbent CEO will expect these young heirs to be a successor. In analyzing the 
determinants of a CEO’s intentions that are critical to within-family succession, De Massis, Sieger, 
Chua, and Vismara (2016) state that the more children the CEO has, and the more family members 
that own shares, the more the current CEO will want a family member to be a successor. 
Family firms also have the option of hiring a CEO from outside the family. Hiring a CEO 
who is not a family member means that the family is relinquishing fundamental control; thus, 
choosing to make the change from a family CEO to a non-family CEO is a critical decision for a 
family firm (Chang & Shim, 2014; Miller et al., 2003). Several empirical studies have identified   
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Table 2: Overview of Empirical Studies on Succession in Family Firms 
 
(Table continues)  
Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Successor appointment
Bocatto, E.,
Gispert, C., &
Rialp, J.
2010 JSBM1994‐2005 Spain 29 Agency theory &
RBV
family succession Performance prior to
succession, outside
involvement, family
involvement, &
successor experience
Performance prior to succession does
not affect these nominations, while
directive experience does.
Calabrò, A.,
Minichilli, A.,
Amore, M. D.,
& Brogi, M.
2018 SMJ 2000-
2012
Italy 771
6,242
firm-year
observations
SEW SEW　endowment
& selecting a
second or
subsequent born
child
Selecting the first
born child as the next
family leader & post
succession
performance
Aspiration level
& generation
Appointing a family firstborn sibling is
more likely when there is a high degree
of SEW endowment and the family firm
has pre-succession performance below
aspiration levels.
Appointing a second- or subsequent-
born sibling has a positive and
significant effect on post-succession
firm profitability.
Damaraju, N.L.,
& Makhija, A.
K.
2018 SMJ 2001–
2009
India 7715 N/A CEO hiring &
ROA
CEO candidate
belonged to the same
caste/religion as the
firm owners
Caste/religion plays a crucial role
in CEO selection as a source of
information (positive discrimination)
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Dehlen, T;
Zellweger, T;
Kammerlander,
N; Halter, F
2014 JBV N/A DEU,
Swiss,
Austria(*)
613 Information
asymmetry theory
Choice of exit
route
Educational
achievement of
successor, work
experience prior to
the succession, &
screening efforts
made by the
incumbent
Firm age Several mechanisms that alleviate
information asymmetries – education
and work experience of the succession
candidate as signal of his or her
superior abilities as well as the
incumbents' screening efforts – affect
the probability of an external transfer of
ownership and management.
De Massis, A.,
Sieger, P.,
Chua, J. H., &
Vismara, S.
2016 FBR 2012 Italy 274 Theory of Planned
Behavior
Incumbent's
attitude toward
intra-family
succession
# of children, # of
family shareholders,
duration of family
ownership, &
perceived positive
firm performance
Family ownership and number of
generations involved in the business
have significant relationships with
incumbents’ attitude toward intra-family
succession.
Wiklund, J.,
Nordqvist, M.,
Hellerstedt, K.,
& Bird, M
2013 ETP 2004-2008 Sweden
(*)
3,829
12,125
firm‐year
observations
Embeddedness
perspective
Ownership transitionOwnership dispersion Ownership dispersion, number of
potential heirs, multigenerational
involvement, and whether the chief
executive officer is a family member
influence the choice of an internal or
external transition of ownership.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Succession process
Chrisman, J. J.,
Chua, J. H., &
Sharma, P.
1998 FBR N/A Canada 485 N/A Desirable attitudes
of successors
attributes
Business profiles
Personal profiles
The older the family business and
the longer the respondent’s tenure in
that business, the more important these
attributes became. Birth order and
gender were rated the least important,
despite the attention the literature has
given to those attributes.
Eddleston, KA;
Kellermanns,
FW; Floyd,
SW;
Crittenden, VL;
Crittenden, WF
2013 ETP N/A USA(*) 107 N/A Family firm
growth
Succession planning
& strategic planning
Family firm
generation
The degree to which strategic planning
and succession planning are associated
with family firm growth depends on the
generation managing the firm.
Strategic planning is negatively
associated with their level of growth.
Filser, M; De
Massis, A;
Gast, J; Kraus,
S; Niemand, T
2018 JPIM 2013
2015
Finland(*) 116 SEW Innovativeness Five major
dimensions of SEW
Family functionality is positively linked
to SEW, whereas divergences emerge on
the effect of different SEW dimensions
on innovativeness.
Marshall, J. P.,
Sorenson, R.,
Brigham, K.,
Wieling, E.,
Reifman, A., &
Wampler, R. S.
2006 JBV 1997-2000 USA 205 Leadership theory Leadership style,
conflict
management style
The importance of
succession planning
& formal succession
planning
Older owner age was positively
associated with formal succession
plans.
Autocratic and relational leadership are
positively related to the importance of
succession planning.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Sharma, P.,
Chrisman, J. J.,
& Chua, J. H.
2003 JBV N/A Canada 76 Stakeholder theory Satisfaction with
the succession
process
Succession timing,
propensity of the
incumbent to step
aside, willingness of
the successor to take
over, agreement to
maintain family
involvement,  extent
of succession
planning
Satisfaction with the succession process
in family firms is enhanced by the
incumbent’s propensity to step aside,
the successor’s willingness to take over,
agreement among family members to
maintain family involvement in the
business, acceptance of individual roles,
and succession planning.
Venter, E.,
Boshoff, C., &
Maas, G
2005 FBR N/A South
Africa(*)
332 N/A The perceived
success of the
succession process
Willingness to take
over the business,
Family harmony,
Preparation level of
successor, &
Relationship between
owner and successor
The successor-related factors that
influence satisfaction with the process
are, on the one hand, the willingness of
the successor to take over and the
relationship between the owner-manager
and successor, on the other hand.
The continued profitability of the
business is influenced by the
willingness of the successor to take over
the business, the preparation level of the
successor, and the relationship between
the successor and owner-manager.
The relationship between the owner-
manager and successor is in turn
influenced by the extent to which
interpersonal relationships in the family
can be described as harmonious. Based
on these findings recommendations for
successful succession are offered.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Post succession performance
Amore, M. D.,
Minichilli, A.,
& Corbetta, G.
2011 JCF 2003-2007 Italy 4,251 N/A Debt/Capital &
Short-term
debt/Capital
Managerial
succession
Substantial heterogeneity in the
impact of professional successions on
debt financing: the increase in debt is
particularly pronounced for young
firms, firms with a high level of
investment, and firms in which the
controlling family maintains a dominant
representation on the board of directors.
Anderson, R.
C., Mansi, S.
A., & Reeb, D.
M.
2003 JFE 1993-1998 USA  252
1,052
firm-year
observations
Agency theory Corporate yield
spread
Succession (CEO
descendent), Family
management (CEO-
family), & Family
ownership
Founding family ownership is common
in large, publicly traded firms and is
related, both statistically and
economically, to a lower cost of debt
financing
Founding family firms have incentive
structures that result in fewer agency
conflicts between equity and debt
claimants.
Anderson, R. C.
& Reeb, D. M.
2003 JLE 1993-1999 USA 319 firms
2,108
firm-year
observations
Agency theory Excess value,
economic value
added
Succession
(Descendent-CEO),
Family management
(Founder CEO), &
Family ownership
(family ownership
ratio)
Family firms actually experience less
diversification than, and use similar
levels of debt as, nonfamily firms.
Direct measures of equity risk are not
related to founding-family ownership.
Minority shareholders in large U.S.
firms benefit from the presence of
founding families.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Barontini, R.,
& Caprio, L.
2006 EFM 1999-2001 West
Europe
675 N/A Tobin's q & ROA Succession
(next generation
CEO or non-
executive)
Family management
(Family CEO)
Family control
(dummy for family
firm)
Valuation  and  operating performance
are significantly higher in founder-
controlled corporations and
incorporations  controlled  by
descendants  who  sit  on  the  board  as
non-executive directors.
When  a  descendant  takes  the
position  of  CEO,  family-controlled
companies  are  not  statistically
distinguishable  from  non-family  firms
in  terms of valuation and performance.
Bennedsen, M.,
Nielsen, K. M.,
Perez-Gonzalez,
F., &
Wolfenzon, D.
2007 QJE 1994-2002 Denmark 4,692
successions
N/A ROA Succession & family
management (Family
CEO)
Family successions have a large
negative causal impact on firm
performance.
Family-CEO underperformance is
particularly large in fast-growing
industries, industries with highly skilled
labor force, and relatively large firms.
Professional, nonfamily CEOs provide
extremely valuable services to the
organizations they head.
Calabro, A.,
Minichilli, A.,
Amore, M. D.,
& Brogi, M.
2018 SMJ 2000-
2012
Italy 771
6,242
firm-year
observations
SEW SEW　endowment
& selecting a
second or
subsequent born
child
Selecting the first
born child as the next
family leader & post
succession
performance
Aspiration level
& generation
Appointing a family firstborn sibling is
more likely when there is a high degree
of SEW endowment and the family firm
has pre-succession performance below
aspiration levels.
Appointing a second- or subsequent-
born sibling has a positive and
significant effect on post-succession
firm profitability.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Chang, S. J., &
Shim, J.
2015 SMJ 1949-
2004
Japan 1,152 SEW CEO succession &
Performance
CEO succession Performance improvement is more
pronounced when (1) families maintain
high ownership control but leave no
family legacy behind, (2) when the
transition moves from non-founder
family managers to professionals, and
(3) when professional managers
graduated from elite universities.
Chung, C. N.,
& Luo, X. R.
2013 SMJ 1996 -
2005
Taiwan 573 Social
embeddedness &
institutional
theory
ROA CEO change &
successor origin
Family
ownership,
business group
membership, &
high tech
industries
Outsiders  are associated with higher
post-succession profitability than inside
and family successors.
Outsider premium is reduced in firms
embedded in family and business group
relationships.
Gomez-Mejia,
L. R., Nunez-
Nickel, M., &
Gutierrez, I.
2001 AMJ 1966-
1993
Spain(*) 216 Agency theory CEO tenure &
editor tenure
Performance &
business risk
Family tie Firm performance and business risk are
much stronger predictors of chief
executive tenure when a firm's owners
and its executive have family ties and
that the organizational consequences of
CEO dismissal are more favorable when
the replaced CEO is a member of the
family owning the firm.
Executives operating under weakly
relational (less ambiguous) contracts are
held more accountable for firm
performance and business risk
outcomes, even under nonfamily
contracting.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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Author(s) YearJournal
Time
period
Country
sample
# of sample Theoretical lens Dep. Variable Ind.Variable Moderator Main findings
Minichilli, A.,
Nordqvist, M.,
Corbetta, G., &
Amore, M. D.
2014 JoMS 1998–
2007
Italy 1,610
 firm-year
observations
SEW &
Agency Theory
ROA Succession
mechanism (relay
succession,
horse race
succession), Outside
non-family CEO, &
CEO succession
event
Family
involvement on
the board of the
firm
Implementing one of these succession
mechanisms reduces the negative impact
that typically characterizes CEO
transitions in family firms.
Family presence on the board offsets
the benefits of having selected these
balancing succession mechanisms, in
either placing too much emphasis on
SEW, or creating negative dynamics
that make the chosen succession
mechanisms less effective.
Molly, V.,
Laveren, E., &
Jorissen, A.
2012 ETP 2006 USA(*) 425 Trade‐off theory,
Agency theory, &
Pecking order
theory
Capital structure
& growth behavior
Next-generation companies grow slower
because they have the tendency to
forego part of their growth rather than
risk the loss of family control due to the
increased use of debt.
Pérez-González,
F.
2006 AER 1994 USA 335 N/A ROA and Tobin's q Succession (Next generation CEO) Firms where incoming CEOs are related
to the departing CEO, to a founder, or
to a large shareholder by either blood or
marriage underperform in terms of
operating profitability and market-to-
book ratios, relative to firms promoting
unrelated CEOs.
Lower performance is prominent in
firms that appoint family CEOs who did
not attend “selective” undergraduate
institutions.
Note: The journal abbreviation list is as follows: SMJ(Strategic Management Journal), ETP (Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice), AMJ (Academy of Management Journal), JoMS
(Journal of Management Studies), JSBM (Journal of Small Business Management), JBV (Journal of Business Venturing), JFE (Journal of Financial Economics), JLE(Journal of Law &
Economics), EFM (European Financial Management), QJE (Quarterly Journal of Economics), AER (American Economic Review), JAR (Journal of Accounting Research), JEEA (Journal
of the European Economic Association). (*) means that a data sample consists of SMEs.
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factors that influence such a change. For example, Bocatto, Gispert, and Rialp (2010) analyze the 
relationship between choosing whether to select a successor from inside or outside the family, and 
company performance prior to succession. The study shows that when pre-succession performance 
is high, the successor is usually chosen from within the family, but when pre-succession 
performance is poor, there is a tendency to choose a successor from outside the family. In addition, 
Damaraju and Makhija (2018), who analyze the similarities between incumbent CEOs and their 
designated successors at 7,715 Indian companies, found that there were more religious similarities 
between the incumbent CEO and the successor at family firms that hire the next CEO from the 
outside, than at those who hire the successor from within the family. 
Although much extant research on choosing successors for family firms have not made 
an issue of ownership transfer, family firms also have the option of selling the business or 
relinquishing ownership. Selling ownership of a family firm to an external party can sometimes be 
a good way to protect the family’s economic assets or socioemotional wealth (Sharma & Manikutty, 
2005). Wiklund, Nordqvist, Hellerstedt, and Bird (2013) analyze decision-making regarding the 
ownership transfer from the standpoint of family structure and involvement. According to this 
study, it is easier for a family to transfer ownership within the family when the incumbent CEO is 
a family member, when the family has a large number of successor candidates under the age of 17, 
and when stock ownership is more concentrated. 
Factors affecting the success or failure of succession 
Choosing a successor does not necessarily mean that the succession will succeed. 
Succession is a process that involves the incumbent CEO, non-candidate family members, 
financial institutions, and other stakeholders. Extant studies have showed factors that impede the 
succession process. Issues in the succession process at family firms result from several sources. 
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The first is the personal characteristics of the incumbent CEO and the successors. The incumbent 
CEOs will be concerned about losing their social status and power when a succession takes place 
(Lansberg, 1988; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). Therefore, for succession to be effective, it is 
necessary for the incumbent CEO to have the intention of passing the torch, and to be able to 
transfer power at the appropriate time (Dyer, 1988; Handler, 1994; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). 
Successors can also cause problems during this process. For succession to take place 
within the family, the successor must have the desire and the ability to take over the business 
(Sharma, 2004; Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo, & Chua, 2001; Venter, Boshoff, & Maas, 2005). In an 
analysis of data from 485 family firms in Canada, Chrisman, Chua, and Sharma (1998) indicate 
that sincerity and proactive involvement are the ideal characteristics for successors. For example, 
in comparing methods for grooming successors in family- and non-family firms, Fiegener, Brown, 
Prince, and File (1994) assert that family firms tend to use methods that favor more personal, 
relationship-centered approaches, while non-family firms prefer formalized, task-oriented 
development approaches. In addition, Lansberg (1988) states that the key to an effective succession 
is to understand the difference between giving advice and preparing for successions, so that one 
can offer the best advice and preparations in a timely manner. 
The relationship between the incumbent CEO and the successor is another factor 
influencing succession (Chrisman et al., 1998; Lansberg, 1999). For example, when there is 
conflict between the two, it is more likely that the successor will end his/her involvement with the 
business, or that the incumbent CEO will block the successor’s appointment, which heightens the 
risk that the succession process will fail. Both, the relationship between the incumbent CEO and 
the successor, and harmony within the family, play important roles in successfully handing over a 
business. In particular, when conflict occurs between siblings who are potential successors, the 
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risk that the succession process will end in failure increases (Calabrò et al., 2018). 
 A succession plan helps an incumbent family CEO, the successor, and all stakeholders 
play their proper roles in the succession process. Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997) state 
that a succession plan has three main objectives: (1) the effective and fair allocation of wealth from 
the current to the next generation; (2) the transfer of management authority in a way that secures 
effective leadership; and (3) the promotion and maintenance of family harmony. A succession plan 
that aims to achieve all three of these objectives promotes collaboration among the incumbent 
CEO, the successor, and other stakeholders, thus enabling a smooth and efficient succession 
(Morris, Williams, Allen, & Avila, 1997; Sharma et al., 2001). 
Extant research shows that the sudden retirement of a CEO without a succession plan in 
place leads to confusion over who is in charge, and conflict among successor candidates (Lansberg, 
1988). Yet, even though the importance of having a succession plan is acknowledged, family firms 
do not necessarily make any plans for succession (Sharma et al., 1996; Sharma, 2000). With this 
challenge in mind, Lansberg (1988) points out that most stakeholders in family firms may have 
negative feelings toward succession. For example, the incumbent CEO may feel mental resistance 
toward a succession that means the loss of one’s authority. Furthermore, other family members 
may fear that a succession plan will erode harmony within the family, and the company’s identity, 
and thus avoid creating such a plan. Employees and executives who have worked alongside the 
incumbent CEO for a long time may show resistance to losing their personal relationship with the 
incumbent CEO by shifting over to the successor (Sharma et al., 1996). 
Several studies have examined the factors that impact the effectiveness of a succession 
plan and whether a succession plan is in place. Sharma, Chrisman, and Chua (2003), for example, 
show that satisfaction with a succession process depends on the existence of a succession plan. In 
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addition, using data obtained from a survey of family business owners, Marshall, Sorenson, 
Brigham, Wieling, Reifman, and Wampler (2006) show that the older the CEO, the more likely 
they are to create a succession plan. However, although the importance of creating a succession 
plan has been noted in case studies and several empirical studies, few studies have actually 
examined the correlation between the succession plan and whether the succession succeeds or fails. 
Post-succession performance 
In the management field, many negative views have been expressed regarding the impact 
of CEO succession on business performance (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Karaevli, 2007; 
Kesner & Sebora, 1994). According to these studies, a CEO succession is a destructive event that 
harms organizational morale and productivity, because it destabilizes the organization and causes 
tension in stakeholder relationships (Cao et al., 2006). In addition, a CEO’s retirement creates 
discomfort within an organization and among its stakeholders and is considered to have a negative 
impact on subsequent firm performance (Miller, Steier, & Breton-Miller, 2003; Schulze et al., 
2001; Shen & Cannella Jr, 2002), because it leaves an organizational void that generates 
uncertainty regarding the future (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Sharma et al., 2003). 
However, in the context of a family firm, there are clear differences in post-succession 
performance depending on whether the new CEO is a family member or a professional hired from 
outside. For example, using data on publicly traded companies in Taiwan, Chung and Luo (2013) 
show that post-succession performance is better when the successor is hired from outside, than 
when the successor is hired from within the firm. In addition, Chang and Shim (2015) show, based 
on longitudinal data on Japanese family firms, that performance improves when, after the second 
generation, succession shifts to an outside professional manager,. Moreover, according to 
Wennberg, Wiklund, Hellerstedt, and Nordqvist (2011), firms that transferred authority to an 
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external party showed more improvement in their performance, than did firms that transferred 
authority to another family member. Bennedsen et al. (2007), who focuses on succession within 
families, holds that succession within a family and post-succession performance are negatively 
correlated, and that this correlation is more pronounced in rapidly growing industries and large 
corporations. Amore, Minichilli, and Corbetta (2011), in an analysis of Italian family firms, 
examine the impact of CEO succession on corporate financial policies. This study shows that 
appointing an external professional who is not a family member facilitates the procurement of debt 
financing. In addition, Pérez-González (2006) holds that when a relationship through blood or 
marriage exists between the next CEO and the incumbent CEO, the founder, or the major 
shareholder, the firm’s profitability, and ratio of market value to book value is lower than when no 
such relationship exists. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
While succession has become a popular topic in studies on family firms (Chrisman et al., 
2005; Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012), some have pointed out that succession lacks much of 
a presence in recent research on family firms (Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson, & Brigham, 2012). This 
may be attributable to an analytical issue. Although many empirical studies on the impact of 
succession on performance have been conducted in such fields as finance, in the case of the other 
two research questions, most studies have only gone as far as to show anecdotal evidence. 
Selection of successors and the success or failure of succession are linked to many factors that are 
difficult to measure, such as familial ties, and the emotional factors that go along with them. Of 
course, many more case studies will be needed to develop theories to explain the unique qualities 
of family firms, and to bring research in this field to maturity. At the same time, it will also be 
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necessary to use data to validate the hypotheses that these case studies generate. 
As summarized in this paper, existing studies on the issue of succession have primarily 
focused on the factors that impact selection of a successor, the factors that affect the success or 
failure of succession, and post-succession performance. However, these studies have not 
sufficiently clarified the impact of succession on the strategic decision-making of the incumbent 
CEO. As extant studies have also pointed out, the current CEO must make plans for a smooth 
succession to the next generation, and coordinate with stakeholders. At the same time, they must 
make strategic decisions. Strike, Berrone, Sapp, and Congiu (2015) is one of the few studies that 
deals with the relationship between the issue of succession and the strategic decision-making of 
the incumbent CEO. Using panel data, they find that CEOs having a shorter career horizon, which 
refers to time left until retirement (Antia, Pantzalis, & Park, 2010), are less inclined to make 
international acquisitions in cases of succession within a family than in cases of succession at non-
family firms. These findings suggest the possibility that incumbent CEOs make strategic decisions 
taking into account how these decisions would affect the next generation. 
The impact of succession issues on the strategic decision-making of the incumbent CEO 
is especially great in SMEs, as it is much harder to find successors for these firms than for large 
firms. In large firms, regardless of whether they are family-owned or not, there is a high likelihood 
that a successor will be present, and it is perhaps easier to ensure perpetuity. However, that a 
succession will succeed is not a given in SMEs. In these firms, the incumbent CEO probably makes 
strategic business decisions while having no certainty that the firm will survive and continue into 
the next generation. Given these points, answering the question of how the uncertainty of 
succession affects the strategic decision-making of CEOs at family firms, which comprise of the 
bulk of SMEs, and whether the effect will vary depending on the successor’s attributes, will 
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contribute to the development of research on succession at family firms. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 - The CEO’s Subjective Career Horizon and Environmental Investments 
Introduction 
In recent years, amongst those attributes of CEOs that affect the long-term investment 
behavior of the company, CEOs’ career horizon has attracted special attention. The relationship 
between CEOs’ career horizon and long-term investment behavior is referred to as the “career 
horizon problem”. As a CEO’s retirement approaches, he/she tends to choose short-term 
investments that will benefit him- or herself, avoiding long-term investments that would benefit 
his/her business. In fact, in empirical analysis, a positive relationship has been consistently 
observed between CEOs’ career horizon, and long-term investment. For example, in Butler and 
Newman (1989) and Dechow and Sloan (1991), it is revealed that the shorter a CEO’s career 
horizon, the less likely he/ she is to make long-term investments such as R&D and advertising. 
Focusing on corporate behavior, Matta and Beamish (2008) and Levesque and Minniti (2006) 
reveal that as a CEO's career horizon becomes shorter, corporate actions accompanied by risks 
such as international acquisitions and entrepreneurial behavior decreases. 
However, in interpreting the estimation results of these studies, we must pay attention to 
the fact that existing studies use easily observable variables such as CEO age as a proxy variable 
for CEO career horizon. For example, Barker and Mueller (2002) and Cho and Kim (2017) 
measure career horizon by CEO age and examine the relationship between CEO career horizon 
and innovation activities. Moreover, some researchers use the difference between uniform 
retirement age and actual CEO age as a proxy variable for career horizon and examine its effect 
on long-term investment behavior (Heyden Reima, & Van Doorn, 2017; Krause, Withers, & 
Semadeni, 2017; Matta & Beamish, 2008). The prevalence of such operationalization of career 
horizons is due primarily to the fact that most existing research focuses on large-scale, publicly 
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listed firms. Generally, in the case of large-scale firms, CEO terms and retirement age are 
predetermined. As a result, in many existing studies, analysis of the effects of career horizon has 
been carried out based on the assumption that CEOs can make predictions regarding their 
remaining careers based on their current age (Yim, 2013).  
When targeting larger firms, it thus makes a certain amount of sense to use the CEO’s age 
as a proxy variable for career horizon. However, there are still analytical problems arising from 
such operationalization. We can consider that CEOs’ age captures several CEO characteristics, 
which are difficult to observe, other than career horizon. Existing literature in the field of 
management regards CEOs’ age itself as an important variable affecting their strategic decision-
making. For example, Child (1974) suggests that, as they grow older, CEOs begin to experience a 
decline in the abilities needed to implement organizational changes and tend to choose lower-
growth strategies compared to younger CEOs. Based on this suggestion, by using the CEO’s actual 
age as a proxy variable for career horizon, we confront the challenge of being unable to interpret 
whether the estimate results imply the effects caused by changes in various hard-to-observe factors 
based on CEOs’ age, or that of changes in the CEOs’ career horizon. Even when assuming a certain 
retirement age, the same challenge arises. There is perfect correlation between CEO age and a 
variable where the actual age is subtracted from the retirement age. Therefore, even in this case, 
only the constant term changes, and the estimated coefficient of a focal variable does not differ 
from a model where actual age is used as a proxy for CEO career horizon. Such problems that 
result from using the CEO age-related variable as a proxy to career horizon have not been pointed 
out sufficiently in the past. 
In the present study, after resolving this analytical problem in career horizon research, we 
clarify the influence of CEOs’ subjective career horizon on environmental investment, which is a 
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long-term investment behavior. More specifically, we firstly measure the subjective career horizon 
of the CEO directly through survey investigations. We estimate the model including both 
subjective career horizon and CEO age, identifying the effects by CEO age, and that by career 
horizon. Based on a framework for myopic loss aversion, a CEO with a short career horizon will 
assess the risks of environmental investment on firm performance over a short period of time and 
will evaluate these risks more frequently. Therefore, even if they are the same age, it is expected 
that the CEO with the shorter subjective career horizon will more often avoid the risks associated 
with environmental investments. Using survey data on 1,147 manufacturing SMEs located in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area, we found strong evidence that CEOs’ subjective career horizons are 
associated with their firm’s environmental investment. 
This study makes several contributions to existing research. First, through a survey 
investigation, we clarify how CEOs actually think about their careers. Many of the existing studies 
on career horizons make an implicit assumption that CEOs have the same career horizon, by their 
age. This study contributes to existing research by pointing out that this assumption does not hold. 
Put differently, there is heterogeneity of career horizon among the same age group. Moreover, by 
using the CEO’s subjective career horizon, measured through the survey on SMEs, together with 
the actual CEO age in the estimation model, we extracted the true effects of career horizon from 
the effects of various factors that CEO age captures. As a result, we have made a significant 
contribution to research on career horizons, in that we are able to discuss the influence of CEO 
career horizons more accurately. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
The CEO is the most influential decision-maker in the company. It is for this reason that 
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so much research has been carried out on the relationship between the various CEO characteristics 
and long-term investment, which is a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007; Gerstner, Konig, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987; Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). In particular, the career horizon problem is a topic that has drawn 
increasing interest in recent years. Existing studies dealing with this problem have consistently 
confirmed a positive relationship between a CEO’s career horizon and long-term investment. In 
recent years, Lundstrum (2002), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), and Demers and Wang (2010) 
have also confirmed a positive relationship between career horizon and R&D investments, 
suggesting that as retirement approaches and the career horizon becomes shorter, CEOs gradually 
begin to make more short-term investments. Moreover, Oh, Chang and Cheng (2016) reveal that 
the tendency for CEOs to undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities is lessened by 
a shorter career horizon. In this way, the career horizon problem has been considered a challenge, 
due to the opportunistic behavior of CEOs facing retirement. 
Underlying reasons for these opportunistic actions based on career horizons is the fact 
that management incentives change throughout a CEO’s career stage. Evaluation of CEO ability 
depends greatly on the success or failure of the CEO’s strategic decision-making (Matta & 
Beamish, 2008). As a result, it has been pointed out that whether to carry out long-term investments 
such as environmental investments and R&D, which are risky and uncertainty, depends largely on 
the career stage of the CEO (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). Specifically, early in their careers, CEOs 
still have time to recover from failure; thus, there is an incentive to make high-risk choices such 
as long-term investments, so as to gain positive feedback from the external labor market. On the 
other hand, for a CEO in the latter part of their career, long-term investment may weigh on short-
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term corporate performance, and thus negatively impact the CEO’s evaluations. For that reason, 
in order to preserve his/ her record of success, CEOs avoid strategies that are highly uncertain and 
serve to undercut their own profits, instead choosing strategies that enhance their short-term 
compensation and reputation (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). The stage of a CEO’s career that 
greatly influences such decision-making as long-term investments may depend on their age. As a 
result, existing research assumes that the change in incentives throughout a CEO’s career can be 
seen by their age. 
However, CEO age not only represents changes in management incentives, but also in the 
CEO’s experience, knowledge and attitudes (Hermann & Datta, 2006). For example, younger 
CEOs may lack knowledge related to management, but this increases with experience (Buchholtz, 
Ribbens, & Houle, 2003; Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 2006). Moreover, by accumulating 
management experience, the CEO develops a detailed understanding of the market and customers 
and develops an understanding of changes in the business environment (Von den Driesh et al 2015). 
Accordingly, as the CEO grows older, changes in managerial ability and knowledge occur, which 
can affect long-term investment decision-making. Furthermore, as the CEO grows older, his/ her 
attitudes may also change. For example, middle-aged CEOs tend to be more conservative 
(Buchholtz et al., 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Henderson et al., 2006; Herrmann & Datta, 
2006). Moreover, because older CEOs are especially prone to preferring to maintain the status quo, 
they are less interested in, and committed to, innovative ideas (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). As a 
result, they prefer low-risk behavior that will bring financial security, avoiding long-term 
investment. Thus, extant research in the field of management has regarded CEO age as a variable 
that represents changes in his/her knowledge, experience, abilities, and attitude. 
Based on these points, we can infer that, in the extant studies, the influence of CEOs’ 
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career horizons on the long-term investment behavior would include both, the effects of changes 
in incentives throughout the career stage, and that of changes in experience, knowledge, and 
attitudes as the CEO ages. Yim (2013) has made similar remarks in this regard, indicating that, 
given the high correlation between CEOs’ career horizon and their age, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the two effects caused by a change in age. However, there is little research that 
systematically identifies the effects of career horizon and the effects of age itself. 
One way to identify the effects of career horizon and that of CEO age is to simultaneously 
introduce both, the career horizon subjectively perceived by the CEO, and their actual age, to the 
model. The influence of subjective evaluation on individual choice behavior has received much 
scholarly attention, mainly in the field of economics. For example, many economic studies have 
noted that the subjective evaluation of life expectancy influences individual investment behavior 
such as savings, consumption, and portfolio selection, based on the myopic loss aversion theory. 
For example, Spaenjer and Spira (2015) reveal that the share of risky investments in an individual’s 
portfolio tends to increase as the self-reported expectation of remaining lifespan grows longer. 
Moreover, Gan, Gong, Hurd, and McFadden (2015) show that the higher the subjective risk of 
death based on personal health information, that is, the shorter one’s subjective life expectancy, 
the more the individual will tend to choose current consumption over savings. It has also been 
shown that this subjective evaluation has a higher prediction accuracy than estimates based on the 
standard life expectancy tables offered by life insurance companies. 
From the perspective of myopic loss aversion, when a CEO evaluates his or her career 
horizon based on personal information such as physical strength and ability, the subjective career 
horizon of the CEO can influence long-term investment behavior by changing the evaluation 
period for the impact of long-term investment, and the frequency of such evaluations. Given the 
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characteristics of environmental investments, that usually take a long time to turn a profit 
(Mahapatra, 1984), a CEO with a subjectively short career horizon will shorten the period for 
evaluating the impact of environmental investment on corporate performance and will evaluate 
these effects more frequently. Accordingly, it is anticipated that such CEOs will avoid the risks 
involved with making environmental investments. 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEOs’ subjective career horizon 
and CEOs’ investment behavior related to the environment. 
 
Research Method 
Data collection and sample 
To test the hypothesis, we used data obtained from a questionnaire survey conducted in 
2016. The companies surveyed were 15,111 SMEs located in Tokyo metropolitan area, with either 
300 or fewer employees, or capital of 300 million yen or less. The names and the site location were 
specified using Tokyo Shoko Research data. The survey form was designed so that it could be 
administered in both paper and online formats. A reminder letter was sent two weeks after the 
distribution of the questionnaire, and a response was requested within one month. 
In our questionnaire, we requested CEOs to respond by themselves, because our focus is 
on how CEOs evaluate their career horizons based on their own physical strengths and 
psychological status. Therefore, responses from individuals other than CEOs were excluded from 
the sample in order to avoid biased estimation. As our target firms were SMEs, almost all responses 
were from CEOs themselves. Responses were obtained from 1,499 CEOs (9.9%). After excluding 
incomplete responses, the sample size finally used for analysis is 1,147. 
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Variables 
Environmental investments: In the questionnaire, we asked whether respondents have 
implemented six environmental investments (investments in emission reductions at new business 
sites, development of new low-emission products, design of environmental products, introduction 
of clean technology/manufacturing methods/processes, fuel conversion, investment in/cooperation 
with reforestation efforts). We created dummy variables that take the value of one if firms make 
each environmental investment, zero otherwise, and then used these as explanatory variables. 
About 25% of firms were engaged in some form of environmental investment. “Introduction of 
clean technology/manufacturing methods/processes” is the most frequent investment, with 27.9% 
of firms making this investment (see Table 3).  
The CEO’s subjective career horizon: In order to better understand the effects of a CEO’s 
career horizon, we used the answer to the question “up to what age will you be able to carry out 
your CEO duties satisfactorily?” Then, we make the variable that represents the difference between 
the answer and the actual CEO age at the time of the survey, using it as a variable indicating the 
CEO’s subjective career horizon. This variable differs from one that represents the difference 
between the actual CEO age and assumed retirement age, which has been used in empirical 
research on career horizons. For example, by using this variable, we could understand at what age 
the CEO believes that he/ she will no longer be able to fulfill his/ her managerial duties. In fact, 
about 5% of CEOs had a negative value for subjective career horizons, which consists of CEOs 
with an average age of 73.3 years. Within this group, the CEO with the largest negative subjective 
career horizon reported that he/she has already been working for more than 32 years; this CEO is 
80 years old. The longest career horizon is 50 years; this CEO is 35 years old. In the present study, 
in order to capture such negative values, we controlled this variable without taking logarithms. 
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Subjective career horizon demonstrated a strong negative correlation with the CEO age (γ=-0.78), 
suggesting that the older the CEO, the shorter the subjective career horizon tends to be. In this 
study, we also estimated a model with CEO age as a proxy variable for career horizon, in a similar 
manner to the previous studies.  
Instrumental variable: A CEO’s subjective career horizon may actually be an endogenous 
variable due to omitted variables. Unobservable factors such as opportunism and optimism affect 
a CEO's subjective career horizon, as well as environmental investment decisions. For example, 
an optimistic CEO may perceive a longer career horizon, and not be aggressive to environmental 
investments. If this is the case, the coefficient of the subjective career horizon would be 
underestimated. To avoid the potential omitted variable bias, we used the instrumental variables 
method. As an instrumental variable, we used a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
CEO’s father had already died, and zero otherwise. Our identification assumption is that this 
instrumental variable is unrelated to factors that affect environmental investment behaviors, once 
we control the CEO’s subjective career horizon and other variables. 
Control variables: Based on the responses to the questionnaire and the data of Tokyo 
Shoko Research, we created a series of control variables that can affect long-term investment 
behavior related to the environment. These variables consisted of both the CEO’s and his/her 
firm’s demographic backgrounds. Ownership structure plays an important role in determining 
corporate philosophy and governance structure. This is particularly true for SMEs, where stock is 
often owned by the CEO’s family members. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the influence 
exercised by the CEO’s family. For this purpose, we used the percentage of shares owned by the 
CEO’s family. In addition, we also controlled for the firm’s age, that could influence 
environmental investment behavior. Because older firms may be able to accumulate resources, 
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knowledge, and ability to handle uncertainty (Levitt and March 1988), it is possible that these 
firms are more likely to invest in environmental practices. In order to control these influences, this 
study control for a natural logarithm of firms’ age. Similarly, the firm’s size can also affect 
environmental investment behavior. The firm’s size is thus controlled for using a natural logarithm 
of the number of employees. We also considered differences between generations. For example, 
management style varies greatly between the founder, first generation and second generation (Dyer, 
1988; Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). Accordingly, we expect that such differences among generations 
will also affect environmental investments. In order to control for the influence of generations, we 
use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the current CEO is also the founder, and zero 
otherwise. Extant research has pointed out that the capital structure would affect long-term 
investments (Choi, Kumar, & Zambuto, 2016). In order to better understand the influence of capital 
structure, we used a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has a debt, and zero 
otherwise. The variables that control for the attributes of CEOs are the number of years of 
employment (natural logarithm), education level (dummy variables indicating whether the CEO 
has a bachelor's degree), and gender (dummy variable). Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for 
variables used in the analysis, and the correlation between these variables. 
 
Estimation models 
This research aims to examine the influence of CEOs’ subjective career horizon on firms’ 
environmental investment behavior, and to distinguish the effects of career horizon and CEO age 
on this behavior. To this end, we estimate a model that includes CEO age as a proxy variable for 
career horizon, as well as another model that simultaneously includes both, the subjective career 
horizon and CEO age. Furthermore, we control for the endogeneity of the subjective probability  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Investment in emission reductions at
new facilities (d)
0.24 0.43 0 1
2 Development of new, low-emission 0.25 0.43 0 1 .78
3 Design of environmental products (d) 0.24 0.43 0 1 .75 .81
4 Introduction of clean technology /
manufacturing methods / processes (d)
0.28 0.45 0 1 .70 .72 .72
5 Fuel conversion (d) 0.25 0.43 0 1 .78 .73 .69 .68
6 Investment in/cooperation with
reforestation efforts (d)
0.23 0.42 0 1 .84 .75 .71 .66 .76
Instrument Variable
7 CEO's father's death (d) 0.23 0.42 0 1 -.16 -.15 -.16 -.16 -.15 -.18
8 Subjective career horizon 9.96 8.65 -32 50 .20 .17 .18 .18 .16 .20 -.39
9 Age 60.38 11.36 29 92 -.21 -.16 -.18 -.19 -.18 -.23 .43 -.78
10 Tenure 16.93 13.56 1 58 -.15 -.13 -.13 -.12 -.14 -.17 .29 -.49 .67
11 Education (d) 0.68 0.47 0 1 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 .01 .04 .04 -.05 -.10
12 Gender (d) 0.95 0.22 0 1 .01 .02 -.01 .02 .01 .00 -.04 .05 -.02 .10 .14
13 Founder (d) 0.29 0.45 0 1 -.02 -.02 .00 -.05 -.02 -.03 .07 -.19 .28 .37 -.19 -.01
Firm Attributes
14 Sales (log) 12.16 1.46 4.61 17.44 .08 .07 .05 .09 .06 .09 -.06 .05 -.10 -.13 .13 .07 -.24
15 Debt (d) 0.85 0.36 0 1 .02 .01 .01 .04 .01 .00 .05 -.04 .05 .06 -.04 .03 .01 .14
16 Age 48.66 26.26 1 199 -.02 -.03 -.07 .00 .00 -.04 .01 .01 .03 .06 .15 .04 -.57 .21 .04
17 Family ownership ratio 0.74 0.34 0 1 -.01 -.01 .00 .03 .00 -.02 .03 .10 -.05 .19 -.08 -.06 .12 -.28 .04 .02
Note: (d) means a dummy variable. N=1,147.
CEO attributes
Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Independent Variables
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of succession by applying the method proposed by Terza, Basu, and Rathouz (2008). We first 
regressed the endogenous variables with covariates and the instrumental variable, then calculated 
the residuals from the reduced form equation, and added them to the second-stage structural form 
equation as explanatory variables. This technique, named “two stage residual inclusion approach 
(2SRI)”, ensures consistency, and is able to test for endogeneity. Since the dependent variable is a 
binomial variable, the structural form equations are estimated using a probit model. 
 
Results 
To test for endogeneity in the CEOs’ subjective career horizon, we first needed to check 
the relevance of the instrument in the reduced form equation. The instrument had a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the subjective career horizon (β = -1.06, robust std. err. = 
0.37). Therefore, this variable satisfies at least one of the conditions of a valid instrumental variable. 
The instrumental variable’s F-statistic is found to be 30.70. An often-used rule of thumb proposed 
by Staiger and Stock (1997) is that an F-statistic of less than 10 indicates weak instruments in the 
context of the two-stage least squares estimator; this suggests that our estimation is unlikely to 
suffer from the weak instrument problem. 
In all models assuming that the CEOs’ subjective career horizon is an endogenous variable, 
the coefficients of residuals calculated from the first stage equation were significant, at least at 5%. 
This means that the null hypothesis that the CEOs’ subjective career horizon is an exogenous 
variable is rejected. Table 4 shows the marginal effect calculated based on the estimated results of 
this model. 
First of all, in the odd-numbered model including actual CEO age as a proxy variable for 
career horizon, the coefficient of CEO age is negative and statistically significant for all 
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environmental investments. The marginal effect calculated based on the estimation result is the 
largest at -0.0076, indicating a 0.76% reduction in the probability of investing in emission 
reductions at a new business site. It is worth noting that even when we utilized a variable that 
represents the difference between the assumed retirement age (70 years old) and actual CEO age, 
the estimation results do not change qualitatively. We obtain similar results, even when we assume 
the retirement age is 75 and 80 years old. These results are consistent with previous studies dealing 
with the career horizon problem.  
In the even-numbered model, we include both, CEO age and their subjective career 
horizon simultaneously. The coefficient of the subjective career horizon is positive and statistically 
significant at least at 5%, regardless of the type of environmental investment. This result shows 
that the subjective career horizon may have a positive influence on environmental investment 
behavior, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The marginal effect calculated based on the 
estimate results is the largest at 0.07, suggesting that with the subjective career horizon shortened 
by one year, the probability of introducing clean technologies and manufacturing 
methods/processes decreased by 7%. In each model that controlled for subjective career horizon, 
except for model (2), the coefficients of CEO age are positive and statistically significant, while 
that in the odd-number model show the opposite signs. These results imply that CEO age has a 
positive impact on environmental investment, after eliminating the influence of career horizon. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we examined the relationship between environmental investments, which 
are long-term investments, and the subjective career horizon, using data from 1,147 SMEs in the 
Tokyo metropolitan area. Our results indicates that the shorter the subjective career horizon, the 
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Table 4: Estimated Marginal Effects 
    
Subjective career horizon 0.05 ** 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.07 ** 0.06 ** 0.06 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age -0.01 *** 0.02 -0.00 *** 0.03 * -0.01 *** 0.03 * -0.01 *** 0.04 * -0.01 *** 0.03 * -0.01 *** 0.03 *
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
-0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 -0.07
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
-0.01 -0.08 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
0.02 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 ** 0.02 * 0.03 *** 0.03 ** 0.02 * 0.03 ** 0.02 *** 0.03 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02 0 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
-0.02 -0.06 * -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.05 ** 0.00 ** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 **
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 -0.07
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Residual -0.05 ** -0.02 ** -0.06 ** -0.07 ** -0.06 ** -0.06 **
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age (log)
Family ownership ratio
Note: Standard errors in parentheses for odd-numbered column, while we show the bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for the endogeneity models (even-numbered column). (d) means a
         dummy variable. (          ) indicates that actual coefficient is 1/100. *: p<0.10、 **p<0.05  ***p<0.01. N=1,147.
Debt (d)
(10) (11) (12)
CEO attributes
Tenure (         )
Education (d)
Gender (d)
Founder (d)
Firm attributes
Sales  (log)
Investment in/
cooperation with
reforestation efforts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fuel conversion
Investment in
emission reductions
at new facilities
Development of new,
low-emission products
Design of
environmental products
Introduction of
clean tech. / mfg.
methods / processes
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less likely they make long-term investments, suggesting the validity of using CEO age as a proxy 
variable for career horizon. However, there is a difference in the size of the marginal effect of the 
career horizon between the model using age as a proxy variable, and that using subjective career 
horizon. As an example of this, let us look at a model that estimates the effects on emission 
reductions at new business sites [columns (1) and (2) of Table 4]. When CEO age is used as a 
proxy variable for career horizon, if the CEO was a year older (i.e., his/her career horizon is 
shortened by one year), the probability of investing in emission reductions at a new business site 
decreased by 0.76%. On the other hand, in the model including both the CEO’s subjective career 
horizon and the CEO age, if the CEO’s subjective career horizon were shortened by one year, the 
probability of investing in emission reductions at a new business facility decreased by 5.12%. This 
suggests that extant studies that have used age as a proxy variable for CEO career horizon may 
have underestimated the effect of career horizon. In other words, the impact of the opportunistic 
behavior of CEOs approaching retirement on long-term investment behavior may be even greater 
than what is indicated in previous studies.  
This study is not without its limitations. There are several limitations with regard to data 
collection. First of all, we carried out our analysis using cross-sectional data. While we use the 
instrumental variables method to deal with the endogeneity problem caused due to missing 
variables, we do not take account of the problem of reverse causality. In order to directly measure 
CEO career horizon, this research focused on analyzing SMEs. In SMEs, unlike large firms, 
retirement age is rarely specified, and the timing of the CEOs’ retirement is largely up to personal 
discretion. As a result, there is the possibility that some mechanisms between the subjective career 
horizon and environmental investments do not remain valid for publicly listed firms. A future 
research opportunity is whether the influence of such subjective career horizons can be confirmed 
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even in large firms where retirement age is often predetermined, and CEOs are more likely to 
engage in opportunistic behavior. Moreover, because extant research on career horizons has used 
R&D-related variables as an indicator for long-term investment behavior, it will be necessary to 
verify whether the same relationships hold in the R&D context.  
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Chapter 4: Study 2 - Family CEOs’ Expectations of Managerial Succession and Investment 
Time Horizons 
Introduction 
A firm’s investments are sometimes long-term and may not completed during the tenure 
of its current CEO. Succession of CEOs is inevitable for all firms and is crucial for the continuity 
and completion of long-term investments that take the form of internationalization, research and 
development (R&D), and introduction of new products (Covin & Miller, 2014; Gómez-Mejia, 
Makri, & Kintana, 2010; Laverty, 1996; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-
Miller, 2005). In family firms, defined as firms “in which multiple members of the same family 
are involved as major owners or managers, either contemporaneously or over time,” (Miller, 
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2007: 836) certainty about CEO succession would be more salient in 
deciding long-term investments. This is because the prospect of long-term investments being 
neglected owing to failure to find successors could ruin a family’s socioemotional wealth, that is, 
the “non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity, the 
ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty.” (Gómez-Mejia et 
al., 2007: 106) Family owners and managers use socioemotional wealth as their primary frame of 
reference when making managerial decisions; thus, they tend to choose options that increase 
socioemotional wealth (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 
2011). 
Although managerial succession inevitably occurs in any firm and directly affects the 
firm’s performance and continuity (Minichilli, Nordqvist, Corbetta, & Amore, 2014; Strike, 
Berrone, Sapp, & Congiu, 2015), previous studies have largely overlooked the uncertainty about 
a successor as an antecedent of the variance among the periods over which family firms evaluate 
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their investments. Not all family firm CEOs have successors and those that think their successors 
are unlikely to be found would be concerned about the marshaling of their long-term investments. 
As the value of a manager’s socioemotional wealth conceptually arises from his/her subjective 
assessment of financial and non-financial return on investment, his/her perceived uncertainty about 
the return on investment would change his/her investment horizons. In fact, the empirical results 
regarding family firms managers’ tendency to make long-term investments are mixed. Some 
studies have found that family firms tend to prefer making long-term investments (e.g., Gómez-
Mejia et al., 2007; Kellermans, Eddeleston, Barnett & Pearson, 2008; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 
2005; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010), whereas others do not find such a tendency (e.g., 
Chen & Hsu, 2009; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Duran, Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger, 
2016). These inconclusive findings suggest that family firms’ CEOs are not necessarily 
homogeneous in their investment time horizons and there would be potential determinants of such 
behavioral heterogeneity among them (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; Duran et al., 2016). 
Therefore, the research question of this study is: why and how do the expectations of managerial 
succession by family firm CEOs, or a belief in someone succeeding them in the future, influence 
their investment time horizons? 
We tackle this research question by using the socioemotional perspective to go beyond 
the myopic loss aversion framework. Myopic loss aversion is the combination of the sensitivity to 
loss and frequent evaluation of investment outcomes (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995; Thaler et al., 1997). 
The infrequent assessment of their investments by family managers, based on their firm’s possible 
continuity, lengthens the period of evaluation, leading to their preference for risky investments 
that generate returns in the long run (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Family firm CEOs invest for both 
themselves and subsequent generations so that they can hand over the family businesses in as good 
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a condition as is possible, thereby preserving the family’s socioemotional wealth (Le Breton-Miller 
& Miller, 2006). However, when the CEO of a family firm does not have any potential successors 
in mind, he/she might perceive that his/her long-term investments are unlikely to pay back fully. 
Thus, the uncertainty prompts to monitor and evaluate investments more frequently during his/her 
tenure. As a result, the family firm CEO will become more myopically loss averse and is likely to 
avoid long-term investments, as these would eventually reduce the socioemotional wealth owing 
to the greater likelihood of financial losses. 
Further, the status of successors, that is whether or not they are the family firm CEO’s 
children or her, affects the relationship between his/her expectations of managerial succession and 
the firm’s investment time horizons. Long-term investments are inherently risky, owing to 
unanticipated changes, and require considerable managerial skills for success. Compared to short-
term investments, long-term investments are more likely to cause losses and even bankruptcy. The 
loss of socioemotional wealth from such negative investment outcomes varies, depending on the 
status of the successors. The failure in nurturing long-term investments by children successors 
cause greater losses to their family’s socioemotional wealth than those by others (hereafter, non-
children). This is because such failures ruin their careers and may lead to the loss of private 
property, thereby jeopardizing the prosperity of their offspring. Accordingly, when a family firm 
CEO expects that his/her children are more likely to succeed him/her than non-children, the firm 
is less likely to engage in long-term investments to avoid the likelihood of substantial losses in 
socioemotional wealth. 
Using survey data on 410 small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms owned and 
managed by families in the metropolitan area of Tokyo, we find strong evidence that a family firm 
CEO’s expectations that his or her successors will be found significantly increase the likelihood 
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that he/she makes long-term investments, such as internationalization activities, R&D, and new 
product introduction. Further, we find that a family firm is more likely to engage in long-term 
investments when its CEO expects a non-family member to be his/her successor. 
The findings of this study make three significant contributions to the theory and empirics 
on family firms. First, we explain how family firm CEOs’ expectations of managerial succession 
affect family firms’ varied investment time horizons, thus expanding the socioemotional wealth 
perspective. Second, we clarify the impact of successors being related to a family firm CEO on 
his/her investment time horizon, indicating that expected losses in socioemotional wealth from 
long-term investments vary depending on the status of successors. Finally, we apply a new method 
for measuring subjective probabilities, recently developed in economics (Giustinelli & Manski, 
2016; Manski, 2004; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2013), to CEOs’ expectations of managerial 
succession, thereby broadening the methodological repertoire of management studies. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Family firm CEO’s expectations of managerial succession and investment time horizons 
Family firms are characterized by family ownership, management, or both (Arregle, 
Duran, Hitt, & von Essen, 2017). Family firms are known to engage in a variety of specific 
behaviors, as family managers and owners have a stock of affect-related values pertaining to family 
control and influence, family members’ identification with the firm, binding social ties, emotional 
attachment, and the renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession, (Berrone et 
al., 2012; Chua et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007). In particular, family firms are likely to 
undertake long-term investments (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006) because they tend to favor 
socioemotional goals, such as firm continuity and transgenerational control, which require a long-
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term perspective (Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007; Laufs & Schwens, 2014; Fernandez & Nieto, 2006; 
Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss, 2010). 
However, not all family firms prefer long-term investments. For example, although Miller 
& Le Breton-Miller (2005) argue that the managers of family firms are likely to invest more in 
R&D over the long run, Chen & Hsu (2009) find a negative relationship between family ownership 
and R&D investment, suggesting that the former may restrain investment in risky long-term R&D 
activities. Similarly, Anderson, Duru, & Reeb (2012) find that family firms, unlike non-family 
firms, prefer investing in physical assets rather than riskier R&D projects. Further, Gómez-Mejia 
et al. (2010) find that, family firms are less likely to internationalize than non-family firms. In 
addition, Souder, Zaheer, Sapienza, & Ranucci (2016) empirically demonstrate that family firms 
are less likely to adopt new technologies. According to a meta-analysis by Duran et al. (2016), 
non-family firms, the R&D input of family firms is smaller than that of non-family firms and varies 
according family management and ownership. These results suggest that the presence of unknown 
antecedents can explain the heterogeneity in the investment time horizons of family firms. 
One possible antecedent is derived from a family firm’s managerial succession. 
Managerial succession inevitably occurs in all firms; sometimes, it entails changes in knowledge, 
expertise, and cognitive ability within top management teams, and brings about flux in executive 
decision-making routines (Berns & Klarner 2017; Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Kesner & Sebora, 
1994; Summers, Humphrey, & Ferris, 2012; Weng & Lin, 2014). The process of managerial 
succession is more salient for family firms than non-family ones, because the former may face 
uncertainty of transgenerational control and continuity, potentially decreasing their socioemotional 
wealth (e.g., Chang & Shim, 2015; Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; Hillier & McColgan, 2009; 
Minichilli et al., 2014; Nordqvist, Wennberg, Bau, & Hellerstedt, 2013). The family members of 
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family firms are concerned about the needs of their future generations (Ward, 2016). Indeed, 
family members accumulate wealth not only for themselves, but also to ensure the financial health 
of successive generations (Chen, Hsu, & Chang, 2014; Calabrò, Minichilli, Amore, & Brogi, 
forthcoming). Succession planning in family firms represents a clear expression of future 
orientation (Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 2003), because its aim is to transfer the control of the 
business to the next generation of family members. Similarly, Strike, Berrone, Sapp, and Congiu 
(2015) find that a CEO nearing retirement is concerned about transgenerational control and legacy 
for future generations in making long-term investments. Because the primary motivation behind a 
family firm CEOs’ long-term investments is the preservation of socioemotional wealth (Berrone 
et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), he or she evaluates the likelihood of returns from these 
long-term investments. A family firm CEO’s expectations of managerial succession provide a 
bright long-term outlook for his/her firm because expectations act as a cognitive structure 
organizing related attributes and their relationships (Fiske, 2004). Thus, the investment decisions 
of a family firm depend on the current CEO’s perception about the certainty of being succeeded. 
Nonetheless, few studies have either theoretically or empirically examined how a family firm 
CEO’s expectation of managerial succession influences the investment time horizon of his/her 
family firm. 
The myopic loss aversion framework explains the relationship between a family firm 
CEO’s expectation of managerial succession and long-term investment. According to this 
framework, individuals are assumed to be loss averse and their problem framing is affected by the 
period over which an investment is evaluated (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995). The less frequent 
evaluation of an investment leads to the aggregation of its outcomes for a longer period of time, 
resulting in preferences for riskier options (Loewenstein & Thaler, 1989; Thaler et al., 1997). By 
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adopting this framework, Chrisman & Patel (2012) argue that owing to the transgenerational 
control of family firms, they tend to evaluate the socioemotional wealth generated by their 
investments over longer time horizons. 
A family firm CEO’s expectations that his/her successors will be found would prolong 
his/her firm’s investment time horizon. Long-term investments, by definition, need a certain period 
to yield returns. From the myopic loss aversion framework, the investment time horizons are 
affected by the frequency with which the investments are evaluated (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). 
When a firm evaluates its investments less frequently, it accepts greater risks in decision making. 
Based on this idea, when a family firm CEO expects to be succeeded by a certain individual, the 
evaluation periods of the firm’s investments could extend because managerial succession ensures 
firm continuity, and accordingly, the CEO may not face end-game scenarios in investments (Patel 
& Fiet, 2011). In contrast, if there are no potential successors in mind, a family firm CEO would 
hesitate to make long-term investments because he/she would feel uncertain about getting a return 
during his/her tenure. Such uncertainty makes the family firm CEO reconsider more frequently 
his/her investments during his/her tenure, a relatively short period of time, and become more 
myopically risk averse in decision making. This leads to the avoidance of long-term investments, 
which are inherently risky. 
Indeed, previous studies have found that a family firm CEO’s expectations of managerial 
succession are a potential driver of long-term investment. For example, Claver, Rienda, & Quer 
(2009) empirically demonstrate that the number of generations that have run a family firm—a 
higher value indicates that its managerial succession is highly predictable—has a positive impact 
on high-level resource commitments for internationalization. Similarly, Fernandez & Nieto (2005) 
show that the involvement of a family firm’s second and subsequent generations in its running 
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promotes internationalization. These results indicate that a family firm tends to engage in long-
term investments when it has high expectations of managerial succession through the involvement 
of subsequent generations in management. 
The concept of a CEO’s expectations of managerial succession is theoretically and 
empirically different from CEO career horizons; the latter reflect a CEO’s expected tenure until 
his/her retirement. Near-retirement CEOs may behave opportunistically to maximize their own 
benefits, thereby avoiding long-term projects with uncertain short-term outcomes. Based on this 
argument, Strike et al. (2015) empirically demonstrated that longer career horizons of a CEO 
(obtained by subtracting his or her age from 70) increased the likelihood of an international 
acquisition— a type of long-term investment —by a firm. Career horizons and expectations of 
managerial succession may have a similar mechanism in terms of explaining long-term investment. 
Nonetheless, the concepts shed light on different aspects of CEOs’ concerns. A CEO’s career 
horizon pertains to concerns about ongoing managerial issues until his/her retirement, whereas a 
CEO’s expectations of managerial succession relates to his/her concerns regarding how effectively 
ongoing and future managerial issues will be processed after his/her retirement. This becomes 
clear if you imagine a hypothetical situation in which two CEOs of the same age are nearing 
retirement but only one of them is certain about his/her successor. The career horizons viewpoint 
indicates that the two CEOs would have a weaker tendency for long-term investment; however, 
the managerial succession expectations viewpoint suggests they would have completely opposing 
tendencies. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood that a family firm engages in long-term investment is 
positively associated with its CEO’s expectation that successors will be found. 
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Family firm CEO’s expectations of managerial succession by children and non-children 
Even when a family firm CEO is confident that his/her successors will be found, the firm’s 
investment time horizon might still depend on the family status of these potential successors, who 
could be either children successors—having strong blood relations with the family firm CEO—or 
non-children successors, such as sons/daughters-in-law, cousins, distant relatives, or those from 
outside the family. The success of children in their careers may lead to the prosperity of their 
offspring, which is a source of socioemotional wealth. Because family firm CEOs have an 
incentive to preserve their socioemotional wealth when making investment decisions, it is 
predicted that they consider the family status of successors when deciding on investments. 
 Threats to the socioemotional wealth of family firm CEOs trigger a “loss mode” (Berrone 
et al., 2012), leading them to choose strategic options based primarily on potential losses in 
socioemotional wealth. As such, CEOs tend to be loss averse and inclined to avoid risky decisions 
that may cause huge losses in socioemotional wealth. Accordingly, a family firm CEO’s 
investment choices depend on an evaluation of their impact on socioemotional wealth. 
When a family firm CEO expects his/her children to succeed him/her in the family firm, 
he/she is less likely to engage in long-term investments because of non-negligible potential losses 
in socioemotional wealth from such investments. When children successors fail to manage the 
long-term investments and their firm goes bankrupt, their family’s socioemotional wealth could 
disappear for three reasons. First, through firm bankruptcy, children successors would waste their 
managerial skills and ruin their careers as managers, most of which are typically firm-specific and 
sunk. Children successors who have failed in running their family firm would not easily find 
equivalent jobs or recover their previous standard of living, thereby reducing their family’s 
socioemotional wealth. Second, the failure of a family firm could destroy the wealth and property 
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of its family managers, who frequently mortgage their own homes to raise capital. When the firm 
becomes insolvent, its family managers must pay its liabilities, which may be considerable in 
countries where the bankruptcy laws are strict (Lee, Peng, & Barney, 2007); this implies a higher 
chance of personally going bankrupt. Third, the bankruptcy of a firm lead to its managers incurring 
psychological costs (Shepherd, 2003). Further, children successors feel ashamed and responsible 
for the firm’s failure, which harms their psychological well-being. 
In contrast, the failure of a family firm managed by non-children successors would result 
in lower losses of socioemotional wealth. The effect of bankruptcy on the lives of non-children 
successors has much less impact on a family firm CEO’s socioemotional wealth. This is because 
the non-children successors and their offspring do not influence the family firm CEO’s affective 
needs, such as family control and influence, identity, and the perpetuation of his or her family 
dynasty, which are the core dimensions of socioemotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, a family firm CEO, who is typically loss averse, is more likely to engage in long-
term investment when he or she expects that non-children successors will take his or her place as 
opposed to children successors, owing to the lower fear of the failure of such investments causing 
a decline in socioemotional wealth. 
 As the defining feature of a family-controlled business, a family firm CEO typically 
intends to maintain the firm’s continuity by passing it onto succeeding generations (Lansberg, 
1999). Nevertheless, because of a family firm CEO’s loss aversion, the potential losses in 
socioemotional wealth derived from the failure of children successors would loom much larger 
than the potential gains arising from their successful recovery of long-term investments. This 
discourages the family firm CEO to leave risky long-term investments as his or her legacy. 
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: The likelihood that a family firm engages in long-term investment is 
more positively associated with its CEO’s expectation that non-children will succeed 
him/her rather than his/her children. 
 
Research Methods 
Our dataset is based on a time-lagged survey of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). The target firms were incorporated manufacturers located in the Tokyo metropolitan area, 
and had either fewer than 300 regular employees or less than 300 million yen in capital stock. The 
names and addresses of these firms were identified by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd., the largest 
credit reporting agency in Japan. We chose the Tokyo metropolitan area as the sampled area, 
because the largest number of SMEs in Japan are located there. Thus, the sampled manufacturing 
SMEs, which are from a variety of industries, reflect industry effects on long-term investments. 
In November 2016, we sent the first survey on firm attributes, CEO demographic 
characteristics, and their succession expectations to 15,111 firms that met the above conditions. 
Then, in January 2018, we sent the second survey on long-term investments, which are the 
dependent variables of this study, to 1,499 respondents of the first survey. Because the second 
survey was lagged for one year from the first, which collected a set of independent variables, the 
possibility of reverse causality is effectively eliminated. For both surveys, we used a mixed-mode 
strategy (Groves et al., 2009). Specifically, we sent each firm a hard copy of our questionnaire and 
a cover letter explaining the purpose of this study, along with the respondent’s identification 
number and password required for answering the online survey. A reminder letter was sent to each 
firm two weeks after the surveys had been mailed. Respondents were asked to answer within a 
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month each questionnaire, either by the mail or online option. 
 Although we obtained responses to the second survey from 732 firms—a response rate 
of 48.8%—we apply the following two conditions to further limit our sample. First, we only used 
firms where the CEOs themselves answered the questions about their expectation of succession. 
Including responses from non-CEOs in our analysis would bias our estimation results, as we are 
interested in the effect of CEOs’ expectations that their successors will be found. As our target 
firms were SMEs, most of the responses were provided by CEOs. Indeed, the CEOs of large firms 
rarely answer questionnaires themselves, even if they are designated as the survey respondents. 
Second, owing to our core interest, we restricted our observations to family firms. There is a lack 
of consensus among researchers on the definition of a family firm (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010). 
Hence, we chose the most prevalent definition in studies of family firms, which is based on the 
proportion of a firm’s equity held by family owners (Crick et al., 2006; Davis & Harveston, 2000; 
Okoroafo, 1999). In particular, most studies define family SMEs as businesses in which the 
founding family owns over 50 percent share (Astrachan & Kolenko, 1994). Therefore, we adopted 
this ownership-based definition. After removing incomplete responses, we used 410 observations 
in our analysis. 
Variables capturing long-term investments 
Using the data from the second survey, we adopt three variables to capture long-term 
investments, following previous studies: internationalization activities, R&D, and new product 
development (Laverty, 1996; Reilly, Souder, & Ranucci, 2016). The first variable is an indicator 
of whether firms plan to expand their businesses into overseas markets (Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). In our sample, about 3.9 percent of firms planned to internationalize, 
suggesting that most Japanese family SMEs may not have positive attitudes toward 
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internationalization. The second variable is an indicator of whether firms perform R&D activities 
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Desyllas & Hughes, 2010; Hopp, 1987). In total, 31.5 percent of our 
firms performed R&D activities. The third variable measures the involvement of firms in inventing 
new products and services (Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Souza, Bayus, & Wagner, 2004). The 
responses ranged from one (not at all involved) to seven (extremely involved) and were categorized. 
Respondents who answered “not at all involved” comprised the highest share (21.7%), suggesting 
that many Japanese family SMEs are not enthusiastic about developing new products and services. 
Subjective probability of managerial succession 
To understand the effects of uncertainty about managerial succession, we constructed a 
variable using the following question in the first survey, “(h)ow likely is it that there will be a 
successor to take over the firm?” We asked respondents to report their probabilistic expectations 
(on a scale from zero to one). Hereafter, this variable is referred to as the “subjective probability 
of (managerial) succession.” Over the past 20 years, economists have increasingly captured 
probabilistic expectations from survey respondents (Manski, 2004). Expectations, measured by 
subjective probabilities, are considered to have high predictive power in situations where 
individuals have considerable private information (Hurd, 2009). In fact, applied microeconomics 
studies, especially those in health economics and labor economics, have used subjective 
probabilities to examine individual choice behaviors (e.g., Giustinelli & Manski, 2016; 
Montmarquette & Cannings, 2002; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2013; Wiswall & Zafar, 2015). 
In our observation, the sample mean of the subjective probability of managerial 
succession is 0.55. While the probabilities provided were concentrated at zero (31.3%) and one 
(44.8%), about one-third of the CEOs provided probabilities between zero and one, expressing 
perceived uncertainties about succession. In addition, if the CEOs’ probabilities were greater than 
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zero, we then asked about their potential successors (i.e., children or non-children). The sample 
mean of the subjective probability of succession by children was 41.7 percent and that by non-
children was 15.8 percent. 
The subjective succession probability variable could be endogenous owing to omitted 
factors. For example, unobserved factors, including the personality traits of the CEO, such as 
optimism and narcissism, may affect his/her investment time horizon (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 
2007); further, they are correlated with his/her expectations that a successor will be found. 
Accordingly, we used an instrumental variable approach to account for the endogenous nature of 
the subjective probability of succession. In particular, we used the presence of a son as an 
instrument. In Japanese family firms, incumbent CEOs consider their children as the first in line 
to succeed their businesses. Indeed, children with family business backgrounds tend to take over 
their parents’ businesses. As Japanese women generally take the last names of their husbands, 
family firm CEOs would expect their sons to succeed them in their family businesses. In addition, 
extant research indicates that firms in which the CEO’s first child is male are more likely to pass 
on control to a family firm CEO (Bennedsen et al., 2007). Thus, our identification assumption was 
that the presence of a son is unrelated to factors that affect long-term investment decisions, once 
we control for the subjective probability of succession and other variables. In our sample, 68.3 
percent of family firm CEOs had at least one son. 
Control variables 
Using information from responses to the first survey, we constructed a set of control 
variables that affect long-term investment decisions. These control variables reflected the effects 
of both firm and CEO demographic backgrounds. To control for the extent of family influence 
within a firm, we used the family ownership ratio. As the family plays an important role in 
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determining the vision and control mechanisms in a family firm (Anderson et al., 2012), family 
ownership significantly influences its major decisions. To capture familiness better, we also 
included a dummy variable indicating whether the name of a firm derives from its family’s last 
name. In our sample, 24.9 percent of firms used family names as part of their firm names. 
We also controlled for firm age because this may be associated with long-term 
investments. Thus, as older firms accumulate resources, managerial knowledge, and the ability to 
handle uncertainty (Levitt & March, 1988), they would be more likely to make long-term 
investments. To control for this effect, we included the natural logarithm of firm age, as in previous 
studies (Claver et al., 2009; Fernandez & Nieto, 2005, 2006; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2010; Sciascia 
et al., 2012). Similarly, firm size may also play a role in long-term investments; thus, large firms 
can achieve economies of scale and access sufficient resources for long-term investments. 
Accordingly, we measured firm size by taking the natural logarithm of the number of employees. 
A firm’s international experience would provide many opportunities to acquire profound 
knowledge of new foreign markets. This knowledge would enable decision making when firms 
make long-term investments (Fernandez & Nieto, 2005). To control for the effect of a firm’s 
international experience, we used three variables: (1) a dummy variable taking value one if the 
firm had entered overseas markets in the past and zero otherwise; (2) the ratio of export to total 
sales (Chang, 1995); and (3) the ratio of imports to total purchases (Chang, 1995). 
We also considered differences in investment time horizons across generations. Extant 
research indicates remarkable differences between the first generation (founder) and subsequent 
generations of a firm in several aspects (Sonfield & Lussier, 2004). For instance, the management 
styles of CEOs might differ considerably across generations (Dyer, 1988; McConaughy & Phillips, 
1999). Therefore, such managerial differences across generations may influence long-term 
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investment decisions. To control for the effects of generation, we included a categorical variable 
that takes four values: one if the CEO of a firm is its founder; two if he/she is from the second 
generation; three if from the third-generation, and four if the CEO is from the fourth-generation or 
later. In our sample, the second generation CEOs were 39.5 percent of the respondents and 
constituted the largest category. 
Previous literature also indicates links between capital structure and investment behavior 
(Du, Guariglia, & Newman, 2015; Choi, Kumar, & Zambuto, 2016). To control for the effect of 
capital structure, we used a categorical variable taking one if a firm has less than 10 million yen in 
debt; two if their debt is between 10 million and 100 million yen; and three if they have more than 
100 million yen in debt. There is no qualitative change in our results when an alternative variable 
is used to measure whether firms have debt. 
Other control variables that capture CEO demographic background were CEO tenure 
(measured by taking the natural logarithm of CEO tenure), international experience (a dummy 
variable to capture whether a CEO has experience of living abroad), educational level (a dummy 
variable that indicates whether a CEO has a bachelor’s degree or higher), age (the natural logarithm 
of CEO’s age), and gender (a dummy variable to capture whether a CEO is male). These 
demographic background characteristics may be valid indicators of the CEO’s cognitive 
capabilities (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The literature shows 
that the CEO’s age (Deakin et al., 2004; Taylor, 1975), tenure (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992), and international experience (Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001) 
affect long-term investment decisions; this is because these factors influence the extent to which 
CEOs are willing to take risks and the information-processing demands they face when making 
important strategic decisions, such as internationalization (Laufs, Bembom, & Schwens, 2016). 
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For example, although a CEO with a longer tenure is more likely to hold onto the organizational 
status quo (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993), a CEO with a shorter tenure is more 
inclined to take risks because of his/her novel information and flexible attitude (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990). Table 5 reports summary statistics and correlations among the variables used in 
our analysis. 
 
Models  
Estimation models for Hypothesis 1 
To test Hypothesis 1, we use two types of variables as dependent variables: two binary 
variables and an ordered variable. Specifically, the binary variables are (i) a variable that captures 
plans of entering overseas markets and (ii) a variable for performing R&D activities. The ordered 
variable is a variable for developing new products and services. For the binary dependent variables, 
we estimate probit models to account for their binary nature: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐼(𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ≥  ), (1) 
where subscript i indicates firm I; 𝑠𝑝𝑖  is the CEO’s subjective probability of managerial 
succession; 𝐱𝑖 is a set of other observed factors; 𝑢𝑖 is an error term, which is assumed to follow 
a standard normal distribution; and 𝐼(∙) is an indicator function. 
 As mentioned earlier, the estimation of these models may suffer because the subjective 
probability of succession (𝑠𝑝𝑖) may be an endogenous variable. To address this issue, we control 
for the endogeneity of the subjective probability of succession by applying the method proposed 
by Terza, Basu, & Rathouz (2008). For this, we slightly modify equation (1) by decomposing 𝑢𝑖 
into two parts: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐼(𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜌1𝜔1𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 ≥  ), (2) 
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where 𝜔1𝑖 captures a set of unobserved factors correlated with 𝑠𝑝𝑖 ; 𝜌1 is the corresponding 
parameter; and 𝑣𝑖 captures a set of unobserved factors not correlated with 𝑠𝑝𝑖 and assumed to 
be standard normally distributed. Conditional on 𝜔1𝑖  (as well as  𝑠𝑝𝑖  and 𝐱𝑖 ), the response 
probability is 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 =  |𝑠𝑝𝑖, 𝐱𝒊, 𝜔1𝑖) = Φ(𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜌1𝜔1𝑖), (3) 
where  Φ(∙)  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. 
Endogeneity emerges owing to the presence of 𝜔1𝑖; if a probit model is estimated via maximum 
likelihood without dealing with 𝜔1𝑖, the estimator will be inconsistent unless 𝜌1 =  . 
To control for 𝜔1𝑖 , we specify a reduced-form equation to formalize the relationship 
between 𝑠𝑝𝑖 and 𝜔1𝑖: 
𝑠𝑝𝑖 = 𝑔(𝐱𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖) + 𝜔1𝑖, (4) 
where 𝑔(∙) is some function and 𝑧𝑖 is an identifying instrument. This instrumental variable 
satisfies the following three conditions (Terza et al., 2008): it is not correlated with 𝜔1𝑖 ; it is 
sufficiently correlated with 𝑠𝑝𝑖; and it can neither have a direct influence on 𝑦𝑖 nor be correlated 
with 𝑣𝑖. 
The subjective probability of succession (𝑠𝑝𝑖) has a particular nature; it takes values in 
the unit interval [0, 1], with a grouping at both zero and one. To account for this nature, we specify 
a probit function  Φ(∙)  for 𝑔(∙)  in equation (4) so that  𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑖|𝐱𝒊, 𝑧𝑖) = Φ(𝐱𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖) . This 
specification allows 𝑠𝑝𝑖 to take any values in the unit interval, including at the endpoints, while 
the fitted values for 𝑠𝑝𝑖 are between 0 and 1, as desired. This equation can be consistently 
estimated using the Bernoulli QMLE fractional probit regression (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; 
Wooldridge, 2010).
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Table 5: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
1. Plan to internationalize (d) 0.04 0.19 0 1
2. R&D (d) 0.32 0.46 0 1 .22
3. New products 3.84 2.07 1 7 .19 .59
4. Subjective probability of succession0.55 0.44 0 1 .12 .17 .20
5. By children 0.42 0.46 0 1 .05 .05 .10 .67
6. By non-children 0.16 0.31 0 1 .04 .15 .18 .23 -.37
7. Son (d) 0.68 0.47 0 1 .00 -.02 .03 .23 .42 -.22
8. Family ownership 0.88 0.16 0.50 1 -.08 -.12 -.11 -.09 -.02 -.08 .01
9. Family name (d) 0.25 0.43 0 1 .00 -.05 -.12 -.01 .09 -.09 -.01 .05
10. Firm age 50.99 26.34 1 168 .01 -.05 -.02 .11 .18 -.06 .04 .00 .24
11. Debt (< 10 million yen) 0.29 0.46 0 1 -.07 -.11 -.19 -.22 -.19 .00 -.08 .07 -.04 -.10
12. Debt (10 million - 100 million yen) 0.41 0.49 0 1 -.07 .01 .02 .00 .02 -.08 .07 .08 -.01 -.07 -.54
13. Debt (> 100 million yen) 0.30 0.46 0 1 .15 .10 .17 .23 .17 .09 .00 -.15 .05 .18 -.42 -.54
14. Firm's international experience (d) 0.07 0.26 0 1 .24 .08 .10 .01 -.04 .03 -.12 -.06 -.03 .07 -.05 -.06 .11
15. Current generation (founder) 0.30 0.46 0 1 .04 .07 .12 .03 -.05 .05 -.02 .02 -.20 -.57 .04 .12 -.17 -.07
16. Current generation (2nd) 0.40 0.49 0 1 -.03 -.04 -.09 -.07 .02 -.07 .03 .07 .11 -.01 .01 -.05 .05 -.01 -.52
17. Current generation (3rd) 0.22 0.42 0 1 .01 -.06 -.05 -.01 -.01 .01 .01 -.05 .09 .34 -.06 -.04 .10 .15 -.35 -.43
18. Current generation (4th or later) 0.09 0.28 0 1 -.02 .05 .03 .09 .05 .02 -.03 -.07 .00 .44 .01 -.05 .04 -.09 -.20 -.25 -.17
19. Export ratio 0.09 0.21 0 1 .06 .09 .13 -.01 -.07 .06 .01 .01 -.10 -.14 -.07 .04 .02 .08 .08 -.07 .00 .00
20. Import ratio 0.04 0.12 0 0.98 .05 .08 .11 .06 .01 .01 .03 -.09 .02 .07 -.03 -.01 .03 .05 -.01 -.11 .07 .09 .10
21. The number of employee (log) 2.24 1.03 0 5.48 -.02 .12 .14 .24 .18 .17 -.04 -.28 .13 .27 -.35 -.21 .57 .11 -.27 .08 .12 .14 .00 .10
22. CEO tenure 20.07 14.41 1 65 .05 -.02 .02 .22 .26 -.08 .10 .07 -.07 .02 -.11 .13 -.03 -.03 .42 -.12 -.23 ### ### ### -.06
23. CEO education (d) 0.70 0.46 0 1 .02 .11 .08 -.02 -.03 .06 .01 -.05 .10 .19 .02 -.06 .05 .08 -.21 .17 .06 -.04 -.01 .07 .12 -.11
24. CEO age 59.98 11.74 29 88 .04 .02 .02 .26 .26 -.04 .14 .00 .00 -.01 -.03 .09 -.06 -.09 .37 -.09 -.23 -.11 -.13 .00 -.13 .72 -.04
25. CEO's international experience (d) 0.10 0.30 0 1 .10 .09 .14 -.02 -.02 -.03 -.10 .03 .09 -.02 -.05 -.05 .11 .10 -.04 .05 .00 -.02 .03 .21 .07 -.14 .10 -.14
26. Sex (d) 0.97 0.18 0 1 .04 -.05 .02 -.04 -.08 .07 .05 -.09 .02 .00 -.03 -.03 .06 .05 .00 .04 .04 -.13 .01 .05 .03 .10 .20 .03 .02
Note: Correlation greater than 0.09 are significant at p<0.05; greater than 0.13 are significant at p<0.01. (d) means a dummy variable. N=410.
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Given equations (3) and (4), we can control for endogeneity using the following two-stage 
procedure. In the first stage, we estimate equation (4) and compute the residual ?̂?1𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝𝑖 −
𝑔(𝐱𝑖
′𝛾 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖). In the second stage, we estimate the probit model represented by equation (3) by 
substituting ?̂?1𝑖  into  𝜔1𝑖 . We compute the estimates of the standard errors using bootstrap 
resampling (500 replications) to account for the fact that ?̂?1𝑖 is a generated regressor of 𝜔1𝑖. If 
𝜌1 is not statistically different from zero, it can be concluded that the subjective probability of 
succession (𝑠𝑝𝑖) is an exogenous variable. 
For the ordered dependent variable, we estimate an ordered probit model. As the 
endogeneity problem for this model is dealt with in a manner similar to that for the probit 
estimation, we do not repeat the model descriptions. 
Estimation model for Hypothesis 2 
We now decompose the CEO’s subjective probability of succession (𝑠𝑝𝑖 ) into (i) the 
subjective probability that his/her children will succeed him/her at the firm (𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 ) and (ii) the 
subjective probability that non-children will succeed him/her at the firm (𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 ); thus, 𝑠𝑝𝑖 =
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖. This approach allows us to test Hypothesis 2 by examining the extent to which the 
effect of the former on long-term investment is smaller than that of the latter. 
Therefore, we relax the assumption (implicitly imposed on equation [1]) that the 
coefficient on 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 is the same as that on 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖1: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝐼(𝛼1 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 ≥  ).  (5) 
Equation (5) has the same endogeneity problem as equation (1), in that 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 may be 
correlated with 𝑢𝑖. To control for potential endogeneity, we decompose 𝑢𝑖 into three parts: 
                                                   
1 If 𝛼1 = 𝛼 = 𝛼, then equation (5) becomes equation (1), given that 𝑠𝑝𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖. 
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𝑦𝑖 = 𝐼(𝛼1 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜌 1𝜔 1𝑖 + 𝜌  𝜔  𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖 ≥  ),  (6) 
where 𝜔 1𝑖 (𝜔  𝑖) captures the set of unobserved factors correlated with 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 (𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖); 𝜌 1 and 
𝜌    are the corresponding parameters; and 𝑣𝑖  captures the set of unobserved factors not 
correlated with 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖, and assumed to be standard normally distributed. Conditional on 
𝜔 1𝑖 and 𝜔  𝑖 (as well as 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖, 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖, and 𝐱𝑖), the response probability can be expressed as 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 =  |𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 , 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 , 𝐱𝒊, 𝜔 1𝑖, 𝜔  𝑖)
= Φ(𝛼1 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 + 𝛼 ∙ 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜌 1𝜔 1𝑖 + 𝜌  𝜔  𝑖). 
(7) 
To control for 𝜔 1𝑖 (𝜔  𝑖 ), we specify a reduced-form equation to formalize the relationship 
between 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 (𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖) and 𝜔 1𝑖 (𝜔  𝑖): 
 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔𝑐(𝐱𝑖
′𝛾𝑐 + 𝛿𝑐𝑧𝑖) + 𝜔 1𝑖,  (8) 
𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔𝑛𝑐(𝐱𝑖
′𝛾𝑛𝑐 + 𝛿𝑛𝑐𝑧𝑖) + 𝜔  𝑖. (9) 
These variables can be regarded as multivariate share data because they are within the unit interval 
[0, 1] and the total of these probabilities and the subjective probability of not being succeeded 
(𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑖 ) is one. To account for the nature of 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 , we choose the multinomial logit 
functional form for 𝑔𝑗(∙) (𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑛𝑐) , which is an extension of the fractional regression 
methodology mentioned above. 
𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑗𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝑔𝑗(𝐱𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑧𝑖) =
exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑧𝑖)
 + ∑ exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝛽𝑗 + 𝛿𝑗𝑧𝑖)𝑗
 𝑗 = 𝑐, 𝑛𝑐, 
 
and 𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) =  − 𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) − 𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖). The multinomial fractional logit model 
(Koch, 2010; Mullahy, 2015) can be estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood method (see 
Mullahy (2015) for details of this estimation technique). 
 Given equations (7), (8), and (9), we use the following two-stage procedure. We first 
estimate a multinomial fractional logit model and compute the first-stage residuals: 
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?̂? 1𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖),  
?̂?  𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖 − 𝐸(𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖).  
In the second stage, we estimate equation (7) by substituting ?̂? 1𝑖 and ?̂?  𝑖 for the unobserved 
latent factors, 𝜔 1𝑖 and 𝜔  𝑖. We compute the standard errors using bootstrap resampling (500 
replications). If the null hypothesis that 𝜌 1 = 𝜌  =   is not rejected, it is appropriate to treat the 
subjective probabilities of succession (𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑖 and 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐𝑖) as exogenous variables (Geraci, Fabbri, 
and Monfardini, 2016). 
 
Results 
Endogeneity test 
To test for endogeneity in the subjective probabilities, we must first check the relevance 
of the instrument (i.e., the presence of a son) in the reduced-form equations for the subjective 
probabilities. As presented in Table 6, the presence of a son is found to be positively and 
significantly associated with the subjective probability of succession in the fractional probit model. 
In the multinomial fractional logit model—despite this variable being significantly associated with 
only the subjective probability for children-we can reject the joint null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the “presence of a son” are all simultaneously zero (𝜒 = 64. 7, 𝑝 =  .    ). 
Therefore, this variable satisfies at least one of the requirements for a valid instrument. 
We also estimate a linear model to further examine how strongly the instrument is 
correlated with the subjective probability of succession. The instrumental variable’s F-statistic is 
found to be 19.34. An often-used rule of thumb proposed by Staiger & Stock (1997) is that an F-
statistic of less than 10 indicates weak instruments in the context of the two-stage least squares 
estimator; this suggests that our estimation is unlikely to suffer from the weak instrument problem. 
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Similar results were obtained for the subjective probabilities for children (82.31) and non-children 
(19.09). 
The lower part of Table 6 provides the second-stage results, particularly the estimated 
coefficients of the residuals from the first-stage regressions. They are not significant, even at the 
10 percent level. Moreover, a Wald test of the joint insignificance of 𝜌 1 and 𝜌   is not rejected 
at the 10 percent level. These results provide evidence in favor of the exogeneity of all the variables 
measuring the subjective probabilities. Therefore, we can conclude that the results under the 
assumption of exogeneity are relevant. 
Estimation results under the assumption of exogeneity 
As the subjective probabilities are found to be exogenous, we next estimate the models 
under the assumption of exogeneity. Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 7 provide the estimation 
results for the internationalization equation, when excluding the subjective probability measures, 
including the subjective probability of managerial succession, and including those by children and 
non-children, respectively. Similarly, columns (4), (5), and (6) present the results of the R&D 
equation and columns (7), (8), and (9) contain the results of the new product/service equation. 
In columns (2), (5), and (8), the coefficient of the subjective probability of managerial 
succession is found to be positive and significant at least at the 5 percent level. These results 
support Hypothesis 1, suggesting that the subjective probability of managerial succession is more 
likely to facilitate long-term investments. 
We further confirm the importance of the subjective probability of succession when 
decomposing the potential successors into children and non-children. Specifically, in columns (3), 
(6), and (9), the subjective probability of succession by non-children is positively and significantly 
associated with long-term investments. Similar results are obtained for the CEO’s children. The 
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null hypothesis for Hypothesis 2 is 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑐 = 𝛽𝑛𝑐 . The alternative is one-sided, 𝐻1: 𝛽𝑐 < 𝛽𝑛𝑐 , 
which implies that a one-unit increase in the probability of succession by the CEO’s children has 
less worth than that by non-children. For the R&D equation (column [3]), the null hypothesis is 
rejected (𝜒 = 2.56, p = 0.055). Similarly, the null hypothesis isrejected (𝜒 = 5.53, p = 0.009) 
for the new product/service equation (column [9]). These results imply that the effect of the 
subjective probability of succession by non-children is statistically larger than that by the CEO’s 
children; thus Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
We also measure the extent to which the subjective probability of managerial succession 
influences each of the dependent variables. For this, we compute the marginal effects on the means 
under the assumption of exogeneity. As presented in Table 8, the marginal effects of the subjective 
probability of managerial succession are found to be 0.059 for planning internationalization, 0.153 
for R&D activities, and 0.058 for new product/service development. In other words, firms whose 
CEOs are certain of succession are 5.9 percent, 15.3 percent, and 5.8 percent more likely to 
internationalize, implement R&D activities, and engage in new product/service development than 
those whose CEOs are not at all certain whether a successor will be found. 
In addition, for each long-term investment, we find the predicted probabilities of CEOs’ 
expectations of potential successors, based on the estimated coefficients. The results, presented in 
Tables 9(a), 9(b), and 9(c), provide some insight into how long-term investment decisions are 
influenced by the family status of potential successors. In particular, the results reveal that even if 
two CEOs of family firms have the same subjective probability of managerial succession, their 
long-term investment behavior may differ, depending on the family status of their expected 
successors. Consider the planning of internationalization as an example. Table 9 shows five 
combinations of CEO expectations in which the subjective probability of managerial succession is 
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Table 6: Tests for Endogeneity of Subjective Succession Probabilities 
 
1st stage
Son (d) 0.55 ** 2.22 ** -0.20
(0.12) (0.30) (0.26)
Family ownership -0.18 0.15 0.36
(0.39) (0.75) (0.81)
Family name (d) -0.08 0.29 -0.51
(0.14) (0.28) (0.34)
Firm age(log) -0.06 0.22 -0.37 †
(0.12) (0.28) (0.23)
Debt (10 million - 100 million yen) 0.22 0.30 -0.15
(0.14) (0.28) (0.32)
Debt (100 million yen -) 0.49 ** 0.72 † 0.29
(0.18) (0.38) (0.42)
Firm's international experience (d) 0.14 0.07 0.05
(0.21) (0.55) (0.49)
Current generation (2nd) -0.04 0.20 -0.37
(0.19) (0.38) (0.42)
Current generation (3rd) 0.11 0.26 -0.08
(0.23) (0.48) (0.53)
Current generation (4th or later) 0.49 † 0.54 0.21
(0.28) (0.57) (0.60)
Export ratio 0.00 -0.45 0.10
(0.27) (0.57) (0.57)
Import ratio 0.19 -0.55 0.13
(0.45) (0.90) (0.93)
The number of employee (log) 0.23 ** 0.61 ** 0.78 **
(0.08) (0.16) (0.18)
CEO tenure (log) 0.10 0.48 * -0.20
(0.09) (0.21) (0.22)
CEO education (d) -0.07 -0.21 0.33
(0.13) (0.27) (0.29)
CEO age (log) 1.40 ** 2.14 ** 2.13 *
(0.39) (0.80) (0.93)
CEO's international experience (d) 0.07 0.22 -0.62
(0.19) (0.42) (0.40)
Gender (d) -0.46 -1.74 ** 0.79
(0.30) (0.55) (0.82)
Constant -6.12 -12.80 -10.48
(1.66) (3.35) (3.91)
log pseudo likelihood
2nd stage
calculated residuals
Plan to internationalize 0.43 0.53 5.14
(1.77) (1.78) (5.01)
R&D 0.82 0.36 -0.07
(0.78) (0.73) (1.55)
New Products -0.37 -0.19 0.57
(0.60) (0.56) (1.22)
by children by non-children
-244.57 -333.37
Fractional probit Multinomial fractional logit
Subjective probability of succession
(1) (2) (3)
Note : Robust standard errors in parentheses for 1st stage estimation results, while we show the standard errors in parentheses for the raw residual(s). (d) means a
          dummy variable. When estimating the internationalization equations, we dropped 14 observations where Gender=0, because female CEO (Gender=0) perfectly
          predicts "do not have plan to internationalize (Plan to internationalize=0)." N=410.  †, *, and ** imply that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
          10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
𝜔1 𝜔 1 𝜔  
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Table 7: Estimated Coefficients under the Assumption of Exogeneity 
   
0.96 * 0.48 ** 0.37 **
(0.44) (0.17) (0.13)
By children 0.84 † 0.39 * 0.46 **
(0.45) (0.18) (0.14)
By non-children 1.15 * 0.75 ** 0.89 **
(0.56) (0.24) (0.19)
Family ownership -1.66 * -1.81 * -1.92 * -0.70 † -0.71 † -0.75 † -0.40 -0.38 -0.43
(0.82) (0.86) (0.88) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34)
Family name (d) 0.20 0.17 0.23 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 -0.29 * -0.28 * -0.27 *
(0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Firm age (log) 0.05 0.08 0.09 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
(0.40) (0.42) (0.43) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Debt (10 million - 100 million yen) 0.26 0.11 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.25 0.28 * 0.25 † 0.28 *
(0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Debt (100 million yen -) 1.49 ** 1.39 ** 1.44 ** 0.33 0.23 0.28 0.48 ** 0.42 * 0.45 **
(0.52) (0.54) (0.54) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Firm's international experience (d) 1.18 ** 1.27 ** 1.35 ** 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.36 †
(0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Current generation (2nd) -0.09 -0.09 -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.16 -0.32 † -0.33 † -0.32 †
(0.48) (0.51) (0.52) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Current generation (3rd) -0.21 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23 -0.28 -0.27 -0.31 -0.34 -0.35
(0.66) (0.68) (0.69) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Current generation (4th or later) -0.03 -0.14 -0.17 0.20 0.11 0.14 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13
(0.93) (0.98) (1.03) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28)
Export ratio 0.56 0.48 0.39 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.44 † 0.44 † 0.46 †
(0.65) (0.71) (0.72) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Import ratio 0.02 -0.29 0.13 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.52
(1.10) (1.19) (1.08) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
The number of employee (log) -0.56 ** -0.68 ** -0.74 ** 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.01
(0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
CEO tenure (log) 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.02
(0.38) (0.40) (0.41) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
CEO education (d) -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.47 ** 0.49 ** 0.47 ** 0.27 * 0.28 * 0.27 *
(0.32) (0.33) (0.34) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
CEO age (log) -0.12 -0.62 -0.42 0.02 -0.26 -0.22 0.16 -0.04 -0.11
(1.20) (1.26) (1.26) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38)
CEO's international experience (d) 0.46 0.53 0.57 0.28 0.30 0.35 0.43 * 0.43 * 0.48 **
(0.40) (0.41) (0.42) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Gender (d) -0.71 † -0.66 † -0.71 † -0.15 -0.11 -0.14
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Constant -0.82 1.17 0.32 0.49 1.44 1.27
(4.62) (4.82) (4.79) (1.98) (2.02) (2.02)
Log likelihood
(9)
-736.01-232.62
(5) (7) (8)
Note : Standard errors in parentheses. (d) means a dummy variable. When estimating the internationalization equations, we dropped 14
          observations where Gender=0, because female CEO (Gender=0) perfectly predicts "do not have plan to internationalize (Plan to
          internationalize=0)." To save space, we do not report the estimated cut points in (7)- (9).  †, *, and ** imply that the coefficient is
          significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Subjective probability of succession
New product
(Ordered probit)
R&D
(Probit)
Plan to internationalize
(Probit)
48.74 -45.90 -45.92 -727.82-231.25 -740.10-236.60
(1) (3) (6)(4)(2)
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100 percent (𝑠𝑝 = 𝑠𝑝𝑐 + 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐 =    ). For example, the highest predicted probability of R&D is 
found to be 47.3 percent, which occurs when (𝑠𝑝𝑐, 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐) = ( ,    ), while the lowest is 33.3 
percent when (𝑠𝑝𝑐, 𝑠𝑝𝑛𝑐) = (   ,  ). Therefore, the highest is 1.5 times as large as the lowest. 
Similar results are obtained for the development of new products/services. Overall, long-term 
investment decisions are influenced by the family status of a potential successor in a non-negligible 
manner. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
Beginning with the research question that family firm CEOs’ expectations of managerial 
succession affect their firms’ investment time horizons, we tested two hypotheses using survey 
data on 410 family firm CEOs of small- and medium-sized manufacturers in the metropolitan area 
of Tokyo, Japan. The following are our two major findings. First, when a family firm CEO is sure 
that his/her successor will be found, his/her firm is more likely to engage in long-term investment. 
Second, a family firm CEO’s expectation of managerial succession by his/her children or someone 
other than his/her children has a differential impact on the firm’s investment time horizons. 
Specifically, the expectation that someone other than their children will succeed them is more 
likely to trigger long-term investment than the expectation that children will be the likely 
successors. 
Theoretical, empirical, and practical implications 
The findings of this study contribute to the theory, empirics, and practice of family 
businesses. The first theoretical contribution is the finding that a family firm CEO’s expectation 
of managerial succession serves as an antecedent of investment time horizons. Theoretically, the 
beliefs of top managers are predictors of corporate behavior; however, few studies have  
 79 
 
Table 8: Estimated Marginal Effects under the Assumption of Exogeneity 
  
0.06 * 0.15 ** 0.06 **
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
By children 0.05 † 0.13 * 0.06 **
(0.03) (0.06) (0.02)
By non-children 0.07 * 0.26 ** 0.15 **
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04)
Family ownership -0.11 * -0.12 * -0.23 † -0.24 † -0.06 -0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05)
Family name (d) 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 * -0.04 *
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm age (log) 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Debt (10 million - 100 million yen) 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.03 † 0.04 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Debt (100 million yen -) 0.09 * 0.09 * 0.07 0.09 0.06 * 0.07 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm's international experience (d) 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Current generation (2nd) -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 † -0.05 †
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Current generation (3rd) -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
Current generation (4th or later) -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05)
Export ratio 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.07 † 0.07 †
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04)
Import ratio -0.02 0.01 0.13 0.15 0.07 0.08
(0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.18) (0.07) (0.07)
The number of employee (log) -0.04 ** -0.05 ** 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
CEO tenure (log) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
CEO education (d) -0.01 -0.01 0.16 ** 0.15 ** 0.04 * 0.04 *
(0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
CEO age (log) -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06)
CEO's international experience (d) 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.08 * 0.09 *
(0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
Gender (d) -0.23 † -0.25 † -0.02 -0.02
(0.13) (0.13) (0.05) (0.05)
          where     is a 6th cut point.
          Probit model:
          Ordered probit model:
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. (d) means a dummy variable. For the sake of saving space, we only report the marginal effects on the probability of choosing
        "extremly involved" in (5)- (6). When estimating the internationalization equations, we dropped 14 observations where Gender=0, because female CEO (Gender=0)
         perfectly predicts "do not have plan to internationalize (Plan to internationalize=0)." †, *, and ** imply that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
         10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects of subjective probability of succession for children and non-children are calculated as follows,
Plan to internationalize
(Probit)
R&D
(Probit)
New product
(Ordered probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Subjective probability of succession
 𝐸 = Φ 𝛼1   + 𝛼   + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 − Φ 𝛼1   + 𝛼   + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 ,
 𝐸 =  −Φ    − 𝛼1   − 𝛼   − 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 −  − Φ    −𝛼1   − 𝛼   − 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 ,
 𝐸 = Φ 𝛼1   + 𝛼   + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 − Φ 𝛼1   + 𝛼   + 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 .
 𝐸 =  −Φ    − 𝛼1   − 𝛼   − 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 −  − Φ    −𝛼1   − 𝛼   − 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 ,
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theoretically and empirically identified the beliefs that have impact and how they matter. To bridge 
this gap in the literature, we successfully apply the concept of socioemotional wealth to explain 
how a family firm CEO’s expectation of managerial succession determines the choice of 
investment time horizons by varying the periods over which firms evaluate investments. Among 
family firms, managerial beliefs in future socioemotional wealth could be an influential driver of 
managerial behaviors. Because the possibility of managerial succession varies significantly across 
family firms, its expectations may at least partially explain why such firms are sometimes less 
growth-oriented, less innovative, and more conservative (Kets de Vries, 1993; Miller, Le Breton-
Miller, and Scholnick, 2008). We also show that family firm CEOs have different expectations of 
managerial succession, despite having children. For instance, children might choose their own jobs 
and be reluctant to assume the position of CEO in their family firms if their own jobs are more 
lucrative. The presence of children is a necessary, but never a sufficient condition for family 
managerial succession. Accordingly, to obtain more accurate estimation results, we need to 
consider family firm CEOs’ expectations of managerial succession, rather than the number of 
children, as a proxy for succession. 
Second, we clarify how the family status of a successor that a family firm CEO has in 
mind influences his/her firm’s investment time horizon. Managerial succession by family members 
is generally considered to preserve the family’s socioemotional wealth because such succession 
achieves transgenerational control. However, our argument shows that a family firm CEO might 
find that being succeeded by his/her children causes huge losses in socioemotional wealth when 
firms cannot effectively manage long-term investments, leading to bankruptcy. The family status 
of successors would change potential socioemotional wealth, and accordingly, the choices of  
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Table 9: Predicted Probabilities of Long-term Investment across CEOs’ Expectations for 
Potential Successors 
   
(a) Plan to internationalize
0% 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.018
(0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.121)
25% 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.022
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012)
50% 0.009 0.016 0.027
(0.007) (0.010) (0.015)
75% 0.019 0.032
(0.015) (0.021)
100% 0.038
(0.031)
Note: Delta-method standard error in parentheses. N=396.
0% 0.207 0.236 0.266 0.299 0.333
(0.036) (0.029) (0.026) (0.030) (0.041)
25% 0.265 0.297 0.331 0.367
(0.033) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036)
50% 0.329 0.365 0.402
(0.039) (0.037) (0.042)
75% 0.399 0.437
(0.055) (0.057)
100% 0.473
(0.076)
Note: Delta-method standard error in parentheses. N=410.
0% 0.037 0.047 0.060 0.075 0.093
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019)
25% 0.059 0.074 0.092 0.112
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020)
50% 0.090 0.110 0.134
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024)
75% 0.132 0.159
(0.029) (0.032)
100% 0.186
(0.045)
Subjective probability of
 succession by children
Subjective probability of
 succession
by non-children
Subjective probability of
 succession by children
0% 25% 50% 75%
(b) R&D
100%
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
(c) New products
Note: Delta-method standard error in parentheses. For the sake of saving space, we only report the predicted probability of choosing
         "extremely involved." N=410.
Subjective probability of
 succession
by non-children
Subjective probability of
 succession by children
Subjective probability of
 succession
by non-children
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
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family firms could also vary. This finding complements recent studies of managerial succession in 
family firms. Several empirical studies report that managerial succession by family members tends 
to decrease firm performance more than that by non-family members (e.g., Chang & Shim, 2015; 
Cucculelli & Micucci, 2008; Hillier & McColgan, 2009; Minichilli et al., 2014). This relationship 
can be explained by investment decisions made by former family CEOs. As we found, when a 
predecessor family CEO expects managerial succession by children, he/she tends to avoid long-
term investments. Because long-term investments generally lead to higher firm performance 
(Souder, Reilly, Bromiley, & Mitchell, 2016), miserable firm performance after the succession by 
children can be attributed to lower level of engagement in long-term investments by a family firm’s 
predecessor CEOs. 
In addition, we contributed to the empirics of management studies by introducing a new 
approach for understanding the impact of family firm CEOs’ expectations on their strategic 
decision making. This is one of the first studies in management to measure individual subjective 
probability, which has recently been used in the field of applied microeconomics to predict 
individual choice behaviors. Conventional management research has paid little attention to the fact 
that CEOs have a subjective probability distribution. Thus, our findings contribute to the literature 
by confirming the effectiveness of the subjective probabilistic approach. 
Our findings also provide intriguing implications for practitioners and policymakers. First, 
family firm CEOs may unconsciously avoid long-term investments when they confidently expect 
their children to succeed them owing to their inherent aversion to loss of socioemotional wealth. 
Accordingly, family firm CEOs with children successors in mind should be cautious that their 
investment decisions are not too short-term in orientation. Second, our results indicate that 
governmental support for the managerial succession in SMEs, such as successor candidate 
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matching services or tax reductions for succession, would promote long-term investments by 
family SMEs by reducing the perceived uncertainty in managerial succession. In particular, 
because our results suggest that expectations of managerial succession by non-children encourage 
long-term investments, governmental agencies and officers of SMEs that are eager to increase 
investments by SMEs could introduce external candidates to such firms. 
Limitations and future directions 
Although we provide interesting insights into the relationships between a CEO’s concern 
about managerial succession and his/her long-term investment decisions, the findings should be 
interpreted with caution, considering the following two limitations. First, our study sample is 
firmly established in the national context of Japan. As Japanese culture is characterized by a high 
level of uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 1980), the CEOs of the sampled firms might show 
relatively stronger risk aversion when making investment decisions. Therefore, the findings of this 
study might overestimate the impact of the expectations of managerial succession on long-term 
investments. If we tested the same relationships in societies where uncertainty avoidance is low, 
the positive impact of a family firm CEO’s expectations of managerial succession on investment 
time horizons might weaken. Further, Japanese succession laws— the law of inheritance in Japan 
imposes a higher tax on the transfer of property to family members—may influence the impact of 
expectations of managerial succession. Accordingly, family firm CEOs in Japan who expect 
managerial succession would be more likely to invest their financial resources to reduce taxable 
assets. We would need to shift the focus to these cross-national differences in CEOs’ expectations 
of managerial succession to corroborate the generalizability of our findings. 
Second, our findings are based on a sample of family SMEs. The CEO position in SMEs 
is generally less attractive than that in large, listed firms, because limited financial resources of the 
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former mean that they often provide relatively lower compensation to CEOs. Further, SMEs have 
a relatively smaller pool of human resources than large, listed firms do. Accordingly, SMEs may 
have difficulty finding potential successors, causing managerial anxiety about succession and firm 
continuity. On the contrary, owing to a large stock of human resources, the large and listed family 
firms can easily find potential successors from within or outside the firm. Therefore, even when 
CEOs of large and listed family firms have no potential successors in mind, they would not hesitate 
to make long-term investments; this is because it is almost certain that someone will eventually 
assume the CEO role and the firm will continue. Accordingly, if we test the same hypothesized 
relationships between a CEO’s expectations of managerial succession and the likelihood of long-
term investments using the sample of large and listed family firms, the relationship would be 
weaker than that for family SMEs. Further investigation of our findings is necessary; their 
generalizability can be tested by using a sample of large and listed family firms. 
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Chapter 5: Study 3 - CEOs’ Religiosity and Corporate Proactivity 
Introduction 
Firms undertake CSR activities, or “context-specific organizational actions and policies 
that take into account stakeholders’ expectations and the triple bottom line of economic, social, 
and environmental performance” to contribute to sustainable development (Aguinis 2011, p. 855). 
One CSR issue is environmental concerns, and firms proactively engage in environmental 
management practices to address them. This proactive engagement, called environmental 
proactivity, is “the voluntary implementation of practices and initiatives aimed at improving 
environmental performance” (González-Benito and González-Benito 2006, p. 88). Environmental 
proactivity can be composed of a bundle of environmental practices in the firm’s context, such as 
reducing electricity and water consumption, pollution emissions, greenhouse gas emissions, and 
so on. The intensity of pro-environmental activities varies across firms and existing studies have 
antecedents such as organizational slack, governmental and self-regulations, peer pressure, 
stakeholder influence, and business ethics (Berchicci and King 2007). Nevertheless, these previous 
studies provided little insight into the micro-foundations of these activities, which are “individual 
action and interactions inside the firm” (Aguinis and Glavas 2012, p. 956).  
Among the micro-foundations of CSR, we investigate managerial religiosity as a new 
way of perceiving the drivers of environmental proactivity. Religiosity (or religious beliefs) is 
“belief in superhuman entities or powers, notions of afterlife” (Höllinger and Eder 2016, p. 4, 
Norris and Inglehart 2011). Because more than 82 percent of people worldwide believe that 
religion is important in their daily lives (Crabtree & Pelham, 2009), most managers would also 
have their thoughts on religion in the workplace (Chan-Serafin, Brief, & Geroge, 2013). 
Accordingly, managerial religiosity is a potential influential driver because managerial personal 
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values and beliefs would reflect the ethical tenets of religions, forming the core values of corporate 
environmental proactivity. Recent studies that adopt upper echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 
1984, Hambrick 2007) indicate that CEOs’ expertise, personality, emotions, and ideology 
influence diverse aspects of firm behaviors, like managerial risk taking, mergers and acquisitions, 
and technological adoption (e.g., Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, Gerstner et al. 2013, Gupta and 
Wowak 2017, Hayward and Hambrick 1997, Li and Tang 2010). Against the backdrop of these 
findings, we propose that a CEO’s religiosity leads to his/her firm’s environmental proactivity. 
Recent studies in economics and sociology report that individual religiosity triggers pro-
environmental attitudes and behaviors at the individual (Owen and Videras 2007) and societal 
levels (Barro and McCleary 2003, McCleary and Barro 2006). Accordingly, we expect that a 
CEO’s religiosity naturally affects corporate environmental proactivity, which are beyond his/her 
personal practices, but surely within his/her sphere of influence. 
The main thesis of this study is that a CEO’s religiosity promotes his/her firm’s 
environmental proactivity. A religious CEO tends to have strong religious role expectations to 
fulfill (Glock and Stark 1965, Weaver and Stansbury 2014). Such expectations evoke the CEO’s 
perception of monitoring to fulfill these roles by supernatural powers or religious members. The 
perception of monitoring would evoke cooperation with others to maintain public goods like 
natural resources. Because a CEO can wield power in corporate decision making, his/her firm will 
engage in more pro-environmental behaviors. Additionally, the positive impact of CEOs’ 
religiosity on his/her firm’s environmental proactivity will be alleviated as his/her decision-making 
style is participative rather than autocratic because intuitive ideas derived from a CEO’s religiosity 
are diluted through logical discussion with his/her subordinates in the decision-making process. 
Using unique survey data on CEOs’ religious beliefs and pro-environmental practices 
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from 1,184 small- and medium sized manufacturing companies in Tokyo, Japan, we categorized 
CEOs’ religious belief systems into eight classes through latent class modeling to identify classes 
by choice sets of religious beliefs from data rather than ad hoc choice sets of a single belief (Owen 
and Videras 2007). We found strong empirical support for the aforementioned relationships. In this 
study, we make two contributions to the literatures on corporate environmental proactivity, upper 
echelons, and religions. First, this is the first empirical study of how CEO’s religiosity influences 
corporate practices, providing a new theoretical view of the impact of CEOs’ novel personal 
characteristic, which is prevalent in society. Second, an individual’s religiosity triggers his/her 
firm’s environmental proactivity, suggesting a new analytical view of the micro-foundations of 
environmental proactivity. 
  
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Environmental integrity in sustainable development and its corporate micro-foundations 
Sustainable development rests on three principles: environmental integrity, social equity, 
and economic prosperity (Scherer et al. 2013). Although the sphere of the concept is not restricted 
to environmental concerns (e.g., Bansal 2002, 2005, Hart and Dowell 2011, Scherer et al. 2013), 
environmental integrity, which ensures that “human activities do not erode the earth’s land, air, 
and water resources” (Bansal 2005, p. 198), tends to attract the most attention in academia and 
practice (Bansal and Song 2017, Starik and Rands 1995). In response to the call for CSR, firms 
engage in environmental management practices to contribute to environmental integrity (Bansal 
and Song 2017). Beyond the mandatory environmental regulations of greenhouse gas and pollution 
emissions, energy consumption, and water consumption, firms often voluntarily adopt practices 
and initiatives to improve environmental integrity, called corporate environmental proactivity. 
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Although previous studies find antecedents of corporate environmental proactivity from 
diverse theoretical perspectives such as the resource-based perspective (Bansal 2005), agency 
theory (Calza et al. 2016), intuitional theory (Bansal 2005), and stakeholder theory (Bansal and 
Roth 2000, Freeman 1984, Henriques and Sadorsky 1999; Buysse and Verbeke 2003), their 
explanations are restricted mainly to corporate or institutional characteristics. Little research sheds 
light on the micro-foundations of environmental proactivity (Aguinis and Glavas 2012); how 
would individual action and interactions inside the firm form its environmental proactivity? This 
is not a small piece lacking in the picture of CSR. Recent strategy researchers shifted their focus 
to the behavioral aspects of the firm and find how collective actions emerge from individuals 
(Powell et al. 2011; Felin et al., 2015). 
The CEO’s personal values and beliefs as a micro-foundation is a possible factor in 
corporate environmental proactivity. A CEO’s values and beliefs are their principles or standards 
(Agle et al. 1999) influencing the decision-making processes, whether individuals realize it or not. 
It is thus important to understand how values influence engagement in corporate-level decisions 
(Hay and Gray 1974, Swanson 1999). An upper-echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason 1984, 
Hambrick 2007) explains top executives’ personal characteristics, including values and beliefs 
have a significant impact on their cognition and behaviors in diverse aspects of management (see 
a comprehensive review by Finkelstein et al. 2009). Because top executives determine a firm’s 
strategy for corporate sustainable development, managers’ personal values and beliefs would also 
influence the firm’s social strategies. For instance, Dahl et al. (2012) report that the male CEO of 
a small Danish firm changed his employees’ wages after fathering a child, which affected his 
personal values and beliefs. Accordingly, a CEO’s personal values and beliefs are associated with 
prosocial corporate behaviors. Nonetheless, few studies attempt to investigate what personal 
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values and beliefs promote or hinder corporate pro-environmental behaviors. 
Managerial religiosity as a micro-foundation of corporate environmental proactivity 
Among managers’ personal values and beliefs, their religiosity would be closely tied to 
corporate environmental proactivity because individual religiosity evokes individual morality, 
which is the theoretical origin of CSR. Early management studies argue that legal frameworks and 
managers’ moral responsibilities to society should guide their decisions related to labor, local 
communities, and product safety (see Bansal and Song 2017, Aguinis and Glavas 2012). In the 
organizational context, individual religiosity is closely tied to his/her morality, leading to prosocial 
behaviors. 
From social identity theory and schematic social cognition perspectives, Weaver and Agle 
(2002) explain how individual religiosity formulates individual cognitive schemas and behavioral 
scripts (Wimberley 1984, 1989). A religious individual has stronger levels of self-identification 
with a religion, which comes with affective, cognitive, and behavioral role expectations. Richer 
religious schemas and scripts enable individuals to identify more opportunities “to think, feel, and 
act in religiously informed ways” (Weaver and Stanbury 2014, p. 68). From these perspectives, 
several previous studies report that individual religiosity is prevalent at the workplace and leads to 
prosocial behaviors (e.g., Brief and Motowidlo, 1986; Kutcher et al, 2010). Nonetheless, these 
studies have yet to examine the linkage between managerial religiosity and firm-level prosocial 
behaviors quantitatively, which is observed qualitatively, even among Fortune 500 companies 
(Rossi, 2014).  
 We propose that a CEO’s religiosity will trigger the firm’s environmental proactivity. A 
religious CEO holds religious role expectations and is willing to take action to fulfill them. Because 
a CEO can wield considerable power to make decisions at the corporate level, his/her religiosity 
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will encourage corporate actions to fulfil religious role expectations (Glock and Stark 1965). 
Holding such religious role expectations, CEOs would perceive that they are being monitored to 
fulfill the expectations of supernatural agents and religious members (Johnson and Bering 2006, 
Rossano 2007). A strong perception of monitoring tends to solicit cooperative behaviors with 
others to maintain public goods (Atkinson and Bourrat 2011). For instance, Monsma (2007) report 
that people who regularly go to religious services are more likely to give time and money to 
charities. Likewise, Ben-Ner et al. (2009) empirically demonstrate that religious believers tend to 
offer and share a greater amount than non-believers in dictator game experiments. In light of 
environmental proactivity, Owen and Videras (2007) finds that religious individuals tend to show 
their pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s environmental proactivity is higher when its CEO has religious 
beliefs. 
Moderating impact of a CEO’s decision-making style 
 A CEO’s leadership in the decision-making process would moderate the impact of 
religiosity on the firm’s environmental proactivity. Leaders with an autocratic decision-making 
style maintains control of and responsibility for decisions with little involvement from followers, 
whereas those with a participative decision-making style allows a higher degree of followers’ 
involvement in making decisions through their direct or indirect voices (Kahai et al. 1997, Locke 
and Schweiger 1979, Koopman and Wierdsma 1998, Somech 2006). Participative decision making 
enables group members to engage in decision making. Group decision-making tends to reduce 
errors and aggregate knowledge compared to individual decision making because group members 
typically bring diverse perspectives to consider issues from different angles (Kerr and Tindale 2004, 
Larrick 2016). Additionally, because discussion in a collective decision-making process inevitably 
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promotes logical reasoning to explicitly explain ideas to group members, abstract ideas from 
personal intuitions and values would be diluted. 
The link between a CEO’s religious beliefs and the firm’s environmental proactivity 
would be weaker under a participative rather than an autocratic decision-making style. Although a 
CEO with a participative decision-making style is intuitively urged by his/her religiosity to engage 
in corporate pro-environmental activities, he/she may have to rationally explain to his/her 
subordinates (who may not hold the same religiosity) why such pro-environmental activities are 
required to achieve his/her firm’ goals. The CEO would not provide logical reasons to persuade 
subordinates to agree. On the other hand, a CEO with an autocratic decision-making style can 
initiate pro-environmental activities at will, following his/her religiosity. Accordingly, we propose 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: A CEO’s decision-making style moderates the positive impact of his/her 
religiosity on the firm’s environmental proactivity, such that as his/her decision-making 
style is participative, the impact of his/her religiosity is weaker. 
 
Research Methods 
Data collection and sample 
 To tackle our research questions, we conducted a survey of SMEs in 2016. The target 
firms are incorporated manufacturers located in the Tokyo metropolitan area that satisfy the 
following conditions: either the firm has fewer than three hundred employees or have capital of 
less than three hundred million yen. The conditions are in line with the Small and Medium 
Enterprise Basic Act for manufacturing industries in Japan. TOKYO SHOKO RESEARCH, LTD, 
the largest credit reporting agency established in Japan identified the names and addresses of firms 
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that meet these conditions. The number of corresponding firms is 15,111. 
 For this survey, we used the mail-web mixed mode strategy (Groves et al. 2009). 
Specifically, we first sent a hard copy of our questionnaire and cover letter along with the 
respondent's identification number and password required to answer the survey online to each of 
the target firms on November 12, 2016. We then sent a follow-up letter to each firm two weeks 
after mailing the survey. We asked the respondents to answer the questionnaire by December 9 
either by mail or online. We obtained responses from 1,499 firms, a response rate of 9.9 percent.  
 One of the important features of this survey is that we requested CEOs to answer the 
questionnaire themselves because our analysis requires data on their religious beliefs as well as 
their decisions on environmental practices. Because the target firms are SMEs, the CEOs directly 
provided almost all responses. This would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for large-sized 
firms: CEOs of large-sized firms rarely answer questionnaires themselves, even if they are 
appointed as survey respondents. To prevent possible bias in the estimation results from responses 
from non-CEOs, this study only uses responses in which CEOs answered themselves. 
Determining religious belief systems 
Japan’s Religious Background. The religious composition of Japan is remarkably different 
from that of Western countries, where Judeo-Christian values are predominant. Buddhism and 
Shinto are the dominant religions in Japan, which account for 45 percent and 51 percent of the 
Japanese population, respectively. In contrast, Christianity represents only approximately one 
percent (Japanese Agency for Cultural Affairs 2016). In particular, Shinto and Buddhism played 
an important role at various points of Japanese history (Kuroda et al. 1981), thereby deeply rooting 
them in Japanese culture. 
It is worth noting that most Japanese people tend to consider themselves non-religious; 
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they have no interest in limiting their daily behaviors to specific religious rules and teachings (Ama 
2005). Because Japanese people tend to feel it unnecessary to commit to any particular religion, 
they are flexible in incorporating events from different religions into their daily life. For example, 
even those who adhere to a religion besides Christianity enjoy celebrating Christmas and holding 
parties as year-end events. Likewise, many Christians do not hesitate to attend Shinto weddings or 
Buddhist funerals. Since Shinto, Buddhism, and Christianity are combined together in this manner, 
Japanese people consider these events not as part of religious activities, but rather traditions (Ama 
2005). 
This feature of Japan does not mean that Japanese people are non-religious. Even if 
Japanese people are less religious, they certainly have religious beliefs. According to worldwide 
social surveys such as the World Values Survey (WVS) and the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), Japanese people more or less believe in religious concepts such as life after 
death, heaven, and hell. For example, the religion module of the ISSP 2008 shows that about half 
of Japanese people believe in life after death and heaven. These facts may indicate that religious 
attendance or expressed religious affiliation do not tell accurately what Japanese people see as 
important for realizing their religious values. 
Another important feature of Japanese religious backgrounds is that religious affiliation 
is a delicate subject. Even the few Japanese people who are religious do not wish to talk about 
their religious affiliation with those they do not know well because they keep their religious 
affiliations a private and family affair. Within this context, Japanese society has a tacit agreement 
to avoid conversation about religion. Therefore, it is quite difficult for Japanese scholars to collect 
data about religious affiliations through a questionnaire. 
CEOs’ Religious Beliefs. We measured CEOs’ religious beliefs using responses to the  
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Table 10: Religious Belief Distribution 
 
 
questions “(d)o you believe in each of the following religious concepts: (1) life after death (𝑌1), 
(2) heaven (𝑌 ), (3) hell (𝑌3), (4) religious miracles (𝑌4), (5) reincarnation, meaning “being 
recurring rebirth in this world,” (𝑌5), (6) nirvana, which is a Buddhism term to mean “the highest 
spiritual state possible,” (𝑌 ), and (7) super natural power of deceased ancestors (𝑌7)?” Our 
questionnaire uses the same wording for questions about religious beliefs as the ISSP survey. 
However, we adapted the answer options to Japanese religious culture; specifically, we provide 
"don’t know" as an answer option, in addition to "yes" and "no" as in the ISSP survey because 
the “don’t know” option may play an important role in comprehending religious beliefs among 
Japanese people, given that many tend to have a passive view of religion (Tanaka 2010). In fact, 
according to the six waves of the WVS, 31.2 percent of respondents in Japan report “don’t 
know” for the question “(d)o you believe in God?” in contrast to zero percent in the U.S., 9.2 
percent in China, and 4.5 percent in Spain. Moreover, in terms of the existence of hell, 40.2 
percent of Japanese respondents report “don’t know,” which is the largest share among surveyed 
countries. 𝑌𝑗  (𝑗 =  , … , 7) takes the nominal value of 1, 2, or 3, for responses of yes, no, or 
don’t know, respectively. 
 For this study, we use 1,355 observations where CEOs respond to all seven religious 
concepts. Table 10 presents the distribution of the responses for each religious concept. The 
Yes 268 (19.8%) 217 (16.0%) 166 (12.3%) 162 (12.0%) 279 (20.6%) 341 (25.2%) 363 (26.8%)
No 466 (34.4%) 507 (37.4%) 544 (40.1%) 575 (42.4%) 471 (34.8%) 389 (28.7%) 417 (30.8%)
Don't know 621 (45.8%) 631 (46.6%) 645 (47.6%) 618 (45.6%) 605 (44.6%) 625 (46.1%) 575 (42.4%)
Note: N=1,355.
Afterlife
Supernatural
powerNirvanaReincarnationMiraclesHellHeaven
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Table 11: The Ten Most Frequent Response Patterns for Religious Concepts 
 
 
results show that respondents are more likely to believe in nirvana and super natural power than 
the other religious concepts. In contrast, respondents are more likely to disbelieve in miracles 
and hell than other concepts. Importantly, "don't know" occupies the largest share for each 
religious concept, like in the WVS. For example, 45.8 percent, 46.6 percent, and 47.6 percent of 
respondents answered "don't know" for afterlife, heaven, and hell, respectively. These results 
seem to be in line with the view that many Japanese are vague and uncertain about religion. 
We observe a great deal of heterogeneity in CEOs’ religious beliefs, with 262 unique 
response patterns. To investigate the distribution of response patterns, we sort them according to 
frequency in descending order. Table 11 presents the ten most frequent patterns. The mass seems 
to be concentrated on the two most frequent patterns, "don't know" for all religious concepts is the 
most frequent (28.0%), while the second is "no" for all concepts (19.5%). These two patterns apply 
to approximately half of respondents; in contrast, the other half yields 260 patterns, each of which 
occupies a very small share: the third, fourth, and fifth most frequent patterns account for only 
3.6% ("yes" for all), 2.6% ("don't know" for all except supernatural power), and 1.7% ("no" for all 
except nirvana). 
Rank Afterlife Heaven Hell Miracles Reincarnation Nirvana
Supernatural
power
Cumulative
percentage
1 DK DK DK DK DK DK DK 28.0
2 N N N N N N N 47.5
3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 51.1
4 DK DK DK DK DK DK Y 53.7
5 N N N N N Y N 55.4
6 N N N N N N Y 56.6
7 Y Y Y N Y Y Y 57.8
8 DK DK DK DK DK Y DK 59.0
9 DK DK DK N DK DK DK 60.1
10 N N N N N DK N 61.0
Note 1: Y, N, and DK imply Yes, No, and Don't know response, respectively. N=1,355.
 96 
 
In the following, we examine whether and how CEOs' religious beliefs influence their 
firms' pro-environmental practices, relying on insights from Owen and Videras’ (2007) argument 
that religiosity is a multi-dimensional construct consisting of beliefs about various religious 
concepts, suggesting the need to measure a complex set of beliefs to explore how religiosity affects 
human behaviors. Based on their argument, we examine the combination of religious beliefs CEOs 
hold (i.e., CEOs’ religious belief systems) as a determinant of their firms’ pro-environmental 
practices. Accordingly, we apply the same empirical methodology as Owen and Videras (2007) 
did. Specifically, we take a set of observed religious beliefs as an indicator for unobserved CEOs’ 
religious systems and thereby classify similar CEOs into groups using Latent Class Analysis 
(LCA). We then use latent class memberships as determinants of firm’s environmental practices. 
Latent Class Model. LCA is a statistical method to identify underlying subgroups (i.e., 
latent classes) that explain relationships among observed data. LCA has proven highly useful for 
modeling complex behaviors, including alcohol drinking (Bucholz et al. 1996), gambling addiction 
in young adults (Chamberlain et al. 2017), weight-loss strategies among women (Lanza et al. 2010), 
and marijuana use (Chung et al. 2006). However, researchers in social sciences often do not use 
LCA for standard cluster analysis, although it may be a better choice for achieving their research 
purposes (Andersen et al. 2014). LCA has a number of advantages over other types of clustering 
techniques, the most important of which is that LCA is a model-based approach (Magidson and 
Vermunt 2002) that assumes a sample drawn from a population consisting of a finite number of 
latent classes. Additionally, LCA adopts a probabilistic approach; we can thus choose the number 
of classes less subjectively in a statistical manner. Moreover, LCA provides superior accuracy in 
the classifications over standard clustering and has a lower rate of miss-classification (Magidson 
and Vermunt 2002). 
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 To reduce the 262 unique response patterns to more fundamental underlying religious 
belief systems, we assume that the population of CEOs consists of 𝑇 mutually exclusively latent 
classes denoted by 𝑞 ∈ { , 2, … , 𝑇} . We assume that CEOs within the same class are 
homogeneous; in other words, the probability of observing a particular response to religious 
concept 𝑌𝑗  (𝑗 =  , 2, … , 7) depends only on the CEO’s latent class. We further assume that a set 
of variables 𝑌 = (𝑌1, ⋯ , 𝑌7)  are associated with each other only through their latent class. 
Essentially, the latent class is why they are correlated. This assumption, called local independence, 
is standard in the literature. 
 Under these assumptions, the joint probability of 𝑌 is 
Pr(𝑌) = ∑𝜋𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
∙ ∏Pr(𝑌𝑗 = 𝑦𝑗|𝑞 = 𝑡)
7
𝑗=1
, (1) 
where 𝜋𝑡 = Pr(𝑞 = 𝑡) is the mixing proportion (also called the prior probability) for class 𝑡, 
with the restriction that ∑ 𝜋𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 =   (probabilities must sum up to one). The probability for the 
discrete choice a CEO makes among the three alternatives (yes, no, don’t know) for religious 
concept 𝑗, given that the CEO belongs to class 𝑡, is assumed to take a multinomial logit form: 
Pr{𝑌𝑗 = 𝑘|𝑞 = 𝑡} =
exp(𝜇𝑗𝑘)
∑ exp(𝜇𝑗𝑘)
3
𝑘=1
             (𝑘 =  , 2, 3), (2) 
where 𝜇𝑗𝑘 is a free parameter. For normalization, we set 𝜇𝑗1 =  .  
 We estimate the parameters 𝜇𝑗𝑘  and 𝜋𝑡  for 𝑗 =  , 2, … ,7 , 𝑘 = 2, 3 , and 𝑞 =
 , 2, … , 𝑇 by maximum likelihood. Using these estimated parameters and the Bayes theorem, we 
compute the posterior probability, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡, which is the probability that CEO 𝑖 belongs to class 
𝑡, conditional on observing his/her response to each religious concept. 
We determine the final number of latent classes by an iterative process. We first estimate the model 
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Table 12: Fit Statistics for the Latent Class Model 
 
 
assuming only one class, then re-estimate the model with two classes, then increase the number of 
classes to three and re-estimate, and so on. We chose the optimal number of classes based on the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978). 
Latent Class Model Results. Table 12 reports the goodness of fit results, based on the BIC 
and p-value of the Pearson statistic. We estimated models with up to 15. The results indicate that 
the model with 8 classes is the best fitting solution compared to the other models because it has 
the lowest BIC.  
Table 13 shows the probability structure of the 8 classes model, which provides a basis 
for interpreting and labeling the classes. As Table 13 shows, 26.0 percent of CEOs consist of class 
1 (𝜋1 =26.0%), named the “secular class,” characterized as high probabilities of reporting “no” 
for all religious concepts. For example, if CEOs are in class 1, they will answer “no” for belief in 
an afterlife with a probability of 96.2 %, for heaven with a probability of 100%, and for hell with 
a probability of 100%. Latent class 2 (𝜋 =34.0%) is the largest class. CEOs in this class showed   
1 class -9768.70 19638.36 14 <0.001
2 classes -7013.33 14235.80 29 <0.001
3 classes -5958.93 12235.17 44 <0.001
4 classes -5718.63 11862.74 59 <0.001
5 classes -5527.31 11588.27 74 0.800
6 classes -5436.98 11515.78 89 1.000
7 classes -5353.29 11456.58 104 1.000
8 classes -5294.31 11446.79 119 1.000
9 classes -5258.18 11482.71 134 1.000
10 classes -5242.47 11559.47 149 1.000
11 classes -5227.16 11637.02 164 1.000
12 classes -5211.10 11713.07 179 1.000
13 classes -5196.94 11792.93 194 1.000
14 classes -5187.17 11881.56 209 1.000
15 classes -5169.84 11955.07 224 1.000
Note: N=1,355
The number of
parametersBICLog likelihood
p-value of
 Pearson statistic
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Table 13: Probability Structure of the Model with 8 Classes 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 Class 6 Class 7 Class 8
Indicators 0.260 0.340 0.090 0.083 0.072 0.072 0.042 0.041
Afterlife
Yes 0.010 0.012 0.384 0.898 0.651 0.021 0.160 0.651
No 0.962 0.014 0.036 0.001 0.342 0.745 0.115 0.056
0.029 0.974 0.580 0.101 0.008 0.234 0.725 0.293
Heaven
Yes 0.000 0.002 0.040 0.989 0.412 0.001 0.073 0.994
No 1.000 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.587 0.976 0.001 0.004
0.000 0.998 0.951 0.010 0.001 0.023 0.926 0.002
Hell
Yes 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.922 0.280 0.000 0.018 0.606
No 1.000 0.000 0.011 0.049 0.719 0.978 0.045 0.286
0.000 1.000 0.989 0.029 0.001 0.022 0.937 0.108
Miracles
Yes 0.020 0.002 0.258 0.683 0.275 0.099 0.037 0.130
No 0.970 0.046 0.103 0.218 0.687 0.557 0.831 0.110
0.010 0.953 0.639 0.099 0.038 0.344 0.132 0.761
Reincarnation
Yes 0.020 0.009 0.621 0.918 0.565 0.100 0.136 0.285
No 0.980 0.004 0.011 0.055 0.422 0.364 0.680 0.016
0.000 0.987 0.368 0.027 0.012 0.536 0.184 0.700
Nirvana
Yes 0.086 0.039 0.619 0.879 0.601 0.400 0.130 0.239
No 0.878 0.000 0.016 0.027 0.346 0.067 0.600 0.002
0.037 0.961 0.366 0.094 0.053 0.532 0.270 0.760
Supernatural power
Yes 0.068 0.077 0.700 0.890 0.643 0.202 0.201 0.432
No 0.908 0.001 0.044 0.070 0.307 0.211 0.556 0.019
0.025 0.922 0.256 0.040 0.049 0.587 0.244 0.549
Note: The cells larger than 0.5 are highlighted. Each religious class is described as follows.
                 Class 1: "Secular class," very high probability of disbelieving on all indicators. 
                 Class 2: "Ambivalent class," very high probability of  "don't know" on all indicators. 
                 Class 3: Relative high probability of believing in reincarnation, nirvana, and supernatural power.
                 Class 4: "Strong believers," very high response probabilities on all indicators.
                 Class 5: Relative high probability of believing in life after death, nirvana, and supernatural power.
                 Class 6: Relative high probability of disbelieving in life after death, heaven, and hell.
                 Class 7: Relative high probability of disbelieving in reincarnation, and supernatural power.
                 Class 8: Relative high probability of believing in life after death, heaven, and hell.
         N=1,355.
Don't know
Don't know
Don't know
Don't know
Don't know
Don't know
Don't know
𝜋𝑡
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a high probability of reporting “don’t know” for each religious concept, which we may refer to 
as the “ambivalent class.” CEOs in latent class 3 (𝜋3 =9.0%) tend to believe in Buddhism 
concepts such as reincarnation, nirvana, and supernatural power, while they are unsure about the 
existence of heaven and hell. Latent class 4 (𝜋4 =8.3%) is the “strong believer class” with a high 
probability of reporting “yes” for each concept. Class 5 (𝜋5 =7.2%) shows a response pattern 
that reflects high probabilities of reporting “yes” for life after death, nirvana, and supernatural 
power, while disbelieving in hell and miracles. We refer to Class 6 (𝜋 =7.2%) to as the “not 
believing life after death class,” because CEOs in this class are characterized by relatively high 
probabilities of reporting “no” for concepts related to life after death such as heaven and hell. 
Latent class 7 (𝜋7 =4.2%) includes CEOs who tend to answer “no” for all Buddhism concepts. 
Finally, latent class 8 (𝜋8 =4.1%) is characterized by high probabilities of answering “yes” for 
concepts related to the afterlife and answering “don’t know” for Buddhism concepts. 
Variables and measures 
In our questionnaire, we asked CEOs whether their firms adopt each of the 19 
environmental practices (see the Note of Table 14), which reflect a firm’s environmental 
proactivity. We identified these environmental practices by interviewing multiple CEOs and 
researchers of environmental economics and management. Our dependent variable (𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖) is 
the number of the categories for which CEO 𝑖 answered “yes,” which takes a non-negative integer 
value. There are few large counts, with 90% of the observation taking values of less than 11. By 
asking about the actual adoption of environmental practices as an objective measure, we attenuated 
possible common method variance such that it will not be a threat to this study’s validity (Fuller 
et al. 2016). 
Using information from the survey, we also construct a set of control variables (𝐱𝑖) that 
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affect firms’ environmental practices based on prior studies in the literature. The control variables 
reflect both firm and CEO demographics. First, to control for the extent of family influence in a 
firm, we use the family ownership ratio. Because a family plays an important role in determining 
the vision and control mechanisms in family firms (Anderson et al. 2012), which are typical among 
SMEs, family ownership may significantly influence the key decisions and direction of the firm. 
To capture familiness further, we also include a dummy variable for whether a firm name is derived 
from the family’s name. In our sample, 22.2 percent of the firms use the family name as part of 
their firm name. 
CEOs’ religious affiliation also has potential importance in understanding their firm’s 
environmental behaviors. Previous literature highlights the role of religious affiliation on 
individual environmental practices (Minton, Kahle, & Kim, 2015; Morrison, Duncan, & Parton, 
2015). In fact, attitude toward nature is fundamental to many religious doctrines. For example, 
Buddhism includes deep respect for the natural environment (Du, Jian, Zeng, & Du, 2014) and has 
a long history of addressing environmental issues (Gottlieb, 2017). Therefore, A CEO’s religion 
may affect his/her firm’s environmental practices. Although an individual’s religious affiliation 
seems to be associated with their religious belief systems, religious affiliation does not completely 
determine religious belief systems, and vice versa. Owen and Videras (2007) indicate that these 
two factors do not necessarily correspond one-to-one. Our data also contains some variation within 
each religion, and none of the classes consists of only one religious affiliation when we assign each 
individual into the class in which the posterior class membership probability is the highest. For 
example, Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian believers consist of 8 classes, 6 classes, and 5 classes, 
respectively. This implies that individuals may have different religious belief systems, even if they 
believe in the same religion. In line with Owen and Videras (2007), we focus on the effect of CEOs’ 
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religious belief systems on their firms’ environmental behavior after controlling for their religious 
affiliation (Buddhism, Shinto, other affiliation, no affiliation, decline to answer/no answer). 
Firm age may be associated with environmental proactivity. Because older firms may be 
able to accumulate resources, knowledge, and ability to handle uncertainty (Levitt and March 
1988), it is possible that these firms are more likely to invest in environmental practices. 
Additionally, large firms can achieve economies of scale and access enough resources for 
environmental practices. To control for these effects, we include the natural logarithm of firm age 
as in previous studies, as well as firm size measured by the natural logarithm of annual sales. 
Other control variables that capture CEO demographics, are CEO tenure (measured by 
the natural logarithm of years as CEO), educational level (a dummy variable for whether a CEO 
has a Bachelor’s degree or higher), age (the natural logarithm of CEO age), and sex (a dummy 
variable for whether CEO is male). Extant literature shows that age (Deakin et al. 2004, Taylor 
1975) and tenure (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990, Wiersema and Bantel 1992) affect firms’ 
investment decisions. These factors influence the extent to which CEOs are willing to take risks 
and information-processing demands when making important strategic decisions (Laufs et al. 
2016). For example, the longer CEOs’ tenure is, the more CEOs tend to maintain the organizational 
status quo (Hambrick et al. 1993). In contrast, because CEOs with short tenure have fresh 
information and flexible attitudes (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1990), they may be more likely to 
take risks. Therefore, these CEO demographics may be valid indicators of cognitive capabilities 
(Carpenter et al. 2003, Hambrick and Mason 1984). After removing incomplete responses, we have 
1,184 firms for the estimation. In Table 14, we present the descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the regression and the correlations among the variables. 
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Table 14: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Min 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
Dependent variable
1. The number of environmental practices 6.44 3.75 0 19
Instrument variable
2.
0.04 0.20 0 1 .00
Class membership probability
3. class 1 0.32 0.45 0 1 .02 -.06
4. class 2 0.26 0.43 0 1 -.08 -.08 -.44
5. class 3 0.09 0.26 0 1 .01 .00 -.16 -.22
6. class 4 0.09 0.26 0 1 .02 .09 -.23 -.20 -.11
7. class 5 0.07 0.23 0 1 .06 .07 -.23 -.14 -.11 -.01
8. class 6 0.08 0.25 0 1 -.03 .04 -.23 -.13 -.11 -.11 -.03
9. class 7 0.04 0.19 0 1 .01 .02 -.14 -.14 -.02 -.07 -.07 -.07
10. class 8 0.04 0.18 0 1 .04 .04 -.15 -.14 -.06 .01 -.06 -.07 -.05
CEO attributes
11.
0.83 0.37 0 1 .14 .01 .03 -.07 .02 -.03 .04 .05 -.01 .03
12. CEO education (d)    (=1 if CEO has a bachelor's degree) 0.68 0.47 0 1 .10 .05 .00 .00 -.03 .01 .03 .02 -.06 .01 .03
13. CEO tenure 17.70 14.25 1 73 -.05 .00 -.01 .02 -.01 .00 -.02 -.02 .04 -.03 -.16 -.04
14. CEO age 60.50 11.52 29 92 -.05 .00 .01 .05 .00 -.04 -.05 .01 .03 -.05 -.10 -.03 .60
15. Gender (d)     (=1 if CEO is a male) 0.95 0.22 0 1 .04 -.01 .00 .07 -.07 .01 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.03 .15 .08 .01
Firm Attributes
16. Family ownership ratio 0.73 0.34 0 1 -.12 -.03 -.03 .00 .05 .03 .01 -.04 -.02 .04 -.11 -.09 .23 -.05 -.07
17. The number of employees (ln) 2.36 1.10 1 7.03 .29 .00 .10 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.02 .01 -.04 .24 .14 -.09 -.07 .06 -.26
18. Family name (d)     (=1 if family's name is part of firm's name) 0.22 0.42 0 1 .14 .03 .03 -.06 .01 .01 .00 -.04 .05 .04 .04 .12 .17 .11 .05 .05 .33
19. Firm age (year) 50.47 30.76 1 357 .02 -.03 -.03 .03 -.01 -.01 .01 -.01 .04 .01 -.07 .05 .06 .00 .07 .19 .04 .26
Religious Affiliation
20. 0.10 0.30 0 1 .03 .01 -.01 -.06 .01 .07 .01 .04 -.02 .01 -.02 .03 .06 .09 .06 .07 -.05 .07 .06
21. 0.01 0.12 0 1 .02 .05 -.01 -.05 .10 -.01 .05 -.01 -.02 -.03 .04 .04 .06 .00 .00 .03 .02 .00 .00 -.04
22. 0.02 0.13 0 1 -.01 .14 -.07 -.02 .03 .02 .11 .01 -.03 .01 .02 -.01 .04 .02 .03 .03 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.05 -.02
23. No Affiliation (d) 0.01 0.08 0 1 -.02 -.06 .05 .06 -.05 -.05 -.07 -.04 .06 -.03 .00 -.04 -.04 -.05 -.05 -.05 .04 -.04 -.04 -.72 -.26 -.27
24. 0.30 0.46 0 1 -.01 -.03 -.02 .02 .00 -.01 .01 .01 -.05 .05 .00 .01 -.07 -.06 .00 -.04 .01 -.01 -.01 -.08 -.03 -.03 -.48
Mean Std. dv. Max
Decision style (d)
    (=1 if CEO consult with others before making decision)
Buddhism (d)
Parental religiosity (d)
(=1 if CEO's parent have attended religious facilities every week)
Shinto (d)
Other Affiliation (d)
No answer/Decline to answer (d)
Note:  (ln) means natural logarithm and  (d) means dummy variable. Correlations whose absolute value exceeds 0.06 are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of significance, two-tailed test. The number of environmental practices consists
           of the following 19 environmental practices: (a) To set a goal of reducing paper usage (the mean is 0.08); (b) To assess overall paper usage every month (0.16); (c) To require employees to reduce copies (0.46); (d) To set a goal of reducing the
           amount of discharge (0.08); (e) To assess the amount of discharge every month (0.11); (f) To make waste separation and reduction (0.66); (g) To collect packaging materials (0.29); (h) To set a goal of reducing electricity usage (0.17); (i) To
           assess overall electricity usage every month (0.42); (j) To turn off the light when the  room is not used (0.70); (k) To turn the electronic devices off outside working hours (0.61); (l) To turn off the PC when not in use (0.56); (m) To maintain the
           proper temperature (28℃ in summer, 20℃ in winter) in the office (0.52); (n) To clean air conditioners and filters frequently (0.37); (o) To practice the "cool-biz" / "warm-biz" (0.48); (p) To cultivate employees the interest for environment issues
          (0.20); (q) To practice gene purchase when papers, stationary and electronic devices are in need (0.17); (r) To use a fuel-efficient vehicle as a company car (0.32); (s) To join the local environmental preservation activities (0.09).
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Estimation models 
Given a set of characteristics 𝐱𝑖 and religious class membership probabilities (𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔𝑖 =
(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖1, … , 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖8) ), we estimate the Poisson regression model. We model the following 
conditional mean function: 
𝜆𝑖 = 𝐸(e𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔𝑖) = exp (∑ 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
8
𝑡= 
+ 𝐱𝑖
′𝜷) , (3) 
where we drop the probability of secular class membership (𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖1) to avoid perfect collinearity 
because class membership probabilities must sum up to unity. 
Poisson distribution implies the assumption that the conditional mean is equal to variance 
(equidispersion). Nonetheless, in our data, the variance of the number of environmental practices 
(14.29) exceeds the mean (6.43), which is often the case with count variables. One might think 
that our data violates the Poisson assumption, and that the estimators would be inconsistent. 
However, we should note that the Poisson quasi maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) has a 
robustness property. It is consistent as long as we correctly specify the conditional mean function, 
even if we assume an incorrect distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 2013, Wooldridge 2010). For a 
robustness check, we also estimate Negative binomial models. 
A potential problem with estimating equation (3) is that 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡  (𝑡 = 2,… , 8) may be 
endogenous variables due to omitted factors. For instance, unobserved factors such as the degree 
of opportunism may affect environmental practices and may be correlated with religious belief 
systems at the same time. Another possible source of endogeneity is reverse causality. However, it 
is reasonable to assume that there is no reverse causality because it is highly unlikely that carrying 
out environmental practices affects the CEO’s religious belief system. Therefore, in the following, 
we assume that the omitted factors are the only source of endogeneity. 
To account for the possible endogeneity in religious latent class membership probability, 
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we modify equation (3) as follows: 
𝐸(e𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖|𝐱𝑖, 𝒄𝒍𝒂𝒔𝒔𝑖) = exp (∑ 𝛼𝑡𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡
8
𝑡= 
+ 𝐱𝑖
′𝛽 + ∑ 𝜌𝑡𝜔𝑖𝑡
8
𝑡= 
), (4) 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (𝑡 = 2,⋯ , 8) are unobserved variables that are potentially correlated with religious 
class probabilities 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 , and 𝜌𝑡  are the corresponding parameters. If the corresponding 
parameters are jointly zero (𝜌 = ⋯ = 𝜌8 =  ), the QMLE of equation (3) will be consistent. In 
contrast, if any 𝜌𝑡 is not equal to zero, the QMLE of equation (3) will be inconsistent.  
To address this issue, we apply Terza et al.'s (2008) proposed method. We specify a 
reduced form equation to formalize the relationship between 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 𝜔𝑖𝑡: 
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡𝑧𝑖) + 𝜔𝑖𝑡, (5) 
where 𝑔𝑡(∙) is some function and 𝑧𝑖 is an identifying instrument. This instrument variable must 
satisfy three conditions (Terza et al. 2008): it is not correlated with 𝜔𝑖𝑡, it is sufficiently correlated 
with 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡, and it cannot have a direct influence on 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖. 
Because 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 takes values in the unit interval [0, 1] and the sum of these probabilities 
is one, we choose the multinomial fractional logit function (Mullahy 2015, Papke and Wooldridge 
1996) for 𝑔𝑡(∙), which is an extension of the fractional regression methodology. 
𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) = 𝑔𝑡(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡𝑧𝑖) =
exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝜹𝑡𝑧𝑖)
∑ exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝜹𝑡𝑧𝑖)
8
t=1
   . (6) 
Identifying the fractional multinomial model requires normalizing one set of parameters. We 
normalize 𝜽1 = 𝜹1 = 𝟎; in other words, 
𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) =
 
 + ∑ exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝜹𝑡𝑧𝑖)
8
𝑡= 
    𝑡 =  , (7) 
𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖) =
exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝜹𝒕𝑧𝑖)
 + ∑ exp(𝐱𝑖
′𝜽𝑡 + 𝜹𝑡𝑧𝑖)
8
𝑡= 
         ∀𝑡 ≠  . (8) 
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We can estimate the multinomial fractional logit model by the quasi-maximum likelihood method 
(Geraci et al. 2016). 
Given equations (4), (7), and (8), we use the following two stage procedure. We first 
estimate a multinomial fractional logit model and compute the first stage residuals: 
?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡|𝐱𝑖, 𝑧𝑖)             𝑡 = 2,⋯ ,8. (9) 
In the second stage, we estimate equation (4) by substituting ?̂?𝑖𝑡 for the unobserved latent factors 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 . If the joint null hypothesis that 𝜌 = ⋯ = 𝜌8 =   is not rejected, we can treat the class 
probabilities 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 as exogenous variables (Geraci et al. 2016). 
For 𝑧𝑖, we use parental religiosity as an instrumental variable, which takes a value of 1 if 
the CEO’s parents attended religious activities such as a church and temple every week in the 
CEO’s childhood, and 0 otherwise. Our identification assumption is that parental religiosity is 
unrelated to factors that affect the degree of firms’ pro-environmental practices after controlling 
for religious latent class membership probability and other variables. 
 
Results 
 In Table 15, we report the estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parentheses 
when we assume latent class probabilities (𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗 , 𝑗 = 2, … ,8) are exogenous. As in column (1), 
the coefficients on 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠4, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠5, and 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠8 are positive and statistically significant at least at 
the ten, one, and five percent levels, respectively. This implies that CEOs belonging to class 4 
(belief in all religious concepts), class 5 (belief in life after death, nirvana, and supernatural power), 
and class 8 (belief in life after death, heaven, and hell) are more likely to introduce environmental 
practices to their firms than those belonging to the other classes. We also find that each religious 
affiliation is not significantly associated with the number of environmental practices. Although  
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Table 15: Estimation Results 
 
Class membership probability
0.05 0.25 † 0.06 0.24 †
(Don't know for all religious concepts) (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13)
0.09 0.15 0.09 0.15
(Yes for REI, NIR, & SNP) (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18)
0.10 † 0.15 0.11 † 0.14
(Yes for all religious concepts) (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18)
0.18 ** 0.58 ** 0.18 ** 0.55 **
(Yes for LAD, HEAVEN, & HELL) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.17)
0.00 0.19 0.01 0.18
(No for LAD, HEAVEN, & HELL) (0.07) (0.20) (0.07) (0.19)
0.10 0.56 ** 0.11 0.56 **
(No for REI, , NIR, & SNP) (0.09) (0.21) (0.09) (0.21)
0.19 * 0.53 * 0.20 * 0.51 *
(Yes for LAD, HEAVEN, & HELL) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) (0.24)
Decision style ∗ class 2 -0.24 † -0.22
(0.14) (0.14)
class 3 -0.08 -0.07
(0.19) (0.19)
class 4 -0.05 -0.04
(0.19) (0.19)
class 5 -0.46 * -0.44 *
(0.19) (0.19)
class 6 -0.23 -0.21
(0.21) (0.20)
class 7 -0.55 * -0.56 **
(0.23) (0.23)
class 8 -0.40 † -0.37
(0.23) (0.25)
CEO attributes
Decision style (d) 0.13 * 0.30 ** 0.14 ** 0.30 **
(0.05) (0.1) (0.05) (0.1)
CEO education (d) 0.06 † 0.07 * 0.06 † 0.07 †
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CEO tenure (ln) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
CEO age (ln) -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Gender (d) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Firm Attributes
Family ownership ratio -0.10 † -0.11 * -0.10 † -0.10 †
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
The number of employees (ln) 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm age (ln) 0.04 † 0.04 † 0.04 † 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Family name (d) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Religious affiliation
Buddhism (d) 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Shinto (d) 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Other affiliation (d) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
No Affiliation (d) 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Constant 1.54 1.38 1.54 1.40
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45)
The number of environmental practices
Poisson (1) Poisson (2) Neg. bin. (3) Neg. bin. (4)
class 7
class 8
Note: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  (ln) means natural logarithm and  (d) means dummy variable. The reference group for posterior
         class membership probabilities is Class1 (Secular class). The reference group for religious affiliation is "refuse to answer/no answer."  †, *,  and
         ** imply that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N=1,184.
class 2
class 3
class 4
class 5
class 6
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this result differs from that of Owen and Videras (2007), the point is that a CEO’s religious belief 
systems significantly predict the number of their firm’s environmental practices, even after 
controlling for CEOs’ religious affiliation and other control variables. 
 According to the point estimates, a change in class membership probability from zero to 
one for classes 4, 5, and 8 leads to a 10.3, 17.8, and 19.1 percent increase, respectively, in the 
number of firms’ environmental practices. To investigate whether these class memberships actually 
have differential effects, we test the following three null hypotheses: 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠4 = 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠5 , 
𝐻0: 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠5 = 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠8, and 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠4 = 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠8. We cannot reject any of these null hypotheses, 
even at the ten percent level, suggesting that these class memberships have the same effect on the 
number of firms’ environmental practices. 
One interpretation of this finding may be that the difference among these three religious 
belief systems does not really matter to firms’ environmental practices. Put differently, a common 
characteristic among these religious belief systems, which is "belief in life after death," may be the 
only important determinant influencing firms’ environmental practices. To see whether this is the 
case, we generate dummy variables for the observed attitudes (“yes,” “no,” and “don’t know”) 
towards each religious concept, and estimate an alternative model with these variables instead of 
the class membership probabilities. In this model, we use “no” as the reference category for each 
religious concept. If the coefficients on 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠4 , 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠5 , and 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠8 capture only the positive 
effect of belief in life after death on the number of proactive environmental practices, the 
coefficient in the alternative model must be positive and statistically significant as well. However, 
as Table 16 shows, the estimated coefficient on “yes” for life after death is not significantly 
different from zero. It is also noteworthy that the other coefficients except for “don’t know” for 
life after death are not statistically significant, even at the ten percent level. These results strongly  
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Table 16: Estimation Results: Alternative Model Including Dummy Variables for Attitudes 
toward Each Religious Belief 
 
 
indicate that the complex religious belief systems CEOs hold, not belief in each religious concept 
per se, affect firms’ proactive environmental practices, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
 We further examine whether the effect of the religious belief systems weakens when the 
CEO’s has a participative decision-making style. For this purpose, we add to the original model 
Std. Err.
After Life
0.01 (0.07)
0.12 † (0.06)
Heaven
0.12 (0.08)
-0.03 (0.13)
Hell
-0.08 (0.08)
-0.02 (0.13)
Miracles
0.00 (0.05)
-0.06 (0.05)
Reincarnation
0.01 (0.07)
-0.05 (0.07)
Nirvana
0.01 (0.06)
0.02 (0.06)
Supernatural power
0.08 (0.06)
0.08 (0.06)
The number of
environmental practices
Don't know
Yes
Don't know
Yes
Yes
Don't know
Yes
Don't know
Yes
Don't know
Yes
Don't know
Don't know
Coef.
Yes
Note: Control variables are included. The reference group for religious affiliation is "refuse to answer/no answer." Robust standard
          errors are shown in parentheses. †, *, and ** imply that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and
          1% level, respectively. N=1,184.
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interaction terms 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 ∙ 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗 , 𝑗 = 2,… ,8, where 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 =   if the CEO’s 
decision-making style is participative. Column (2) of Table 15 reports the results. We find a slight 
difference in the coefficients of class membership probabilities between the original and extended 
models. For example, the coefficients on 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠  and 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠7 are positive and significant in the 
extended model, while not significant in the original model. In terms of size, the coefficients on 
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠4, 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠5, and 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠8 become larger than those in the original model. We also find that the 
interaction terms for classes 5 and 8 are negative and significant, while that for class 4 is not 
significant. These results imply that the moderating effects of decision-making style depend on 
religious belief systems. More specifically, the effect of membership for classes 5 and 8 is 
weakened when a CEO’s decision-making style is participative; in contrast, the effect of 
membership for class 4 remains the same, regardless of the CEOs' decision-making styles.  
 We calculate marginal effects at means (MEM) for each class membership probability. As 
Table 17 indicates, the MEMs for class 4, 5, and 8 membership probabilities are 0.65, 1.16, and 
1.26, respectively, for the number of firms’ pro-environmental practices in the original model. 
These results imply that CEOs belonging to classes 4, 5, and 8 carry out 0.65, 1.16, and 1.26 
additional environmental practices, respectively, compared to CEOs belonging to the secular class 
(class 2).  
 We also calculate MEMs for the model with the interaction terms, which we present in 
two different cases based on the value of 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒. When a CEO’s decision-making style 
is participative (column (2)-1), the effect of class membership disappears. In other words, religious 
beliefs do not play a role in determining environmental practices in this case. In contrast, if a 
CEO’s decision-making style is autocratic (column (2)-2), class memberships tends to matter: 1.33, 
3.60, 3.43, and 3.27 additional environmental practices for membership in classes 2, 5, 7, and 8, 
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Table 17: Marginal Effects 
 
 
respectively. In sum, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Robustness checks 
 To examine whether our main results are driven by the Poisson assumption, we also 
estimate negative binomial models. The results in columns (3) and (4) of Table 15 correspond to  
Class membership probability
class 2 0.33 0.11 1.33 †
(0.28) (0.31) (0.70)
class 3 0.56 0.48 0.75
(0.38) (0.42) (0.91)
class 4 0.65 † 0.63 0.73
(0.39) (0.41) (0.95)
class 5 1.16 * 0.76 3.60 **
(0.49) (0.52) (1.25)
class 6 0.02 -0.24 0.98
(0.41) (0.44) (1.07)
class 7 0.65 0.06 3.43 *
(0.58) (0.60) (1.60)
class 8 1.26 * 0.93 3.27 *
(0.61) (0.66) (1.59)
         Marginal effects of               are calculated as follows,
      
             where        is the coefficient of                           ,                   is the coefficient of                                       ,
                                           for ME (1), and                                      for ME (2)-1 and (2)-2.
Note: Control variables are included.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The reference group for posterior class
         membership probabilities is Class1 (Secular class). †, *, and ** imply that the coefficient is significantly different
         from zero at the 10%, 5%,
         and 1% level, respectively. N=1,184.
Poisson
(1) (2)-1 (2)-2
Poisson
Decision style = 1 Decision style = 0
The number of
Environmental Practices
 𝐸(1) = exp ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂? 𝑠  𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝐱 𝑖
′ ̂ − exp ?̂? 𝑠  𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒 + 𝐱 𝑖
′ ̂
 𝐸   1 = exp ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂? 𝑠 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 + ?̂? 𝑠 + 𝐱 𝑖
′  ̂ − exp ?̂? 𝑠 + 𝐱 𝑖
′  ̂
 𝐸    = exp ?̂?𝑗 + 𝐱 𝑖
′ ̂ − exp 𝐱 𝑖
′ ̂
𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑖
𝜷 = 𝛽 𝑠 , 𝛽  𝑠 𝜷 = 𝛽 𝑠 , 𝛽 𝑠 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 ,
𝛽 𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖 ?̂? 𝑠 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑠𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑖 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗
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Table 18: Estimation Result: Assumption of Endogeneity 
 
CEOs' parental religiosity (d) -0.42 0.30 1.39 ** 1.07 * 0.96 † 0.96 1.21 †
(0.56) (0.61) (0.46) (0.50) (0.54) (0.69) (0.65)
CEO attributes
Decision style -0.22 0.09 -0.26 0.28 0.47 -0.01 0.48
(0.20) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) (0.41) (0.44)
CEO education (d) 0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.22 0.18 -0.54 † 0.20
(0.17) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.32)
CEO tenure (ln) -0.01 -0.11 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.22 0.03
(0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.22)
CEO age (ln) 0.42 0.15 -1.20 † -1.10 † 0.07 -0.15 -1.38
(0.52) (0.65) (0.67) (0.66) (0.68) (0.85) (0.90)
Gender (d) 0.71 † -0.58 0.04 -0.28 -0.22 -0.30 -0.77
(0.42) (0.39) (0.51) (0.46) (0.49) (0.57) (0.56)
Firm Attributes
Family ownership ratio 0.02 0.40 0.17 -0.02 -0.34 -0.54 0.34
(0.25) (0.38) (0.38) (0.35) (0.34) (0.48) (0.55)
The number of employees (ln) -0.14 † -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19 † -0.15 -0.38 **
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Firm age (ln) -0.15 0.11 0.08 0.00 -0.14 0.31 * 0.36
(0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.23)
Family name (d) 0.26 -0.03 -0.07 0.21 0.15 0.45 0.13
(0.19) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33) (0.37)
Religious Affiliation
Buddhism (d) -0.61 0.03 0.46 -0.17 0.03 1.76 * -0.69
(0.42) (0.54) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56) (0.85) (0.66)
Shinto (d) -1.04 1.25 † -0.56 0.47 -0.65 0.31 -6.65 **
(0.90) (0.75) (1.09) (0.83) (1.15) (1.25) (1.02)
Other Affiliation (d) 0.64 1.57 1.27 2.02 * 1.01 1.12 0.35
(0.95) (0.98) (1.01) (0.94) (1.08) (1.29) (1.40)
No Affiliation (d) -0.24 -0.22 -0.16 -0.44 -0.41 2.16 ** -0.97 †
(0.33) (0.46) (0.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.72) (0.53)
Constant -1.38 -1.24 3.45 3.44 -0.56 -4.01 3.66
(2.15) (2.79) (2.80) (2.70) (2.82) (3.31) (3.81)
2nd stage
-2.02 -5.36 -0.58 2.06 -4.58 -0.83 -3.22
(2.00) (2.70) (1.91) (2.37) (2.52) (2.14) (2.05)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses for 1st stage estimation results, while we show the bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses for
          the raw residuals that are added to the 2nd stage equation (the number of replications is 500).  (ln) means natural logarithm and  (d) means
          dummy variable. The reference group for religious affiliation is "refuse to answer/no answer." We can reject the null hypothesis that all
          coefficients associated with CEOs' parental religiosity are 0                                          †, *,  and ** imply that the coefficient is significantly
          different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. N=1,184.
class 8
1st stage
(Multinomial fractional logit
model)
Instrument variable
The number of
environmental practices
class 3 class 4 class 5 class 6 class 7
Religious class membership probabilities
class 2
?̂?7
(  = 7.45  𝑝 < . 5).
?̂? ?̂?3 ?̂?4 ?̂?5 ?̂? ?̂?8
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the models without and with the interaction terms, respectively. The results of the negative 
binomial models are qualitatively similar to those of the Poisson models in terms of both the 
significance and size of the estimated coefficients. Therefore, our results do not seem to depend 
on the Poisson assumption. 
These results would not be legitimate if class probabilities are endogenous. To test for the 
exogeneity in 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑗 (𝑗 = 2, . . . ,8), we first need to check the relevance of the instrument in the 
reduced form equations for latent class membership probabilities. In the upper part of Table 18, 
we report the results of the first stage regressions. The coefficients on CEO’s parental religiosity 
are positive and statistically significant, except for the equations for classes 2, 3 and 7. Further, we 
can reject the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on CEOs’ parental religiosity are all 
simultaneously zero at the five percent level (𝐻0: 𝛿 = ⋯ = 𝛿8 =  , 𝜒
 =  7.45, 𝑝 =  .  4).  
Thus, this variable satisfies at least one of the requirements for a valid instrument in that it is 
correlated with the religious class membership probabilities. 
 The lower part of Table 18 provides the results of the second stage regressions, 
particularly the estimated coefficients on the residuals from the first stage regressions. A Wald test 
of the joint insignificance of 𝜌𝑡 is not rejected at the ten percent level (𝐻0: 𝜌 = ⋯ = 𝜌8 =  ,
𝜒 =   .95, 𝑝 =  . 4  ). These results support the exogeneity of religious class membership 
probabilities. Thus, we can conclude that the results when assuming exogeneity presented earlier 
are relevant. 
 
Discussion 
Beginning with the research question of how a CEO’s religiosity influences his/her firm’s 
environmental proactivity, we tested the relationship using the survey data from 1,184 firms in the 
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Tokyo metropolitan area. Our findings are twofold. First, we find strong statistical evidence that 
environmental proactivity, measured by the number of firms’ environmental practices, depends on 
the CEO’s religiosity. Second, a participatory decision-making process attenuates the relationships 
between a CEO’s religiosity and the firm’s environmental proactivity. 
From the further investigation of the empirical results, we could draw an interesting 
inference on the impact of religiosity. The nature of a CEO’s religious beliefs would affect the 
impact on the firm’s environmental proactivity. As Tables 13 and 15 show, among the classes 
reflecting respondents’ religious beliefs (i.e., classes 3, 4, 5, and 8), those pertaining to belief in 
afterlife (i.e., classes 4, 5, and 8) have a significantly positive impact on environmental proactivity, 
while this is not the case for class 3, where CEOs indicated “don’t know” related to afterlife. This 
finding implies that a CEO’s belief systems including afterlife could particularly evoke a 
motivation to help others, leading to environmental proactivity. The possible reason is that because 
people who believe in life after death would have higher expectations that their good deeds would 
be rewarded and bad deeds be punished in the next life, even though such deeds are not found in 
this life, a CEO with belief systems including afterlife would exercise his/her power to engage in 
the firm’s practices to improve environmental integrity. This inference is consistent with the recent 
psychological argument about an afterlife, where supernatural monitoring and punishment would 
discourage individuals from violating established moral norms and facilitate human cooperation, 
leading to the unjustifiability of moral transgressions (Atkinson and Bourrat 2011).  
Theoretical, empirical, and practical implications 
We can draw theoretical, empirical, and practical implications from our findings. In terms 
of theory, we clarified managerial religiosity as a micro-foundational mechanism of corporate 
environmental proactivity. Against the backdrop of a call for a serious investigation of religions in 
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management studies (Chan-Serafin et al. 2013, Tracey et al. 2014), this study is the first attempt 
to explicitly clarify the link between a CEO’s religiosity and corporate environmental behaviors. 
Prior studies adopt the upper echelon perspective to examine the link between the nature of 
managers’ personal values and beliefs and types of corporate behaviors beyond the heterogeneity 
among top management teams and board members (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Hambrick 2007). 
Our findings indicate that managerial religiosity evokes morality and leads to coporate 
environmental proactivity. 
A second theoretical implication is that the impact of a CEO’s personal beliefs on his/her 
firm’s behavior depends on his/her decision-making style. Interactions with others, which 
inevitably occur in participative decision making, reduce the impact of individual personal beliefs 
on corporate decisions. This finding provides an insight into the explanation of the mechanisms in 
the micro-foundations of strategic decision-making. Although a CEO’s personal values and beliefs 
would trigger corporate activities, his/her managerial discretion in the decision-making process 
may change their impact, which is consistent with findings in previous studies from the upper 
echelon theory perspective (e.g., Li and Tang 2010). In total, the study surely provides a new 
theoretical perspective on the micro-foundations mechanism of corporate activities for 
environmental integrity.  
Our study also provides several empirical implications. First, by analyzing a relatively 
large sample of SME CEOs (over 1,000) with sophisticated statistical techniques, we find robust 
quantitative evidence that personal religious beliefs surely influence corporate environmental 
proactivity. Previous survey-based studies of SMEs generally have relatively small sample sizes 
(below 100), which makes it difficult to obtain reliable statistical findings. Additionally, previous 
studies of managerial personal values and beliefs rarely controlled for unobserved individual-
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specific characteristics. Using the instrumental variables estimation, we eliminate the possible 
endogeneity bias derived from CEOs’ idiosyncratic characteristics. 
Second, this study corroborates the link between religious beliefs and environmental 
proactivity in field research. A major criticism of existing studies testing the relationships between 
religious beliefs and prosocial behaviors is that most studies rely on laboratory experiments (Galen 
2012). Religious priming in laboratory experiments would not reflect actual religious beliefs 
(Shariff et al. 2016), but this priming psychologically evokes an individual cooperative mindset, 
leading to prosocial behaviors. Our study, however, supplies solid evidence that individual 
religious beliefs are associated with environmental practices. In addition, another controversy in 
previous studies is whether religious people show helping behaviors to only in-group religious 
members or also to non-group members (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, Preston et al. 2010). 
Because the effects of environmental practices are not restricted to members sharing the same 
religious beliefs, but broadly spread in society, including non-group members, religious CEOs may 
be incentivized by their morality to contribute to others. Accordingly, this study’s findings provide 
partial evidence corroborating the “religious prosociality hypothesis,” indicating a new empirical 
way of seeing the relationships between religious beliefs and prosociality. 
Finally, a practical implication for managers is that they need to be cautious about their 
biased decisions based on religiosity. As this study shows, it is possible that managers may, 
consciously or unconsciously, follow their religious beliefs in the decision-making process. 
Decisions based on personal religiosity would exceed a firm’s appropriate level of environmental 
proactivity. Accordingly, to attenuate the effects of personal values and beliefs and avoid biased 
decisions, managers could consult with their subordinates in decision making. 
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Limitations and future directions 
Our findings should be interpreted with caution. First, because we focus on the number 
of environmental practices as environmental proactivity, it remains unclear whether CEO’s 
religious belief systems are associated with actual improvement in firms’ environmental 
performance, which would then contribute to environmental integrity. Therefore, future studies 
should focus on the empirical relationships between a CEO’s religiosity and his/her firm’s 
environmental performance such as energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions. 
Second, because our sample is restricted to Japanese SMEs, the generalizability of the 
findings could be limited due to potential effects from the research context. In terms of country 
effects, several studies report that religious practices and beliefs in Japan are to some extent unique 
and are possibly different from those in Western countries (Krause et al. 2002). Accordingly, our 
findings could be specific to the Japanese religious context. It may therefore be worth examining 
possible cross-country differences in whether and how managerial religiosity affects firms’ 
environmental proactivity. An improved comprehension of the role of CEOs’ religiosity will 
expand our understanding of the micro-foundations of environmental proactivity. 
The third potential effect from the research context would be sample of SMEs. Because 
CEOs in SMEs tend to have high power in decision making based on their large ownership and 
long tenure, they can proceed with their preferred decisions at will. A CEO’s religiosity may not 
play an important role in large firms because his/her power is more restricted, and accordingly 
decision making in today’s large firms tends to be collective rather than individual. Therefore, our 
findings for SMEs may show relatively larger effects of religiosity on environmental proactivity.   
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
This dissertation contributes to the broader literature on the relationship between upper 
echelon characteristics and organizational strategies, by showing the importance of CEOs’ 
expectations and values. Study 1 represents a methodological improvement on CEO career horizon 
literature. Since previous studies have used CEO age as a proxy for CEOs’ career horizon, they 
are unable to distinguish the effect of CEOs’ career horizons from that of their age. We addressed 
this challenge by directly measuring CEOs’ subjective career horizon through a survey and 
demonstrated that previous studies might have underestimated the effect of career horizon. Put 
differently, the impact of the opportunistic behavior of CEOs approaching retirement on long-term 
investment behavior may be even greater than that indicated in existing studies. 
Study 1 also carries important implications for literature on the effects of CEO age on 
their decision-making. Although management research has regarded CEO age as one of the most 
important variables that affect CEOs’ decision-making, there is no consensus on the effects that 
CEO age really have on their decision-making. For example, some studies emphasized the negative 
aspects of the increasing age of CEOs. They suggested that older CEOs find difficulty in 
integrating the information required for decision-making (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Hanmbrick 
&Mason, 1984), and bring attention to their personal benefit, such as their reputation and wealth 
(Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993; Matta & Beamish, 2008). On the other 
hand, other studies focus on the positive aspects, suggesting that the accumulation of firm-specific 
experience and managerial skills increase as CEO gets older (Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003). 
In fact, although almost all firm-level studies include CEO age in their empirical models, few 
studies systematically explore the effects of CEO age on firm outcome (Krause et al. 2014). Our 
methodological improvement in Study 1 opens up the possibility to identify a more accurate effect 
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of CEO age on their decision-making, by regarding the shorter CEOs’ subjective career horizon as 
negative aspects of the increasing age of CEOs. 
Regarding theoretical implications, Study 2 contributes to family firm succession 
literature. Although organizational researchers have indicated that the beliefs of top managers are 
predictors of corporate behavior, few studies have theoretically and empirically identified the 
beliefs that have impact, and the ways in which they impact. To bridge this gap in the literature, 
Study 2 successfully applies the concept of socioemotional wealth to explain the ways in which a 
family CEO’s expectations of managerial succession determine the choice of investment time 
horizons, by varying the periods over which firms evaluate investments. This study also has 
methodological contributions to succession literature, suggesting that family CEOs have different 
expectations of managerial succession, despite having children. For example, children might 
choose their own jobs and be reluctant to take over the position of CEO if their own jobs are more 
profitable. Since the presence of children is a necessary, but never a sufficient condition for family 
managerial succession, measuring the CEOs’ expectations of managerial succession provides more 
reliable estimation results than the number of children, which has been used in succession literature. 
The results of Study 2 indicate that even if a CEO does not have a successor, he/she would 
carry out long-term investment in the expectation that successor will be found. This result has 
important policy implications for SME development. Nowadays, business succession issues are 
very urgent for Japanese SMEs because of a declining population. Moreover, CEOs of SMEs are 
facing the difficulty of succession, since their children are often not interested in taking over their 
business. Under these circumstances, by providing information about potential successors to aging 
CEOs who are not ready to transfer their business, government agencies can not only save SMEs 
from involuntary termination as a result of succession failure, but also facilitate their long-term 
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investments. 
Study 3 clarified managerial religiosity as a micro-foundational mechanism of corporate 
environmental proactivity. Against the backdrop of a call for a serious investigation of religions in 
management studies (Chan-Serafin et al., 2013; Tracey et al., 2014), this study is the first attempt 
to explicitly clarify the link between a CEO’s religiosity, and corporate environmental behaviors. 
Prior studies adopt the upper echelon perspective to examine the link between the nature of 
managers’ personal values and beliefs, and types of corporate behaviors beyond the heterogeneity 
among top management teams and board members (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). 
Our findings indicate that managerial religiosity evokes morality and leads to corporate 
environmental proactivity.  
Care must be taken in interpreting the results of this dissertation. First of all, several 
limitations exist with regard to data collection. First, each study in this dissertation is based on 
analysis using cross-sectional data. We control for possible endogeneity bias due to CEOs’ 
idiosyncratic characteristics by using the instrumental variables method in each study, but there is 
still a possibility that reverse causality or other sources of endogeneity exist, especially in Study 
1.  
Our results may also suffer from the common method bias. This problem is caused either 
by using a common source to obtain information on both, the dependent and independent variables, 
or by specific characteristics of a questionnaire that strengthen respondents' tendency to answer 
the survey questions in a distorted way (Fuller et al., 2016; Jakobsen & Jensen, 2012). However, 
because common method bias is mostly related to perceptual measures, the fact-based variables 
used in our questionnaire, such as internationalization, R&D implement, new product development, 
and environmental behaviors, are unlikely to be affected by such problems. Moreover, we assured 
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the respondents that their responses are completely anonymous, thereby mitigating the probability 
of social desirability bias in their answers (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Therefore, common method 
bias is unlikely to be a challenge for the three studies in this dissertation. 
Furthermore, partly because we needed to obtain a direct response from the CEO, the data 
of this dissertation are drawn from a survey of Japanese SMEs. It thus remains an open question 
as to how much of what we empirically found can be generalized to large firms, and how much of 
it is limited to Japan. A CEO’s subjective factors may not play an important role in large firms, 
because his/her powers are more restricted, and accordingly, decision-making in today’s large 
firms tends to be collective rather than individual. On the other hand, because CEOs of SMEs tend 
to have significant powers in decision-making based on their large ownership and long tenure, they 
can proceed with their preferred decisions at will. Therefore, our findings for SMEs may show 
relatively larger effects of CEOs’ subjective factors on firm behaviors. 
Despite these limitations, it is noteworthy that this dissertation provides compelling 
evidence that CEOs’ subjective factors have significant impacts on their firms’ behaviors. In future 
research, including the organizational context may be useful to better assess the association 
between CEOs’ subjective factors and firm behaviors. For example, although in Study 3, we found 
that CEOs’ decision-making style moderates the relationship between their religiosity and 
corporate environmental proactivity, we did not include such an organizational context in Studies 
1 and 2 due to the limitations of the data. Future research should test the moderating effects of the 
organizational context on the relationship between CEOs’ subjective factors and firm behaviors in 
a more sophisticated way. 
Another possible research avenue is to address the homogeneity/heterogeneity of 
religious beliefs among top executives. As Bromiley and Rau (2016) argue, top management teams 
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(TMTs) are one of the sources of moderating effects on the relationship between CEOs’ values and 
strategic decision-making. In our context, this argument suggests that CEOs derive more support 
from members of their boards if CEOs’ religious views are similar with those TMT members, than 
if not. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to examine whether, and to what extent the 
homogeneity/heterogeneity of religious beliefs among top executives influences the role of the 
expectations of managerial succession on long-term investment. 
This dissertation extends the methodological repertoire of management research and 
suggests some additional research avenues for literature on the importance of CEOs’ expectations 
and values. We hope that others will use these methodologies to further advance research on the 
role of executives’ values and expectations. 
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Conclusion 
I study the effects of CEOs’ subjective factors on firm behaviors to address critical issues 
in our understanding of firm behavior. Notwithstanding the importance of CEOs’ subjective factors, 
the nascent literature provides limited insights into the relationship between these factors and its 
organizational-level effects. This dissertation focuses on expectations of career horizon, 
uncertainty of managerial succession, and religiosity as determinants of firm behavior. Altogether, 
the results provide consistent evidence in favor of my propositions and raise useful implications 
for scholars and managers. 
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